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Abstract
This Thesis presents three studies on financial reporting and disclosure. In chapter one we study if
quarterly earnings guidance causes managerial short-termism, in the form of real earnings management.
Next, in chapter two we study the links between conditional conservatism and voluntary disclosure of
management private information. Finally, in chapter three we study how firms respond to lower levels
of disclosure from rivals.
Esta Tesis presenta tres estudios sobre la informacio´n financiera suministrada en los estados conta-
bles y la revelacio´n voluntaria de informacio´n de la firma. En el primer cap´ıtulo se estudia el efecto de
emitir previsiones trimestrales de ganancias en la predisposicio´n de los gerentes a concenrtarse exce-
sivamente en las ganacias de corto plazo, induciendo potencialmente manipulacio´n en las operaciones
de la firma. En el segundo cap´ıtulo se estudia la relacio´n entre el cosnervadurismo condicional y la
decisio´n de los gerentes de revelar informacio´n privada de la firma voluntariamente. Finalmente, el
tercer cap´ıtulo estudia la respuesta de las firmas cuando sus competidores emiten menos informacio´n
al mercado.
2
Introduction
Accounting information (i.e. mandatory financial reports) is only a subset of the information available
to investors, and firms usually have more information than what is disclosed in its financial reports.
Most likely, this information is ‘good news’ due to the properties embedded into accounting frame-
works (i.e. stringent verification requirement for the recognition of good news). One way for managers
to convey this ‘good news’ to the market is trough voluntary disclosure (e.g earnings forecasts), but
managers might act strategically using voluntary disclosure to serve their own purposes (e.g. maximize
compensation). Consequently, ‘non-accounting’ information signals might be incrementally beneficial
to investors depending on its properties and the properties of the accounting information, leading
potentially to different impacts on firms characteristics (e.g. cost of capital, stock performance, firm
value). On the other hand, managerial incentives underlying voluntary disclosure might lead to differ-
ent consequences (e.g. managerial myopia) casting doubt on the benefits of voluntary disclosure (i.e.
short-term forecasts), and whether is a good practice or not. Finally, information released by one firm
might have consequences on other firms stock price if they face the same economic conditions or have
similar earnings determinants (i.e. information-transfers). Firms might voluntary disclose information
to intervene in the information-transfer process when disclosure by its peers has negative consequences.
However, the decision to voluntary disclose their private information will depend on a rational assess-
ment of the trade-offs between the costs (e.g. litigation risks, disclosure costs, proprietary costs) and
benefits (e.g. increasing stock prices) associated with the disclosure.
I study the aforementioned issues in this Doctoral Thesis. In chapter one, The Effect of Quar-
terly Earnings Guidance on Real Earnings Management (with Beatriz Garc´ıa Osma and
Encarna Guillamo´n Saor´ın), we study the relationship between short-term earnings guidance and real
earnings management. Some regulators, practitioners and investors claim for the discontinuation of
short-term guidance arguing that this practice fosters short-termism. However, empirical research
on the matter finds mixed evidence. We argue that this mixed evidence found by previous papers is
driven by two factors. First, previous literature studying the relation between short-term guidance and
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short-termism ignores the underlying motives for issuing guidance (i.e. treat all guidance as equal).
Second, previous papers fail to control adequately for endogeneity. These two factors might reduce the
power of the tests and introduce a correlated omitted-variables problem making the results difficult
to interpret. To mitigate these concerns we exploit exogenous decreases in analyst coverage due to
brokerage closure as a shock to firms information environment. Brokerage decisions to close research
operations are related with industry trends, regulatory changes, and strategic reasons not related with
fundamentals of the companies they cover. Therefore, coverage terminations related with brokerage
closure are likely to be exogenous to firms fundamentals. We use this setting to identify instances in
which guidance is made in response to an exogenous shock to firms’ information environment. In this
way we separate informative from strategic earnings guidance and test if quarterly earnings guidance
causes managerial short-termism, in the form of real earnings management. Our results indicate that
managers issuing informative guidance, engage in less real earnings manipulations relative to managers
issuing non-informative or strategic guidance. We interpret this result as informative guidance alle-
viating short-termism. This is consistent with the expectation alignment hypothesis of Ajinkya and
Gift (1984) where guidance helps to reduce information asymmetries and reduce the need of managers
to engage in real earnings management to meet earnings targets. In addition, our results are also
consistent with non-informative guidance increasing market pressures to meet earnings targets and
leading to higher levels of real earnings management. These results reconcile mixed evidence found
by previous literature (i.e. strategic guidance fosters short-termism while informative guidance allevi-
ates short-termism) and suggest that whilst some guidance may indeed be associated with suboptimal
managerial decision-making, not all guidance has this negative consequence.
In chapter two, Conditional Conservatism and Management Earnings Forecasts (with
Beatriz Garc´ıa Osma). We study whether conditional conservatism allows ‘soft’ sources of information
to flourish. Conservatism may attain this benefit because 1) it acts as a governance mechanism that
reduces managerial incentives and ability to manipulate accounting earnings, and 2) it provides a
benchmark for current performance that enables other sources of information to produce credible
information. We show that more conditionally conservative firms issue more (less) good (bad) news
earnings forecasts, and that good news forecasts are associated with greater market reactions (i.e
analyst revisions and cumulative abnormal returns) for conditionally conservative firms, signaling
greater credibility of disclosure. This is consistent with conditional conservatism acting as a mechanism
that lends credibility ex-ante to voluntary disclosure by providing a “hard” reporting benchmark
that allows outsiders to better evaluate the credibility of management forecasts. The results are
robust to considering an exogenous shock to conditional conservatism (i.e. implementation of SFAS
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142). We also verify that the association between conditional conservatism and good news earnings
forecasts is moderated as theory would predict. We find a stronger (weaker) association when the
firms face high (low) information asymmetries, and when managers have less (more) career concerns.
Additionally, we show that the association of conditional conservatism and market reactions to good
news earnings forecasts is stronger during “crisis of trust” periods, when signals of credibility are
more valuable. We contribute to the conservatism literature by presenting empirical evidence on the
benefits of conditional conservatism for firms’ information environment. We show that conditional
conservatism is a mechanism by which managers can commit to truthfully disclose earnings forecasts.
In addition, we contribute to the debate on whether financial reporting and voluntary disclosure
are complements or substitutes, by showing that conditional conservatism acts as a complement for
timely voluntary disclosure of good news and a substitute for timely disclosure of losses. By providing
a “hard” reporting benchmark, conditional conservatism enhances the information value of good news
earnings forecasts.
In chapter three, Firms Reaction to Peers Non-Disclosure (with Beatriz Garc´ıa Osma),
we study how firms respond to lower levels of disclosure from rivals. Prior literature suggests that
managers might voluntarily disclose private information to counteract negative information transfers
from rivals disclosure. We exploit the staggered adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD)
by U.S. state courts, as an exogenous shock to the information environment of peer firms in non-IDD
states. We find that peer firms in non-IDD states are less likely to conceal customer identity after
IDD adoption. Our results are stronger when industry leaders are headquartered in IDD adopting
states, and for firms in industries facing strategic complements interactions and low product market
flexibility.
This Thesis has benefited from financial assistance from the Spanish Ministry of Innovation and
Science (ECO2013-48328, ECO2016- 77579), CAM (H2015/HUM-3353), FEDER (UNC315-EE-3636),
Fundacio´n Ramo´n Areces and the International Mobility Program, UC3M. All errors are mine.
5
Chapter 1
The Effect of Quarterly Earnings
Management on Real Earnings
Managements
1.1 Introduction
We study if firms that issue quarterly earnings guidance engage in greater real earnings management.
Providing short-term forward-looking earnings forecasts, commonly referred to as “earnings guidance,”
is a widespread practice among US firms. However, practitioners and regulators have increasingly op-
posed such guidance, raising concerns that short-term earnings guidance may lead to: (1) an inefficient
consumption of managerial attention, as managers dedicate time to produce and communicate their
forecasts to the market instead of focusing on the firm’s long-term growth objectives; (2) increased
earnings management to meet those forecasts; and (3) an increased likelihood of attracting investors
with a short-term focus. These concerns have led to calls for the discontinuation of guidance to avoid
short-termism and myopic behavior.1
Anecdotal evidence suggests that several companies have followed this recommendation and an-
nounced their decision to stop providing guidance. For example, The Coca-Cola Company announced
on December 13th 2002 the decision to stop providing earnings guidance in the future. Gary Fayard,
CFO of the company at that time, stated that “it will allow the company to continue to focus on
1As representative examples, the consulting firm McKinsey suggests that “companies that currently provide quarterly
earnings guidance should shift their focus away from short term performance and toward the drivers of long-term
company health” (Hsieh et al., 2006), the CFA Institute panel of experts recommends to “end the practice of providing
quarterly earnings guidance”(Krehmeyer et al., 2006), and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce encourages public companies
to “eliminate the practice of providing quarterly earnings guidance” (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2007)
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long-term growth objectives, which is good for our shareholders and not managed in the short-term
quarter-to-quarter” (2002-Q3 Earnings Conference Call).
Against this backdrop, a natural question that arises is whether short-term guidance generates
incentives for real earnings management. Real earnings management refers to operating, investing and
financing decisions taken with the ultimate objective of reporting earnings numbers that misrepresent
true performance (Schipper, 1989; Roychowdhury, 2006). If earnings guidance creates pressures to
take sub-optimal decisions that ensure reported earnings meet management earnings forecasts, it
logically follows that guidance may create incentives for real earnings management. In line with this
view, the survey evidence in Graham et al. (2005) suggest that managers do engage in real earnings
management to meet their own earnings forecasts. However, guidance is not without benefits,2 and
prior literature offers mixed views and conflicting evidence on the effects of guidance on real business
decisions. Focusing on mandatory reporting, Gigler et al. (2014) analytically demonstrate that frequent
reporting of results affects firms’ project selection strategies. Specifically, they show that the price
pressure created by high reporting frequency induces managerial myopia. Looking more directly at
voluntary reporting of results, Cheng et al. (2007a) show that quarterly earnings guidance frequency
is associated with research and development (R&D) underinvestment, consistent with the arguments
in Gigler et al. (2014). In contrast to these results, Houston et al. (2010) find no evidence of firms
having greater investment in capital expenditure and R&D after stopping guidance, relative to firms
that continue issuing guidance.
We expect that this lack of conclusive findings may be explained by two factors. First, prior studies
usually consider all earnings guidance as homogeneous. This ignores managerial motivations. Kim
and Park (2012) argue that guidance may be associated with either a) expectation management (i.e.,
issued with the purpose of meeting or beating market expectations), or b) communication incentives
(i.e., issued to convey reliable information to the market), highlighting the importance of considering
the particular managerial incentives underlying the guidance issued. Second, given that the decision
to issue guidance is voluntary, endogeneity problems can arise as a consequence of self-selection or
omitted-variable bias.3
In this paper, we revisit the question of whether short-term guidance creates incentives for sub-
optimal decision making and contribute to prior research by focusing on its effects on real earnings
management. In doing so, we build on prior work to address the two identified concerns as follows.
First, we acknowledge the role of managerial incentives and identify guidance as either informative or
2For example, managerial forecasting aids to reduce information asymmetries (Healy and Palepu, 2001).
3Treating all guidance as equal and not controlling adequately for endogeneity may lead to power test reductions and
correlated omitted-variables problems (Li et al., 2011a, 2012, 2016)
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strategic.4 We argue that only strategic guidance creates managerial pressure to meet self-imposed
targets, leading to real earnings management. Guidance is strategic when managers attempt to ma-
nipulate expectations opportunistically and with no informative motive, for example, to “hype” stock
prices around equity offerings (Lang and Lundholm, 2000), or to profitable trade in their firm’s shares
(Noe, 1999; Cheng et al., 2007a). In contrast, guidance is informative when it reduces information
asymmetry (Ajinkya and Gift, 1984; Dutta and Gigler, 2002).
Second, we identify as informative those management earnings forecasts issued in response to an ex-
ogenous decrease in analyst coverage arising from brokerage house downsize (Yu, 2008; Anantharaman
and Zhang, 2011). This design alleviates endogeneity concerns and allows us to draw causal inferences.
Analyst coverage is valuable for managers because it drives investor attention and liquidity, therefore
managers have incentives to issue guidance to attract or retain coverage (Rana, 2008). Prior literature
finds evidence that exogenous decreases in analyst coverage deteriorate firms’ information environment
and that managers respond by increasing voluntary disclosure (Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2007; Hong and
Kacperczyk, 2010; Balakrishnan et al., 2014).
By focusing on real earnings management we can account for a number of managerial sub-optimal
operating and investment decisions. Existing research on the association between guidance and short-
termism focuses mainly on R&D expenses (Cheng et al., 2007a; Houston et al., 2010) or accruals
earnings management (Call et al., 2014). In contrast, real earnings management proxies capture
aggregated managerial short-termism. This permits providing novel evidence on the strategies followed
by managers who issue short-term guidance. Indeed, real activities manipulations better captures
managerial short-termism since it has direct effects on firms’ future cash flows, which potentially
conveys higher long-term costs on the company (Khurana et al., 2017).
We test our prediction that strategic (informative) guidance leads to greater (lower) real earnings
management on a large sample of US publicly listed firms over the period 2003-2013. We exclude all
firms that might be subject to specific institutional and regulatory constraints. We follow Roychowd-
hury (2006) and Zang (2012) to measure real earnings management and use the I/B/E/S Guidance
database to identify firms issuing quarterly earnings guidance. We include all guidance made between
0 and 90 days before the quarter-end. Doing this ensures that we focus in short-term quarterly fore-
casts and avoid including stale forecasts and earnings pre-announcements in the sample. As previously
described, we follow a modified Yu (2008) procedure as in Anantharaman and Zhang (2011) to identify
informative guidance.
4Another possible incentive to issue guidance is to comply with insider trading rules, SEC rule 10b-5 prohibit managers
from trading using material private information (Li et al., 2011a).
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Our tests provide the following key findings. We find that strategic guidance leads to greater real
earnings management. In contrast, we find evidence that informative guidance is negatively associated
with real earnings management. We interpret these results as indicating that strategic guidance
increases short-termism, i.e., with strategic guidance increasing market pressures to meet earnings
targets and leading managers to take real decisions that facilitate reporting earnings that allow them
to meet and beat their own estimates. Second, the results obtained for informative guidance are
consistent with the expectation alignment hypothesis of Ajinkya and Gift (1984). They indicate that
a significant number of managers issue guidance that is informative and helps to reduce information
asymmetry, which, in turn, reduces managerial incentives to engage in real earnings management to
meet their earnings forecasts.
These results hold for different model specifications. They are robust to the inclusion of time- and
firm- fixed effects and to clustering standard errors by firm. Results are also robust to different shock
definitions and control samples.
We conduct several additional analyses to support our main results. First, we consider samples with
different degrees of external monitoring. We expect that firms with lower levels of external monitoring
(as measured by lower levels of analyst coverage and firms not audited by big-four audit companies) to
be more prone to manage earnings. Second, we identify samples with different likelihoods of managing
earnings, either because firms are suspect of manipulation or because firms can manage real earnings
to a greater extent. Our main results hold across these different settings. As a final analysis, we divide
our sample between low and high ability managers. We find that low ability managers engage in more
real earnings management when they issue non-informative guidance, whereas the opposite is true for
high ability managers. We do not find evidence that firms that stop issuing guidance change their
real earnings management practices, consistent with prior research. Overall, the findings from these
analyses confirm our main results that only strategic guidance creates managerial short-termism.
We make a number of contributions to prior literature. In particular, we contribute to the voluntary
disclosure literature by presenting additional evidence on the relation between earnings guidance and
earnings management. We extend this literature by estimating the effects of guidance on real earnings
management, which has not been studied in prior literature. In doing so, we contribute to the work of
Call et al. (2014), who studies the effects of short-term guidance on accruals earnings management. Our
work is probably closest to that of Houston et al. (2010) and Cheng et al. (2007a), who study whether
short-term earnings guidance leads to sub-optimal R&D investment and provide mixed evidence. We
add to their work by considering managerial incentives to issue guidance and addressing endogeneity
concerns. This permits providing novel evidence that sheds light and reconciles the mixed findings
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reported in prior work. Our study also contributes to the debate of whether issuing guidance fosters
short-termism. We show that guidance can be informative and lead to optimal decision making (i.e.,
lower real earnings management). By identifying informative from strategic guidance we establish in
which cases guidance is more likely to lead managers to engage in myopic behavior.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 revises the relevant literature and
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 contains the methodology. Section 4 describes the sample and
results. Finally, Section 5 discusses the additional analyses.
1.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
1.2.1 Real earnings management in response to pressures to meet earnings targets
The survey evidence in Graham et al. (2005) indicates that managers are willing to take real actions,
such as postponing a new investment opportunity or reducing discretionary expending in R&D, to meet
short-term earnings targets. Importantly, prior work suggests that earnings pressures originate from
the firm itself as well as from markets. For example, Dichev et al. (2013) show that an overwhelming
majority of surveyed CFOs (91.02%) agree that firms report earnings that misrepresent economic
performance “because there is inside pressure to hit earnings benchmarks” (p.26). Prior empirical
work validates this survey evidence and shows that managers engage in real earnings management
to meet or beat earnings targets. For example, Roychowdhury (2006) finds that firms suspect of
managing earnings, as defined by reporting earnings close to the zero thresholds, present unusually
low discretionary expenditures and unusually high production costs. Roychowdhury interprets this
result as evidence of firms managing real activities to meet earnings targets. Similarly, Gunny (2010)
reports that firms just meeting earnings targets exhibit abnormally low R&D and SG&A expenses,
and abnormally high production costs.
The prior empirical literature generally suggests real activities management is associated with poor
future firm performance, although the evidence is somewhat mixed. Bhojraj et al. (2009) document
that firms beating short-term earnings targets with low earnings quality (i.e. higher accruals and/or
lower discretionary expenditures) underperform in the long-term relative to firms missing the targets
with high earnings quality. In particular, low quality beaters underperform high quality missers over a
3-years period by more than 19% cumulative abnormal returns. The results in Gunny (2010) indicate
that firms missing earnings benchmarks with no sign of real activities management perform better in
the long term relative to firms beating or just missing zero and last year’s earnings with real activities
management. However, firms just meeting earnings benchmarks with real activities management have
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significantly higher future returns than firms not engaging in real activities management, which Gunny
(2010) interprets real actions being a signal of future performance (and not opportunistic). More
recently, Khurana et al. (2017) study real earnings smoothing and suggest that it destroys shareholder
value in that it increases stock price crash risk.
Thus, the main body of research in this area suggests that real earnings management may lead
to firm value destruction in the long-term and negative consequences for the firm. However, despite
the negative effects potentially associated with real earnings management, managers must trade off
many costs and benefits, both in the long- and in the short-term, and they may choose to manage
earnings through real actions because, for example, missing earnings benchmarks may trigger negative
price reactions, which may, in the short-term, be more costly for them (Matsumoto, 2002; Skinner and
Sloan, 2002).
1.2.2 Frequent earnings guidance and managerial short-termism
While prior research does not directly address the question of whether real earnings management
is associated with earnings guidance, a number of empirical and theoretical papers investigate the
closely related issues of whether earnings pressures and earnings guidance creates short-termism. In
the context of mandatory reporting, Gigler et al. (2014) argue that there is a trade-off between the
costs and benefits of frequent reporting that affects firms’ project selection. On the one hand, when
there is information asymmetry between the market and firm’s managers, higher reporting frequency
enables prices to discipline managerial choices. On the other hand, more frequent reporting results in
price pressures that induce managers to be myopic in choosing firm’s investments.
Looking at earnings guidance, Cheng et al. (2007a) argue that frequent guidance exacerbates
investors’ and managers’ focus on short-term earnings, leading to managerial myopic behavior, inde-
pendent of the initial motive for issuing guidance. This is consistent with Gigler et al. (2014) idea that
frequent reporting generates price pressures. In their study, Cheng et al. (2007a) examine differences
in R&D investment between dedicated and occasional guiders and find that dedicated guiders invest
less in R&D, meet or beat analysts’ expectations more frequently and have lower long-term earnings
growth rates relative to occasional guiders. Cheng et al. (2007a) consider these results as evidence of
a positive relation between guidance and short-termism.5
However, when Houston et al. (2010) study whether the decision to stop issuing guidance is as-
sociated with increases in R&D and capital expenditures, they report contrarian evidence. This is
5Other papers presenting evidence and arguments supporting that earnings guidance intensifies managerial myopia
include: Kasznik (1999), Degeorge et al. (1999), Bartov et al. (2002), Richardson et al. (2004), Burgstahler and Eames
(2006), Acito (2011), and Koch et al. (2012).
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surprising, because if it is guidance that fosters short-termism, stopping guidance should reduce man-
agerial myopic behavior. Anecdotal evidence from managerial discussions of their decisions to stop
guidance is in line with this view, as they commonly argue that stopping guidance should allow them
to focus their efforts on long-term growth and to avoid short-term myopic behavior. (See Appendix A
for anecdotal evidence on managerial explanations of firms’ decisions to stop issuing guidance.) The
results in Houston et al. (2010) suggest that after guidance terminates, the firm information environ-
ment deteriorates, mainly due to reduced analysts’ coverage.6 While this loss in coverage would likely
reduce external pressures to meet earnings targets, it also potentially increases information asymmetry.
1.2.3 Earnings guidance and real earnings management
We build on the previously reviewed literature and argue that differences in the underlying incentives
of managers issuing guidance may partly explain the aforementioned lack of clear evidence found in
prior research, which usually considers all guidance as homogeneous.7 These differences, in turn, are
predicted to explain the extent to which managers use real earnings management to attempt to meet
their own forecasts.
We base our expectations on the work of Kim and Park (2012), who argue that the formulation
of guidance is associated with underlying managerial incentives, which they identify as being either
associated with ‘expectation management’ or with ‘communication incentives.’ Li et al. (2011a, 2012,
2016) also recognize that guidance may be issued for different reasons and claim that treating all
guidance as equal reduces the power of tests and introduces correlated omitted-variables concerns.
In particular, we classify earnings guidance as either strategic or informative. Following Kim and
Park (2012), guidance is considered strategic if managers issue forecasts in an attempt to manage
expectations. The ultimate aim may be to lower expectations, for example, to reduce litigation risk
(Skinner, 1994; Kasznik and Lev, 1995) or to avoid missing earnings benchmarks (Matsumoto, 2002).
Managers can also issue strategic guidance to manage expectations upwards to “hype” the stock
price around equity offerings (Lang and Lundholm, 2000), or to trade opportunistically in their own
firm’s shares (Noe, 1999; Cheng et al., 2007a). In contrast, guidance is informative if it aims to
reduce information asymmetries, thereby allowing managers to align market earnings expectations
with their own (Ajinkya and Gift, 1984; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Dutta and Gigler, 2002), and to
reduce information risks (Graham et al., 2005).
As mentioned above, this separation between informative and strategic guidance is predicted to
6Other papers presenting empirical evidence supporting the idea that guidance alleviates short-termism are Chen
et al. (2011) and Call et al. (2014).
7See Hirst et al. (2008) for a review of the literature on management earnings forecasts.
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explain the extent to which short-term earnings guidance leads to real earnings management. In
particular, firms issuing informative guidance are expected to be primarily concerned with reducing
information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders. For managers in these firms, target beating
would either not be a concern, or it would be a second order concern relative to the concern of
reducing information asymmetry. Given this, and also, that real earnings management deteriorates
the information environment and obfuscates the earnings signal (Kothari et al., 2016; Khurana et al.,
2017), managers issuing informative guidance are predicted to have limited incentives for real earnings
management. Further, because informative guidance is intended to fill in the information gaps present
in the market and to improve the firm information environment (Balakrishnan et al., 2014), informative
guidance is likely to result in a reduced need to rely on earnings management to meet relevant earnings
benchmarks.
Prior research is consistent with the above ideas that not all managers are equally concerned with
earnings targets (Graham et al., 2005; Dichev et al., 2013), and also, that markets ‘see through’ target
beating behavior and apply different penalties and rewards to target missers and beaters, depending
on the levels of real earnings management underlying their target beating strategies (Bhojraj et al.,
2009; Garc´ıa Osma and Young, 2009).
In contrast, firms issuing strategic guidance are expected to be primarily concerned with meeting
earnings targets. Managers in these firms are predicted to prioritize expectations management and to
take additional measures (such as engaging in real earnings management practices or issuing additional
earnings guidance) to ensure their forecasts are met. Perversely, in these firms, issuing a misleading
earnings target represents a commitment to subsequently meet it, and thus, guidance serves to increase
the internal and external (market) pressures faced by managers to meet their own forecasts (Cheng
et al., 2007a). It is also likely that strategic guidance, if assessed to not be informative, may create
greater uncertainty among analysts, potentially moving analysts’ consensus forecast further away
from managerial targets, after the forecast is issued. Therefore, managers issuing strategic guidance
are likely to be caught in a game of expectation management that may lead them to engage in real
earnings management.
To summarize, when managers issue informative guidance, we expect them to engage in less real
earnings management relative to managers issuing non-informative or strategic guidance. This leads
us to our main hypothesis:
H1: Real earnings management is greater (lower) in firms issuing strategic (informative)
short-term earnings guidance.
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1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Real Earnings Management Measure
We construct our proxy for real earnings management (REM) following Roychowdhury (2006) and
Zang (2012). These studies use deviations from normal levels of discretionary expenditures and pro-
duction costs to detect overproduction and opportunistic cuts in discretionary expenditures. Following
Zang (2012), we use abnormal production costs minus abnormal discretionary expenditures as an ag-
gregate measure of real earnings management.8
To construct our proxy, we first estimate the following models within each fiscal year and two digits
SIC industry, using quarterly data:
PCi,t
Ai,t−4
=α0 + α1(
1
Ai,t−4
) + α2Q1i,t + α3Q2i,t + α4Q3i,t + α5Q4i,t
+ α6(
∆Si,t
Ai,t−4
) + α7(
∆Si,t−4
Ai,t−4
) + i,t
(1.1)
DEi,t
Ai,t−4
=α0 + α1(
1
Ai,t−4
) + α2Q1i,t + α3Q2i,t + α4Q3i,t + α5Q4i,t
+ α6(
∆Si,t
Ai,t−4
) + i,t
(1.2)
where subscript i indexes firms and t indexes calendar quarters. Production costs (PCi,t) are
defined as the change in inventory from quarter t−4 to t plus the cost of goods sold in quarter t, At−4
is the amount of total assets in quarter t − 4, St are sales in quarter t. Discretionary expenditures
(DEi,t) are defined as the sum of advertising, R&D and SG&A expenditures in quarter t. Following
Collins et al. (2014) we include fiscal quarter dummies Q1i,t to Q4i,t to capture fiscal quarter effects
and calculates changes in sales relatives to the same quarter of the previous year, to avoid seasonality
effects. We require at least 15 observations to perform each estimation. Abnormal levels of production
costs (AB PCi,t) and abnormal discretionary expenditures (AB DEi,t) are measured as the residuals
of models (1) and (2) respectively. Higher values of AB PCi,t indicate more REM while higher values
of AB DEi,t indicate lower REM. Therefore, we define our proxy for REM as the sum of AB PCi,t
and negative AB DEi,t. Thus, positive (negative) values of REM indicate income-increasing (income-
decreasing) earnings management. Appendix B provides further details on the estimation of our these
8Roychowdhury (2006) also creates a measure for abnormal cash flows. We do not consider it because it is affected
in opposite directions by real activities manipulations and the overall effect might be ambiguous (Roychowdhury, 2006;
Zang, 2012).
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proxies.
1.3.2 Identification Strategy
A major concern in studying the effects of guidance on short-termism is the fact that the decision
to issue guidance is likely endogenous. The reasons that lead managers to voluntary disclose more
information might be related with their decision to manage real earnings. This creates a potential
correlated omitted-variable problem, leading to biased and inconsistent OLS estimators. Another
related issue is the fact that, as we have discussed in detail in our hypothesis development section, not
all guidance is equal. Treating all guidance as equal may strengthen endogeneity problems.
To mitigate these concerns, we exploit exogenous decreases in analyst coverage due to brokerage
closure as a shock to the firm information environment.9 Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) argue that
brokerage decisions to close research operations are related with industry trends, regulatory changes,
and strategic reasons not related with fundamentals of the companies they cover. Therefore, coverage
terminations related with brokerage closure are likely to be exogenous to firms’ fundamentals. Using
a difference-in-difference approach, Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) show that exogenous terminations
lead to an increase in treated firms’ information asymmetry. Firms that experience this exogenous
decrease in analyst coverage show an increase in bid-ask spreads, higher values of the Amihud illiquidity
measure, larger number of missing-return days, more volatile returns around earnings announcements,
and greater earnings surprises relative to control firms.
Importantly, prior research shows that this shock to analyst coverage triggers managerial infor-
mative guidance. Anantharaman and Zhang (2011) find that firms suffering an exogenous shock to
analyst coverage react by increasing guidance, and show evidence of subsequent increases in analyst
coverage after the guidance response. This is consistent with exogenous decreases in analyst coverage
being more likely to revert, relative to endogenous decreases (i.e., those related with firm performance).
In the same vein, the evidence in Balakrishnan et al. (2014) confirms that managers respond to exoge-
nous coverage shocks by increasing voluntary disclosure, and establish a positive causal link between
guidance and liquidity. Taken together, these results are consistent with the idea that managers value
analyst coverage, and with guidance being an effective managerial tool to shape the firm information
environment.
We build on this prior evidence and identify as informative those management forecasts made
in response to an exogenous reduction in analyst coverage. To measure exogenous shocks to analyst
9An early paper using this identification strategy is Yu (2008). Other papers exploiting the same idea are: Hong and
Kacperczyk (2010); Anantharaman and Zhang (2011); Irani and Oesch (2013); Balakrishnan et al. (2014); Chen et al.
(2015).
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coverage, we follow a modified Yu (2008) procedure as in Anantharaman and Zhang (2011). According
to Yu (2008), the probability that a particular broker continues to cover a firm after a reduction of its
size gives the expected coverage for the firm of that broker. By aggregating over all the brokers covering
the firm we obtain the expected number of analysts covering it. Expected coverage is not affected by
the endogeneity concerns that affect realized coverage because it is a measure of the tendency to keep
the coverage before a broker decides which firm to keep (Yu, 2008). An important assumption we have
to make to obtain the expected coverage for a particular firm in a given quarter is that brokerage firms
assign the same amount of resources to covering a given firm i in quarter t. Then, if firm i is covered
by j brokers in quarter t−1, following Anantharaman and Zhang (2011) the expected coverage of firm
i from broker j in quarter t (ECi,j ,t) is:
ECi,j,t = min{ Broker Sizej,t
Broker Sizej,t−1
∗ Coveragei,j,t−1, 1} (1.3)
where Broker Sizej,t is the number of analysts working for broker j in quarter t, and Coveragei,j,t−1is
the number of analysts in broker j covering firm i in quarter t − 1. ECi,j,t has a minimum value of
1, because data shows that within brokers each stock is covered only by one analyst. As a result,
expected coverage of firm i in quarter t (ECi,t) is:
ECi,t =
∑
j
ECi,j,t (1.4)
starting from (4), we obtain changes in analyst coverage as the difference in the number of analyst
following firm i after quarterly earnings announcement (COVi,t) between period t and t+1. For those
firms with a decrease in coverage, an exogenous decrease (EXO Chgi,t) is given by the difference
between ECi,t and COVi,t (see Figure 1).
1.3.3 Research Design
To test the relation between guidance and real earnings management, we estimate the following simple
panel data model:
REMi,t =α+ β1GUIDEi,t + β2SHOCKi,t + β3GUIDEi,tSHOCKi,t
+
12∑
k=1
θkControlsi,t−4 + TimeFE + FirmFE + i,t
(1.5)
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where GUIDE is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm issues guidance in a particular quarter
and zero otherwise. We exclude all guidance made more than 90 days before the quarter-end, because
we want to focus in short-term quarterly forecasts and avoid including stale forecasts in our sample.
We also exclude all quarterly forecasts made after the quarter-end because these forecasts are likely
to be earnings pre-announcements. SHOCK is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm suffers
an exogenous shock to analyst coverage in quarter t, it takes value one when EXO Chgi,t is negative
and zero otherwise.
Under H1, we expect β1 to be positive and β3 to be negative. Accordingly, if the exogenous decrease
in analyst coverage deteriorates the firm information environment β2 should be positive. Time- and
firm- fixed-effects are included to control for time-trends or shocks that affect all firms in the sample
and unobservable firm-specific time-invariant characteristics respectively.
We follow prior literature to control for other determinants of real earnings management. We
control for past discretionary accruals (D ACC) as a proxy for constraints in future earnings manage-
ment (Koch et al., 2012), analyst coverage (AF ) as a proxy for the role of analyst as external monitors
(Healy and Palepu, 2001; Yu, 2008), institutional ownership (INST ) because more sophisticated in-
vestors might understand long-term value implications of managerial actions (monitoring role) and
discourage real activities manipulations (Bushee, 1998; Roychowdhury, 2006), leverage (LEV ) as a
proxy for the presence of debt covenants, firms might manage real activities to avoid violating the
covenants (Roychowdhury, 2006; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994), book to market ratio (BTM) as a
proxy for growth opportunities, growth firms have more incentives to manage earnings (Skinner and
Sloan, 2002), for operating cycle (OPCY CLE) as a proxy for the flexibility in real activities manage-
ment (Roychowdhury, 2006), capital intensity (CAPINT ) as a proxy for reporting quality (Cohen,
2006). In addition we include the typical controls used by previous research firm size (SIZE), per-
formance (ROA), volatility of the firms’ operating environment (S CFO) and earnings persistence
(PERS) and earnings predictability (PRED). Our control variables are lagged four quarters in order
to control for seasonality and to avoid possible effects that GUIDE and REM might have on the
controls. Appendix C provides definitions for all variables.
1.4 Sample and Results
Our sample is composed of US publicly-listed firms and covers the period 2003-2013. We start in
2003, after the passage of Reg. FD and SOX, because these regulations had an impact on firms’
guidance and earnings management behavior. Additionally, we exclude all firms that might be subject
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to specific institutional and regulatory constraints (SIC codes 44-49 and 60-69).
We obtain guidance data from I/B/E/S Guidance database, quarterly financial data from Compu-
stat, analyst coverage from I/B/E/S, and institutional ownership information from Thomson Reuters
13F. We drop firm-quarter observations with missing values in Compustat and with negative total
assets and negative sales. After imposing all data requirements for the estimation of model (5), our
final sample consist of 32,841 firm-quarter observations. Continuous variables are winsorized at the
1% and 99% to mitigate concerns regarding outliers.
Over three thousand firms issued quarterly earnings guidance during the period 2003-2013.10 In
our final sample, 22% of firm-quarters are quarters in which firms issue guidance. Table 1 Panel A
shows how the number of firms issuing guidance decreases considerably during the sample period.
In 2003 firms covered by I/B/E/S Guidance represent about 15% of Compustat universe while they
represent only 7.47% by 2013. This data is consistent with the discussed claims from practitioners
to end guidance and with anecdotal evidence reported in Appendix A showing that firms report
terminating guidance to avoid myopic behavior.
Table 1 Panel B presents summary statistics for the variables used in model (5). Mean (median)
REM is 8.73% (6.45%) and a mean (median) discretionary accruals is 1.6% (-2.1%). A mean (median)
firm in the sample has 5.61 (3) analyst following (see Appendix C for variables definitions). Table 1
Panels C and D show average values by whether or not firms issue guidance (GUIDE), and whether or
not firms experience an exogenous decrease in analysts forecasts (SHOCK). On average, guiding firms
have higher discretionary accruals and greater analyst coverage. They also have a higher proportion
of institutional ownership, and greater return on assets. In addition, shocked and non-shocked firms
differ along several observable characteristics. Shocked firms have higher discretionary accruals, more
analyst coverage, higher institutional ownership, larger size, higher leverage, larger capital intensity,
higher return on assets, higher earnings persistence and less earnings predictability (Table 1 Panel
D).11 Table 1 Panel E shows correlation coefficients between our measure of real earnings management
and firm observable characteristics.
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of model (5). All models contain firm fixed effects.
Column 1 report regression results of a na¨ıve OLS model, without considering endogeneity or dif-
ferences in guidance. The coefficient on GUIDE is positive and significant. Columns 2-5 show the
results of the regressions after including the exogenous shock to analyst coverage, and using different
model specifications. Columns 2 and 3 present the results for the estimation of equation (5) with year
10This represents around 20% of Compustat universe and 30% of I/B/E/S coverage for firms issuing earnings guidance
during that period.
11Untabulated results indicate that differences in mean and median values are statistically significant at the 1% level.
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fixed-effects and with quarter fixed-effects respectively. Across the two specifications we find a positive
and significant coefficient on GUIDE and SHOCK, and a negative and significant coefficient on the
interaction between GUIDE and SHOCK.12
A negative coefficient on the interaction term indicates that informative guidance causes a reduction
on income-increasing real earnings management. A positive coefficient on the guidance term suggest
that strategic guidance increase real earnings management.
Our intention is to identify guidance made in response to an exogenous shock in analyst coverage,
but our research design does not allow us to identify the exact date of the shock. To ensure that
we capture guidance made in response to the shock, we split the interaction term between early (i.e.,
guidance made before previous quarter earnings announcement) and late guidance (i.e., guidance made
after previous quarter earnings announcement). We expect guidance made later in the quarter to be
more likely in response to the shock relative to guidance made early in the quarter. Table 2 Column 4
presents the results of estimating equation (5) partitioning the interaction term between early and late
guidance. As expected, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term for guidance made later in the
period is negative and statistically significant, while for early guidance is not significant. Estimated
coefficients on GUIDE and SHOCK remain positive and significant as in previous specifications.13
Our results reconcile mixed evidence found by previous literature on the effects of guidance on
short-termism. The negative and statistically significant estimated coefficient on the interaction term
between SHOCK and GUIDE is consistent with Houston et al. (2010) who find no evidence of higher
R&D and capital expenditures after guidance cessation and support our hypothesis that informative
guidance reduces real activities manipulation. In turn, the positive and significant coefficient on
GUIDE suggest that non-informative guidance is positively associated with real earnings management,
consistent with previous literature claims that guidance increases managers’ pressure to meet self-
imposed earnings targets.
A key element of our paper is the shock that allows us to identify informative guidance and it could
be possible that our results are driven by the definition of the shock. To rule out this possibility we
estimate equation (5) for different SHOCK sizes (i.e. exogenous decrease in analyst coverage relative
to the level of coverage), the results of this analysis are reported in Table 3. An interesting result
is that the coefficient on the interaction term remains negative and significant, and is monotonically
12Results are qualitatively similar in sign and significance if we use absolute real earnings management as dependent
variable.
13In untabulated results we estimate the probability of issuing guidance in a given quarter using a probit model. We
use as independent variables the first four lags of GUIDE, SHOCK and the first three lags of SHOCK, and lagged four
values of BTM, SIZE, LEV, AF. We find that first lagged value of SHOCK is positive and significant in determining
the probability of issuing guidance in quarter t, consistent with managers responding to shocks in the information
environment by issuing guidance.
19
1. The Effect of Quarterly Earnings Management on Real Earnings Managements
increasing in the severity of the shock up to certain point. Meaning that the effect of an informative
guidance is stronger when the shock is more severe. When the definition of the shock includes only
extreme shocks (EXO DEC > 60%) estimation results are statistically insignificant. A possible
explanation is that for extreme shocks (e.g. a company followed by 3 analysts that lost coverage of 2
analysts), the worsening in firms’ information environment is less likely to be reverted by guidance.
Finally, if we define shocked firms as those suffering an exogenous decrease up to 60% of their coverage
(0% < EXO DEC < 60%) our results are similar to those presented in Table 2 column 3.
An additional concern is that guiding firms and non-guiding firms might be different in unobservable
characteristics and this can be driving our results. To mitigate this concern we estimate model (5) using
as control sample non-guidance quarters of guiding firms. Table 4 column 1 presents the estimation
results. We obtain a positive and significant coefficient on GUIDE and a negative and significant
coefficient on GUIDE SHOCK, consistent with the main results presented in Table 2 column 3.
Another factor that might influence our results is the fact that our shock may be affecting a particular
set of firms. Because systematic differences between treatment and control samples might be correlated
with our dependent variable, we built our control sample using a nearest-neighbor propensity score
matching methodology. We match firms in size, performance, leverage, book-to-market and analyst
coverage in the quarter before the shock. For an observation to be in the control sample we also require
to be in the same industry-quarter as the treated nearest-neighbor. We implement the propensity score
matching using a nearest-neighbor logit regression without replacement using a standard tolerance
(0.005 caliper). Table 4 column 2 shows that our coefficient on GUIDE SHOCK remains negative
and statistically significant. Table 4 panel B present the balance properties of the propensity score
matching.
As an additional robustness check Table 4 column 3 presents the results of a placebo test. We
generate a random shock replicating the proportion of shocked firms in our sample and estimate model
(5), as expected estimated coefficients for the SHOCK and the interaction term are not statistically
significant. While for GUIDE the coefficient is positive and significant as in the na¨ıve model presented
in Table 2 column 1.14
14The results in Table 5 column 3 are from one realization of the random shock. Untabulated results indicate that
Fama-MacBeth coefficients of estimating model (5) using one thousand different realizations of the random shock are
similar in sign and significance.
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1.5 Additional Analysis
In this section, we provide additional evidence supporting our main results by examining a number
of contexts where we expect the effects of guidance on real earnings management to be stronger. In
particular, we focus on settings where firms are more likely to manipulate, the ability of managers is
higher or the information environment is poor. These are settings where the effects of the shock are
more severe and thus, the benefits of issuing informative guidance are higher.
1.5.1 External Monitoring
Highly monitored managers have fewer opportunities to manage earnings. Analysts play a role as
external monitors of the firm and might constrain firms’ earnings management behavior. This is
because analysts keep track of earnings numbers regularly and their financial expertise and industry
background can help to uncover cases of fraud or detect unusual earnings numbers (Healy and Palepu,
2001; Dyck et al., 2010; Yu, 2008). Additionally, Big 4 audit firms can also deter earnings management
because they are likely to do a better auditing job relative to small audit firms either because they
are more experienced, have more resources or a reputation to maintain (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991,
1993; Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999).
If monitoring alleviates short-termism we expect our results to be weaker for firms subject to high
monitoring and stronger for firms with low monitoring. To test this prediction we split our sample
between firms with low/high analyst coverage and firms audited by a big 4/non-big 4 auditor. Table
5 present the results of estimating equation (5) for samples with different monitoring. As expected
for firms with low monitoring (i.e. low analyst coverage/non-big 4 auditor) the coefficient on GUIDE
is positive and statistically significant while the coefficient on the interaction between GUIDE and
SHOCK is negative and significant. Besides, for firms with low analyst coverage the shock to the
information environment is likely to be more severe, consistently the coefficient on SHOCK is positive
and significant. On the other hand for high monitoring firms (i.e. high analyst coverage/big 4 auditor)
all the coefficients of interest are not significant.
Supporting our hypothesis we find that for firms with higher external monitoring, that are expected
to engage in less earnings manipulation there is no difference in real earnings management among
informative and strategic guidance. While for firms with low external monitoring, where we expect
more earnings manipulation, we find that informative guidance reduce real earnings manipulations
and strategic guidance increase manipulation.
An additional explanation of this results is that having more analyst coverage and a big 4 auditor
21
1. The Effect of Quarterly Earnings Management on Real Earnings Managements
implies a better firm information environment ex-ante, therefore the effect of the shock is weaker and
the benefits from issuing an informative guidance are lower. While for firms with an ex-ante worse
information environment the effect of the shock is stronger and the benefits of issuing an informative
guidance are potentially higher.
1.5.2 Likelihood of Real Earnings Manipulation
Previous literature indicates that firms just meeting/beating earnings benchmarks are more likely to
engage in earnings management (Burgstahler and Eames, 2006; Degeorge et al., 1999; Bartov et al.,
2002; Graham et al., 2005). Focusing in a setting in which firms are suspect of manipulating earnings
increase the power of our test. Therefore, if suspect firms are more likely to manipulate earnings, we
expect the effects of strategic guidance to be stronger among suspect firms, and the effect of informative
guidance to be stronger among non-suspect firms. Following, Roychowdhury (2006) and Zang (2012)
we define a dummy variable for firm-quarters suspect (SUSPECT ) of manipulation. SUSPECT
takes value one if quarterly earnings before extraordinary items over lagged total assets is between 0
and 0.002 (i.e. firms just meeting/beating zero earnings), change in EPS excluding extraordinary items
from same quarter last year is between 0 and 2 cents (i.e. just meeting/beating last-year earnings),
or earnings surprise is between 0 and 2 cents (i.e. just meeting/beating analyst forecast) and zero
otherwise.
Table 6 columns 1 and 2 present the results of estimating equation (5) separately for suspect and
non-suspect firms. As expected, GUIDE is positive and significant for suspect firms, and four times
larger than for non-suspect firms. While the interaction GUIDE SHOCK is not significant for the
sample of suspect firms and it is negative and significant for non-suspect firms.
As a further check, we focus in another setting where firms are likely to manage earnings and split
our sample between consistent and non-consistent target beating firms. We define CONS BEAT as
a dummy variable equal to one if the firm meet/beat the above mentioned earnings benchmarks in
the past four quarters and zero otherwise. Table 6 columns 3 and 4 present the results of estimating
equation (5) for consistent and non-consistent beaters. GUIDE is positive and significant for both
samples, but as expected is greater for suspect firms. The interaction GUIDE SHOCK is negative
and significant for both samples.
Finally, we split our sample among manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. According to
Roychowdhury (2006) manufacturing firms have more strategies available for real actions management.
Therefore, our results should be stronger for manufacturing firms. Following Roychowdhury (2006) we
define a dummy variable equal to one if the firm belongs to a manufacturing industry (i.e. two-digit SIC
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code between 20 and 39) and zero otherwise. Table 6 column 5 and 6 present the results of estimating
equation 5 for manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. As expected, GUIDE is positive and
GUIDE SHOCK is negative for both samples. The results are only statistically significant for the
sample of manufacturing firms.15
1.5.3 Financial Constraints
Managers in financially constrained firms have lower incentives to manage real earnings because the
costs of deviating from optimal business practices might be too high if the objective of the manager
is to improve firm’s operations (Zang, 2012). Moreover, if financially constrained firms need to raise
external capital to finance investment decisions, the higher scrutiny from capital markets will more
likely deter managers from investing sub optimally. However, managers of firms with poor financial
conditions will have higher incentives to issue overly optimistic forecasts, as an attempt to increase
firm value perceptions due to career concerns or implicit contracts (Koch, 2002). In line with our
main prediction we expect the coefficient on GUIDE to be positive for financially constrained firms,
and the coefficient on the interaction GUIDE SHOCK to be negative for non-financially constrained
firms. We use Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) probability of default (PD) measure to split our
sample among financially constrained and non-financially constrained firms. We consider a firm to be
financially constrained if PD is greater than 20%. Table 6 columns 7 and 8 present the results of this
analysis, as expected we get a positive and significant coefficient on GUIDE for financially constrained
firms and a negative and significant GUIDE SHOCK for non-financially constrained firms.
1.5.4 Managerial Ability
High ability managers are more likely to issue accurate forecasts relative to low ability managers (Feng
et al., 2009). Therefore, low ability managers may engage in more real earnings management after
issuing guidance because this guidance is more likely to be inaccurate (independent of managerial
incentives). While for high ability managers we expect informative guidance to decrease real activities
manipulation, not only because is informative but also because it is more likely to be accurate. We
use Demerjian et al. (2012) measure of managerial ability to split our sample between low ability and
high ability managers. Their measure is a score rank (MA SCORE) between zero and one based on
managers’ efficiency in generating revenues, where one is the highest ability. We consider a firm to
15In untabulated analysis we further consider whether firms in different industries (i.e. manufacturing vs. service) rely
on different real earnings management strategies but we do not find any meaningful difference.
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have a high (low) ability manager if MA SCORE is above (below) the median value of the sample.16
Table 7 present the results of estimating equation (5) for samples with different managerial ability. As
expected, for low ability managers the coefficient on GUIDE remains positive and significant and for
high ability managers GUIDE SHOCK remains negative and significant.
1.5.5 Guidance Frequency and the Decision to Stop Guidance
Cheng et al. (2007a) claim that frequent short-term guidance exacerbates short-termism. To see how
guidance frequency might affect our results we condition our analysis on firms’ quarterly guidance
frequency. Following Cheng et al. (2007a) we measure frequency (FREQ) using the deciles of industry
guidance frequency distribution. We split our sample in Low FREQ (firm-quarters in deciles 1 to 4),
Mid FREQ (firm-quarters in deciles 5 to 7) and High FREQ (firm-quarters in deciles 8 to 10).
If short-term guidance foster short-termism, the decision to stop guidance should lead to less
myopic behavior, and as suggested by anecdotal evidence (see APPENDIX-A) the effect should be
higher for frequent guiders that are supposedly the ones subject to higher market pressures ex-ante.
We identify those firms that stop issuing quarterly guidance in our sample, and whether it happens
after an informative guidance (STOP INFO) or an strategic guidance (STOP STRATEGIC).
Table 8 present the results of estimating model (5) conditioning on frequency and including control
variables for the decision to stop guidance. Our main results hold for Low FREQ and Mid FREQ
samples. For High FREQ sample coefficients are not significant, indicating that for high frequent
guiders there is no difference in income increasing real earnings manipulation between guiding and
non-guiding quarters. Until now we only consider informative guidance as those guidance made in
response to a shock in the information environment of the firm, but managers that are committed to
issue credible short-term guidance will do it even if the firm do not suffer a shock to the information
environment. Frequent guidance capturing informative short-term guidance is a possible explanation
for not finding any significant difference between GUIDE and GUIDE SHOCK for frequent guiders.
Regarding the decision to stop guidance, the only case in which this decision leads to lower income
increasing real earnings manipulations is when this decision is made by infrequent guiders and after
an strategic guidance. Contrary to the arguments present in the anecdotal evidence, the decision of
frequent guiders to stop guidance do not reduce real earnings management in subsequent periods.
Moreover, the sign on the coefficient of STOP INFO is positive in all cases although is not statistically
significant.
16Estimation results remain similar if we use mean value or top and bottom quintiles of MA SCORE to split our
sample across managerial ability.
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1.6 Summary and Conclusions
We study if quarterly earnings guidance causes managerial short-termism, in the form of real earn-
ings management. We exploit an exogenous shock to firms’ information environment to distinguish
between informative and strategic management short-term earnings guidance, and find that informa-
tive guidance leads to less real earnings management in contrast to strategic guidance that increases
real earnings management. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that our results are stronger for firms
with worst external monitoring, firms non-suspect of manipulating earnings, firms in manufacturing
industries, non-financially constrained firms, and firms whose managers have high ability.
We interpret this result as informative (strategic) guidance alleviating (worsening) short-termism.
First, this is consistent with the expectation alignment hypothesis of Ajinkya and Gift (1984) where
guidance helps to reduce information asymmetries and reduce the need of managers to engage in real
earnings management to meet earnings targets. Second, our results are also consistent with non-
informative guidance increasing market pressures to meet earnings targets and leading to higher levels
of real earnings management. In line with survey evidence presented by Graham et al. (2005).
Our study responds to calls for research on the consequences of frequent reporting of results, as
concerns exists that frequent reporting may lead to managerial short-termism and thus, to inefficient
decision-making, reconciling prior mixed evidence (Kasznik, 1999; Degeorge et al., 1999; Bartov et al.,
2002; Richardson et al., 2004; Burgstahler and Eames, 2006; Houston et al., 2010; Koch et al., 2012).
Our results suggest that whilst some guidance may indeed be associated with sub-optimal managerial
decision-making, not all guidance has this negative consequence.
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APPENDIX A- Anecdotal Evidence on Firms Guidance Decisions
Company Guidance Decision Rationale
Source - [Manager Discussing Rationale]
The Coca-Cola Company
Q3-2002 Earnings Conference Call - [Gary Fayard - CFO and Sr. Vice President]
Q: Andrew Conway - CSFB
“as you mentioned, it’s early to talk about 2003 but (...), is it reasonable to think that management
would widen the range of expectations for global volume for ’03 closer to (...). How do you triangulate
your long-term views when we have a period of short-term macro effect?”
A: Gary Fayard
“I’m going to dodge the question, however, only because truly we are in the midst in the process and
premature to give guidance on it. Let me say that we are still committed to the long-term growth
of this business (...) We’ll continue to manage the business for the long-term and as we go through
the business planning process, as we complete that, we’ll give you a full update on the expectations
for next year later this fall.”
Q: Caroline Levy - UBS Warburg
“I’m trying to understand how you managed to achieve your third quarter estimates in the face of all
the economic challenges that exist and yet will not or do not expect to achieve your fourth quarter
(...) any guidance you could give on that, because I think that’s what everybody is confused about.”
A: Gary Fayard
“Let me give a shot at that one. First the following, if we step back and look at the full year first
and let me address it that way first. Because as you know, we give guidance on full year but not,
we do not give any quarterly guidance (...)”
Q3-2002 Earnings Conference Call - [Gary Fayard - CFO and Sr. Vice President]
“A couple of things about the release this morning (...) number one, we are as committed as ever to
our long-term growth objectives in both volume and profit.(...) Number two (...) we will no longer
provide guidance after today about earnings. We believe it will allow the company to continue to
focus on long-term growth objectives, which is good for our shareholders and not managed in the
short-term quarter-to-quarter”
Q4-2002 Earnings Conference Call [Gary Fayard - CFO]
“Now, turning to the current year, as we stated in December, we are not going to give specific
earnings per share guidance for quarters or for the full year (...)”
(continue on next page)
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APPENDIX A- (continued)
IDEXX Laboratories Inc.
Q3-2005 Earnings Conference Call - [Merilee Raines - CFO]
“I want to mention that we will be making a change to our communications regarding financial
guidance beginning next year.(...) When we update our guidance for 2006 at the time of our 2005
fourth quarter earnings release, we will be focusing our projections on the total year, and we will
therefore not give guidance for the first quarter of 2006. As the year progresses, we will continue
to express guidance in terms of the full year rather than on a quarter-by-quarter basis.(...) We’re
making this change, not as a result of any change in our outlook for the business, but because this
approach is consistent with the way that we manage the business, which is not to focus on single
quarterly results but to maximize long-term value creation for our shareholders.”
Q4-2005 Earnings Conference Call - [Merilee Raines - CFO]
“Now, looking forward to 2006. As we mentioned in our third quarter earnings call, we will be giving
only annual guidance for 2006 (...)”
Google Inc.
Q1-2005 Earnings Conference Call - [Eric Schmidt - CEO]
“Our focus remains very, very clearly and steadfastly on the long-term growth (...). We are going to
continue our long-standing policy of not providing forward guidance (...) And I would also encourage
you not to rely on any estimated metric that you hear to try to formulate how our business works
(...) no single estimate of metric is a very good precise predictor of how we’re doing (...)”
Q1-2006 Earnings Conference Call - [Eric Schmidt - CEO]
“We also – of course, there’s been a lot of debate about this – are going to continue to not give
forward guidance, as per our long-term policy(...)”
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APPENDIX B- Real Earnings Management Measure Estimation
This appendix explains the estimation of our proxy of real earnings management. Following Roy-
chowdhury (2006) and Zang (2012), we start from the entire population of COMPUSTAT for the
period 2002-2014. We exclude financial and regulated industries (SIC 6000-6999 & SIC 4400-5000).
Then to avoid possible mistakes in the database we remove all observations with missing (negative)
values of total assets (COMPUSTAT item atq), sales (item saleq) and selling, general and administra-
tive expenses (SG&A) (item xsgaq). We also exclude all observations with missing values of: common
equity (item ceqq), net income (loss) (item niq), cost of goods sold (item cogsq), inventory (item
invtq), and income before extraordinary items (item ibq).
Production cost (PCi,t ) are defined as the same of cost of goods sold (COMPUSTAT item cogsq)
plus change in inventory (item invtq). Discretionary expenditures (DEi,t ) are defined as the sum
of research and development expenses (R&D) (item xrdq) and SG&A expenses (item xsgaq). R&D
expenses are set equal to zero if they are missing in COMPUSTAT and SG&A expenses are available.
At is the value of total assets of quarter t (item taq) and St are the sales of the quarter (item saleq).
Finally Q1i,t to Q4i,t are fiscal quarter dummies, i.e. Q1t would be equal to 1 for fiscal quarter 1 and
zero otherwise (using COMPUSTAT item datafqtr).
Table B.1, panel A report the estimation results of models (1) and (2). The models are estimated
cross-sectionally within each fiscal year and two digits SIC industry using quarterly data. There are 598
industry-years during the sample period and on average the number of observations for each regression
is greater than 260. The mean adjusted R2 is 77.71 percent for the production costs model and 40.29
percent for the discretionary expenditures model. For both models the estimated coefficients are
comparable in magnitude and significance to those reported in the annual models by Roychowdhury
(2006) and Zang (2012). Panel B shows summary statistics for the estimated proxies of real earnings
management. The residuals from equations (1) and (2) measure abnormal levels of production costs
(AB PCi,t ) and discretionary expenditures (AB DEi,t ) respectively. According to Roychowdhury
(2006) managers can boost reported earnings by overproducing which will be reflected in positive
values of AB PCi,t , or by cutting discretionary expenditures which that are going to be associated
with negative values of AB DEi,t. Following Zang (2012) we define real earnings management as
REMi,t = AB PCi,t−AB DEi,t. REMi,t indicates the total level of real earnings management.
Correlations among the proxies of real earnings management are reported in panel C.
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Table B.1
Measurment of Real Activities Manipulation 2002-2014
Panel A: Estimation of the Normal Levels of Production Costs and Discretionary Expendituresa
Production Costs Discretionary Expenditures
Intercept -0.0131*** Intercept 0.0322***
1/At−4 0.0437 1/At−4 1.2392***
Q1t 0.001 Q1t -0.0003
Q2t -0.0007 Q2t -0.0006
Q3t 0.0066 Q3t -0.0017***
Q4t 0.0068 Q4t 0.0040***
St/At−4 0.7212*** St− 4/At−4 0.1432***
∆St/At−4 -0.0989* - -
∆St−4/At−4 0.2661 - -
Mean Adj. R2 (%) 77.71 Mean Adj. R2 (%) 40.29
Mean # of Observations 263.32 Mean # of Observations 263.32
# of industry-years 598 # of industry-years 598
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Real Activities Manipulation Measures
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75%
AB PCt 170528 0.00029 -0.00284 0.08431 -0.03903 0.03468
AB DEt 170528 -0.00321 -0.01101 0.08333 -0.04552 0.01931
REMt 170528 0.00326 0.00953 0.13972 -0.05102 0.07215
Panel C: Pearson (Lower Triangle) and Spearman (Upper Triangle) Correlations
AB PCt AB DEt REMt
AB PCt -0.3647*** 0.8194***
AB DEt -0.3024*** -0.7673***
REMt 0.7941*** -0.7947***
aFollowing Roychowdhury (2006) and Zang (2012), regressions are estimated cross-sectionally for
each industry-year for the period 2002-2014 using quarterly data. Two-digit SIC code industry
grouping is used. Each model is estimated for industry-years having at least 15 observations.
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, * Indicate significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
29
1. The Effect of Quarterly Earnings Management on Real Earnings Managements
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
C
-
V
a
ri
a
b
le
D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
s
C
o
n
st
ru
c
t
P
ro
x
y
N
a
m
e
D
is
cr
et
io
n
ar
y
A
cc
ru
al
s
D
is
cr
et
io
n
ar
y
ac
cr
u
a
ls
fo
r
q
u
ar
te
r
t
ar
e
d
efi
n
ed
as
to
ta
l
ac
cr
u
al
s
m
in
u
s
n
or
m
al
ac
cr
u
al
s
d
er
iv
ed
fr
om
a
m
o
d
ifi
ed
J
on
es
M
o
d
el
(J
on
es
,
19
91
).
F
ol
lo
w
in
g
D
ec
h
ow
et
al
.
(1
99
5)
an
d
C
ol
li
n
s
et
al
.
(2
01
4)
th
e
m
o
d
el
fo
r
q
u
ar
te
rl
y
n
or
m
al
ac
cr
u
al
s
is
sp
ec
ifi
ed
as
:
A
C
C
i,
t
A
i,
t−
4
=
α
0
+
α
1
(
1
A
i,
t−
4
)
+
α
2
Q
1
i,
t
+
α
3
Q
2
i,
t
+
α
4
Q
3
i,
t
+
α
5
Q
4
i,
t
+
α
6
(
∆
S
i,
t
A
i,
t−
4
)
+
α
7
(
P
P
E
i,
t
A
i,
t−
4
)
+
 i
,t
T
o
ta
l
ac
cr
u
al
s
A
C
C
i,
t
is
ea
rn
in
gs
b
ef
or
e
ex
tr
ao
rd
in
ar
y
it
em
s
an
d
d
is
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
op
er
at
io
n
s
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
ib
q
)
m
in
u
s
th
e
op
er
at
in
g
ca
sh
fl
ow
s
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
oa
n
cf
q
)
in
q
u
ar
te
r
t,
A
t−
4
is
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
a
tq
)
in
q
u
ar
te
r
t-
4,
S
t
is
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
sa
le
s
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
sa
le
q
)
fr
om
q
u
ar
te
r
t-
4
to
t
an
d
P
P
E
t
is
gr
os
s
p
ro
p
er
ty
p
la
n
t
an
d
eq
u
ip
m
en
t
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
p
p
eg
tq
)
in
q
u
ar
te
r
t.
F
ol
lo
w
in
g
C
ol
li
n
s
et
al
.
(2
01
4)
w
e
in
cl
u
d
e
fi
sc
al
q
u
ar
te
r
d
u
m
m
ie
s
Q
1 i
,t
−
Q
4 i
,t
to
ca
p
tu
re
fi
sc
al
q
u
ar
te
r
eff
ec
ts
an
d
ca
lc
u
la
te
s
ch
an
ge
s
in
sa
le
s
re
la
ti
ve
s
to
th
e
sa
m
e
q
u
ar
te
r
p
re
v
io
u
s
ye
ar
to
av
oi
d
se
as
on
al
it
y
eff
ec
ts
.
T
h
e
m
o
d
el
is
es
ti
m
at
ed
cr
os
s-
se
ct
io
n
al
ly
b
y
ye
ar
-i
n
d
u
st
ry
(w
e
d
efi
n
e
in
d
u
st
ry
u
si
n
g
2-
d
ig
it
S
IC
co
d
e)
w
it
h
m
or
e
th
an
15
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s
u
si
n
g
th
e
en
ti
re
sa
m
p
le
of
C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
.
N
or
m
al
ac
cr
u
al
s
ar
e
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
as
:
N
A
C
C
i,
t
A
i,
t−
4
=
αˆ
0
+
αˆ
1
(
1
A
i,
t−
4
)
+
αˆ
2
Q
1
i,
t
+
αˆ
3
Q
2
i,
t
+
αˆ
4
Q
3
i,
t
+
αˆ
5
Q
4
i,
t
+
αˆ
6
(
∆
S
i,
t
−
∆
A
R
i,
t
A
i,
t−
4
)
+
αˆ
7
(
P
P
E
i,
t
A
i,
t−
4
)
C
h
an
g
e
in
ac
co
u
n
ts
re
ce
iv
ab
le
s
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
re
ct
q
)
A
R
i,
t
fr
om
q
u
ar
te
r
t-
4
to
t
is
su
b
tr
ac
te
d
fr
om
ch
an
ge
in
sa
le
s
as
p
ro
p
os
ed
b
y
D
ec
h
ow
et
al
.
(1
99
5)
.
A
b
n
or
m
al
ac
cr
u
al
s
A
B
A
C
C
i,
t
ar
e
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
as
:
A
B
A
C
C
i,
t
=
A
C
C
i,
t
A
i,
t−
4
−
N
A
C
C
i,
t
A
i,
t−
4
A
B
A
C
C
L
ev
er
ag
e
L
o
n
g-
te
rm
d
eb
t
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
d
lt
tq
)
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
at
q
).
L
E
V
G
ro
w
th
P
ro
sp
ec
t
B
o
ok
to
m
ar
ke
t
ra
ti
o
,
b
o
ok
va
lu
e
of
eq
u
it
y
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
ce
q
q
)
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
m
ar
ke
t
va
lu
e
of
eq
u
it
y
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
p
rc
cq
ti
m
es
C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
cs
h
o
q
).
B
T
M
F
ir
m
S
iz
e
N
at
u
ra
l
lo
ga
ri
th
m
of
sa
le
s
in
q
u
ar
te
r
t.
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
sa
le
q
).
S
I
Z
E
F
le
x
ib
il
it
y
in
R
ea
l
A
ct
iv
it
ie
s
M
an
ip
u
-
la
ti
on
O
p
er
at
in
g
cy
cl
e
m
ea
su
re
d
in
d
ay
s
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
as
:
[(
A
R
t
+
A
R
t−
4
)/
S
t
+
(I
N
V
t
+
I
N
V
t−
4
)/
C
O
G
S
t
]
∗1
80
W
h
er
e
A
R
t
ar
e
ac
co
u
n
t
re
ce
iv
ab
le
s
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
re
ct
q
)
in
q
u
ar
te
r
t,
I
N
V
t
is
to
ta
l
in
ve
n
to
ri
es
(C
O
M
P
U
S
-
T
A
T
it
em
in
v
tq
)
in
q
u
a
rt
er
t,
S
t
is
sa
le
s
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
sa
le
q
)
in
q
u
ar
te
r
t
an
d
C
O
G
S
t
is
co
st
of
go
o
d
s
so
ld
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
co
g
sq
)
in
q
u
ar
te
r
t.
O
P
C
Y
C
L
E
(c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
o
n
n
ex
t
pa
ge
)
30
1. The Effect of Quarterly Earnings Management on Real Earnings Managements
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
C
-
( c
on
ti
n
u
ed
)
C
o
n
st
ru
c
t
P
ro
x
y
N
a
m
e
C
ap
it
al
In
t e
n
si
ty
Is
n
et
P
P
E
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
p
p
en
tq
)
in
q
u
ar
te
r
t
d
iv
id
ed
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
at
q
)
in
q
u
ar
te
r
t.
C
A
P
I
N
T
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
Is
N
et
in
co
m
e
b
ef
or
e
ex
tr
a
or
d
in
ar
y
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
n
iq
)
it
em
s
in
q
u
ar
te
r
t
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
at
q
)
in
q
u
ar
te
r
t.
R
O
A
C
as
h
-F
lo
w
V
ol
at
il
-
it
y
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
d
ev
ia
ti
on
s
of
op
er
a
ti
n
g
ca
sh
fl
ow
s
ov
er
th
e
p
ri
or
20
q
u
ar
te
rs
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
av
er
ag
e
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
at
q
)
ov
er
th
e
sa
m
e
p
er
io
d
.
Q
u
ar
te
rl
y
op
er
at
in
g
ca
sh
fl
ow
s
ar
e
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
as
th
e
d
iff
er
en
ce
of
an
n
u
al
n
et
op
er
at
in
g
ca
sh
fl
ow
s
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
oa
n
cf
y
)
in
q
u
ar
te
r
t
an
d
t-
1
d
iv
id
ed
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
at
q
)
in
q
u
ar
te
r
t.
S
C
F
O
E
ar
n
in
gs
P
er
si
s-
te
n
cy
P
er
si
st
en
ce
of
ea
rn
in
gs
,
m
ea
su
re
d
b
y
co
effi
ci
en
t
α
1
fr
om
th
e
fo
ll
ow
in
g
m
o
d
el
:
E
P
S
t
=
α
0
+
α
1
E
P
S
t−
4
+
 t
W
h
er
e
E
P
S
t
is
b
as
ic
ea
rn
in
gs
p
er
sh
ar
e
ex
cl
u
d
in
g
ex
tr
ao
rd
in
ar
y
it
em
s
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
ep
sp
x
q
)
fo
r
q
u
ar
te
r
t.
T
h
e
m
o
d
el
is
es
ti
m
at
ed
u
si
n
g
a
ro
ll
in
g
w
in
d
ow
of
20
q
u
ar
te
rs
w
it
h
at
le
as
t
15
n
on
-m
is
si
n
g
q
u
ar
te
rl
y
E
P
S
.
P
E
R
S
E
ar
n
in
gs
P
re
-
d
ic
ta
b
il
it
y
P
re
d
ic
ta
b
il
it
y
of
ea
rn
in
gs
in
q
u
ar
te
r
t
is
m
ea
su
re
d
b
y
th
e
st
an
d
ar
d
d
ev
ia
ti
on
ov
er
20
q
u
ar
te
rs
of
th
e
re
si
d
u
al
s
fr
om
th
e
ab
ov
e
m
o
d
el
.
P
R
E
D
A
n
al
y
st
F
ol
lo
w
in
g
Is
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
an
a
ly
st
(I
B
E
S
S
u
m
m
ar
y
it
em
n
u
m
es
t)
fo
ll
ow
in
g
th
e
co
m
p
an
y
in
q
u
ar
te
r
t.
F
or
co
m
p
an
ie
s
n
o
t
co
ve
re
d
b
y
IB
E
S
A
F
is
se
t
eq
u
a
l
to
ze
ro
A
F
In
st
it
u
ti
on
al
O
w
n
-
er
sh
ip
S
h
a
re
s
h
el
d
b
y
in
st
it
u
ti
on
al
in
ve
st
or
s
as
a
p
er
ce
n
ta
ge
of
to
ta
l
ou
ts
ta
n
d
in
g
sh
ar
es
(T
h
om
so
n
R
eu
te
rs
13
F
it
em
in
-
st
ow
n
p
er
c)
in
q
u
ar
te
r
t.
I
N
S
T
A
u
d
it
Q
u
al
it
y
Is
a
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
eq
u
al
to
on
e
if
th
e
au
d
it
or
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
au
)
is
a
B
IG
4
,
an
d
ze
ro
ot
h
er
w
is
e.
B
I
G
4
M
an
ag
er
ia
l
A
b
il
it
y
M
a
n
ag
er
ia
l
ab
il
it
y
is
th
e
re
si
d
u
al
fr
om
th
e
es
ti
m
at
io
n
of
fi
rm
effi
ci
en
cy
b
y
in
d
u
st
ry
.
T
h
ey
b
u
il
d
a
co
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
m
ea
su
re
ra
n
gi
n
g
b
et
w
ee
n
0
an
d
1,
w
h
er
e
1
is
th
e
h
ig
h
es
t
m
an
ag
er
ia
l
ab
il
it
y
(s
ee
D
em
er
ji
an
et
al
.
(2
01
2)
).
h
tt
p
:/
/f
ac
u
lt
y.
w
as
h
in
gt
on
.e
d
u
/s
m
cv
ay
/a
b
il
it
y
d
at
a.
h
tm
l
M
A
S
C
O
R
E
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
F
ir
m
s
D
u
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
in
d
ic
at
in
g
if
th
e
fi
rm
b
el
o
n
g
to
a
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
in
d
u
st
ry
(2
-d
ig
it
S
IC
co
d
es
20
-3
9)
an
d
ze
ro
ot
h
er
w
is
e.
M
A
N
U
F
E
ar
n
in
gs
M
an
-
ag
em
en
t
S
u
sp
ec
t
F
ir
m
s
D
u
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
eq
u
a
l
to
on
e
if
th
e
fi
rm
is
su
sp
ec
t
to
m
an
ag
e
ea
rn
in
gs
in
q
u
ar
te
r
t
an
d
ze
ro
ot
h
er
w
is
e.
F
ir
st
,
su
sp
ec
t
is
se
t
eq
u
al
to
on
e
if
:
(1
)
ea
rn
in
gs
b
ef
or
e
ex
tr
ao
rd
in
ar
y
it
em
s
an
d
d
is
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
op
er
at
io
n
s
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
ib
q
)
ov
er
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
at
q
)
is
b
et
w
ee
n
0
&
0.
00
2;
(2
)
an
n
u
al
in
cr
ea
se
in
b
as
ic
ea
rn
in
gs
p
er
sh
ar
e
ex
cl
u
d
in
g
ex
tr
ao
rd
in
ar
y
it
em
s
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
ep
sp
x
q
)
is
b
et
w
ee
n
0
&
0.
02
(t
w
o
ce
n
ts
);
(3
)
ac
tu
al
va
lu
e
of
E
P
S
m
ee
t
or
b
ea
t
an
al
y
st
co
n
se
n
su
s
E
P
S
b
y
n
o
m
or
e
th
an
tw
o
ce
n
ts
.
S
ec
on
d
,
su
sp
ec
t
is
se
t
eq
u
al
to
ze
ro
if
:
(a
)
su
sp
ec
t
is
n
ot
eq
u
a
l
to
on
e
an
d
ea
rn
in
g
s
b
ef
or
e
ex
tr
ao
rd
in
ar
y
it
em
s
an
d
d
is
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
op
er
at
io
n
s
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
ib
q
)
ov
er
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
at
q
)
is
gr
ea
te
r
(l
ow
er
)
th
an
0.
05
(-
0.
05
);
(b
)
su
sp
ec
t
is
n
ot
eq
u
al
to
on
e
an
d
an
n
u
al
in
cr
ea
se
in
b
as
ic
ea
rn
in
g
s
p
er
sh
ar
e
ex
cl
u
d
in
g
ex
tr
ao
rd
in
ar
y
it
em
s
(C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
it
em
ep
sp
x
q
)
is
gr
ea
te
r
(l
ow
er
)
th
an
0.
05
(-
0.
0
5)
.
(c
)
su
sp
ec
t
is
n
o
t
eq
u
al
to
on
e
an
d
an
al
y
st
E
P
S
su
rp
ri
se
(p
os
it
iv
e
or
n
eg
at
iv
e)
is
gr
ea
te
r
th
an
fi
ve
ce
n
ts
.
S
U
S
P
E
C
T
C
on
si
st
en
t
T
ar
ge
t
B
ea
ti
n
g
F
ir
m
s
D
u
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
eq
u
al
to
on
e
if
th
e
fi
rm
m
ee
t/
b
ea
t
ea
rn
in
gs
ta
rg
et
s
in
at
le
as
t
fo
u
r
p
re
v
io
u
s
co
n
se
cu
ti
ve
q
u
ar
te
rs
an
d
ze
ro
ot
h
er
w
is
e.
C
O
N
S
B
E
A
T
F
in
an
ci
al
C
on
-
st
ra
in
ts
W
e
u
se
F
ar
re
-M
en
sa
an
d
L
ju
n
gq
v
is
t
(2
01
6)
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
of
d
ef
au
lt
m
ea
su
re
.
P
D
31
1. The Effect of Quarterly Earnings Management on Real Earnings Managements
Figure 1: Changes in Analyst Coverage Breakdown
ECt COVt
Earnings
announcement
quarter t
End of quarter t-1 End of quarter t
Exogenous
∆ COV
Guidance t
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1. The Effect of Quarterly Earnings Management on Real Earnings Managements
Table 1
Summary Statistics
Panel A: Compustat & I/B/E/S Coverage of U.S. Firms by Year
I/B/E/S I/B/E/S
Compusat Analyst Coveragea Guidanceb
Year #Firms #Firms #Firms %I/B/E/S %Compustat
2003 10.943 4.814 1.613 33.51% 14.74%
2004 10.774 5.093 1.644 32.28% 15.26%
2005 10.853 5.318 1.391 26.16% 12.82%
2006 10.724 5.482 1.373 25.05% 12.80%
2007 10.507 5.621 1.143 20.33% 10.88%
2008 10.221 5.268 942 17.88% 9.22%
2009 10.149 5.096 774 15.19% 7.63%
2010 10.232 5.053 752 14.88% 7.35%
2011 10.616 5.038 765 15.18% 7.21%
2012 10.617 4.923 767 15.58% 7.22%
2013 10.193 5.149 761 14.78% 7.47%
2003-2013 17.609 10.024 3.271 32.63% 18.58%
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1. The Effect of Quarterly Earnings Management on Real Earnings Managements
Table 1 (continued)
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. 1% Q1 Median Q3 99%
Dependent Variables c
INC REM 8.737 8.037 0.117 2.890 6.459 11.97 39.76
AB PROD 4.160 6.538 -5.424 0.162 2.443 6.157 30.72
AB DISEXP 4.521 4.574 -5.653 1.458 3.971 7.043 19.07
AB RDd 0.189 0.664 -1.641 -0.015 0.052 0.400 2.488
AB SGAd 2.313 4.206 -8.207 0.040 1.941 4.470 15.42
Control Variablese
AB ACC 0.016 0.119 -0.442 -0.021 -0.021 0.0479 0.476
AF 5.618 6.421 0 0 3 9 27
INST 0.553 0.330 0.000 0.242 0.634 0.831 1.119
SIZE 4.985 2.121 -0.037 3.555 5.019 6.424 9.527
LEV 0.166 0.179 0 0.003 0.128 0.260 0.799
BTM 0.596 0.949 -2.715 0.324 0.535 0.844 3.311
OPCYCLE 546.9 388.9 35.98 309.6 475.6 675.4 2,152
CAPINT 0.243 0.202 0.008 0.088 0.186 0.343 0.850
ROA 0.001 0.058 -0.254 -0.001 0.011 0.020 0.081
S CFO 4.029 21.57 0.026 0.076 0.305 1.376 61.98
PERS 0.209 0.371 -0.654 -0.038 0.138 0.412 1.399
PRED 0.445 0.636 0.021 0.117 0.234 0.482 3.883
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1. The Effect of Quarterly Earnings Management on Real Earnings Managements
Table 1 (continued)
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics by GUIDE
GUIDE= 0 GUIDE= 1
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D.
Dependent Variables
INC REM 8.811 6.542 8.119 8.498 6.188 7.762
AB PROD 4.317 2.560 6.685 3.650 2.051 6.008
AB DISEXP 4.425 3.844 4.625 4.834 4.308 4.389
AB RD 0.182 0.038 0.672 0.213 0.112 0.636
AB SGA 2.471 2.055 4.377 1.785 1.693 3.526
Control Variables
AB ACC 0.015 0.008 0.122 0.022 0.010 0.110
AF 4.478 2.000 5.917 9.301 8.000 6.601
INST 0.492 0.531 0.336 0.748 0.797 0.217
SIZE 4.746 4.728 2.200 5.759 5.701 1.617
LEV 0.169 0.125 0.185 0.158 0.138 0.157
BTM 0.606 0.550 1.052 0.565 0.495 0.485
OPCYCLE 553.6 473.4 407.8 525.1 480.5 319.0
CAPINT 0.256 0.202 0.208 0.201 0.145 0.175
ROA -0.001 0.010 0.062 0.008 0.013 0.045
S CFO 4.947 0.397 24.052 1.076 0.134 9.480
PERS 0.211 0.143 0.369 0.200 0.116 0.378
PRED 0.457 0.235 0.668 0.409 0.232 0.519
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1. The Effect of Quarterly Earnings Management on Real Earnings Managements
Table 1 (continued)
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics by SHOCK
SHOCK= 0 SHOCK= 1
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D.
Dependent Variables
INC REM 9.007 6.694 8.189 7.702 5.519 7.332
AB PROD 4.375 2.627 6.704 3.329 1.815 5.777
AB DISEXP 4.567 4.058 4.691 4.344 3.641 4.088
AB RD 0.194 0.056 0.678 0.170 0.038 0.591
AB SGA 2.445 2.098 4.383 1.686 1.368 3.161
Control Variables
AB ACC 0.016 0.009 0.122 0.017 0.008 0.108
AF 4.071 2.000 5.388 11.567 11.000 6.602
INST 0.503 0.547 0.338 0.742 0.784 0.213
SIZE 4.610 4.629 2.067 6.429 6.382 1.655
LEV 0.158 0.111 0.181 0.198 0.177 0.168
BTM 0.619 0.568 1.045 0.506 0.431 0.393
OPCYCLE 556.584 484.697 393.641 509.733 435.824 367.606
CAPINT 0.235 0.182 0.194 0.277 0.200 0.226
ROA -0.001 0.010 0.062 0.010 0.014 0.041
S CFO 4.935 0.414 24.126 0.578 0.092 2.362
PERS 0.204 0.136 0.368 0.226 0.145 0.383
PRED 0.424 0.224 0.621 0.528 0.287 0.685
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1. The Effect of Quarterly Earnings Management on Real Earnings Managements
Table 2
Real Activities Manipulations and Quarterly Earnings Guidance
VARIABLES INC REM INC REM INC REM INC REM
GUIDEt 0.289** 0.345** 0.359** 0.374**
(0.138) (0.146) (0.146) (0.147)
SHOCKt - 0.182* 0.180* 0.198*
- (0.102) (0.102) (0.106)
GUIDE ∗ SHOCKt - -0.413** -0.411** -
- (0.161) (0.161) -
GUIDE EARLY ∗ SHOCKt - - - -0.231
- - - (0.563)
GUIDE LATE ∗ SHOCKt - - - -0.437***
- - - (0.166)
AB ACCt−4 -0.403 -0.365 -0.182 -0.183
(0.339) (0.337) (0.357) (0.357)
AFt−4 0.033 0.034 0.031 0.031
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
INSTt−4 -0.136 0.547 0.631 0.630
(0.503) (0.521) (0.526) (0.526) )
SIZEt−4 -1.418*** -0.947*** -0.964*** -0.964***
(0.203) (0.230) (0.233) (0.233)
LEVt−4 -0.691 -0.999* -0.983* -0.983*
(0.575) (0.568) (0.569) (0.569)
BTMt−4 -0.336*** -0.257*** -0.269*** -0.269***
(0.093) (0.087) (0.089) (0.089)
OPCY CLEt−4 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAPINTt−4 2.226* 1.596 1.667 1.663
(1.159) (1.151) (1.153) (1.153)
ROAt−4 4.503*** 3.341*** 3.352*** 3.349***
(1.123) (1.124) (1.145) (1.145)
S CFOt−4 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
PERSt−4 0.111 0.135 0.153 0.152
(0.178) (0.180) (0.181) (0.181)
PREDt−4 -0.447*** -0.321** -0.334** -0.333**
(0.160) (0.160) (0.161) (0.161)
Constant 17.145*** 14.604*** 13.546*** 13.546***
(1.067) (1.153) (1.179) (1.179)
Observations 32,841 32,841 32,841 32,841
Number of ID 2,585 2,585 2,585 2,585
Time F.E. Not Included Year Quarter Quarter
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster S.E. Firm Firm Firm Firm
Adjusted R2 0.637 0.616 0.618 0.618
The estimated model is: INC REMi,t = α + β1GUIDEi,t + β2SHOCKi,t +
β3GUIDEi,tSHOCKi,t + CONTROLS + TimeFE + FirmFE + i,t (5). GUIDEt takes
value 1 if the firm issue guidance in t and zero otherwise. SHOCKt takes value 1 if the firm
suffer an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage in t and zero otherwise. GUIDE EARLYt takes
value 1 if guidance is made before earnings announcement of previous quarter earnings and zero
otherwise. GUIDE LATEt takes value 1 if guidance is made after earnings announcement of
previous quarter earnings and zero otherwise. See APPENDIX-C for control variables definitions.
The sample consist of 32.841 firm-quarter observations for the period 2003-2013. Continuous
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3
Different Shock Size
Dependent Variable: INC REM
EXO DECt ≥ 5% ≥ 10% ≥ 20% ≥ 30% ≥ 60% 0%− 60%
GUIDEt 0.327** 0.312** 0.310** 0.290** 0.257* 0.359**
(0.143) (0.140) (0.138) (0.137) (0.136) (0.145)
SHOCKt 0.102 0.092 0.285* 0.295 0.050 0.185*
(0.104) (0.118) (0.152) (0.193) (0.325) (0.101)
GUIDE SHOCKt -0.345** -0.364* -0.711*** -0.775** 0.077 -0.427***
(0.174) (0.186) (0.248) (0.332) (0.764) (0.162)
Observations 32,841 32,841 32,841 32,841 32,841 32,841
Number of ID 2,585 2,585 2,585 2,585 2,585 2,585
Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included
Time F.E. Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster S.E. Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Adjusted R2 0.618 0.618 0.618 0.618 0.617 0.618
EXO DECt is the difference between the expected coverage for quarter t (ECi,t), and the realized
coverage after the announcement of previous quarter earnings (COVi,t) divided by realized cov-
erage (COVi,t). The sample consist of 32.841 firm-quarter observations for the period 2003-2013.
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, * Indicate significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4
Different Control Samples
Panel A: Estimation Results
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3)
INC REMt Guiding Firms PSM Placebo Shock
GUIDEt 0.338** 0.257 0.251*
(0.148) (0.177) (0.134)
SHOCKt 0.144 -0.039 0.006
(0.111) (0.107) (0.086)
GUIDE SHOCKt -0.357** -0.349* 0.027
(0.166) (0.180) (0.152)
Observations 20,630 12,458 32,841
Number of ID 1,341 1,607 2,585
Control Variables Included Included Included
Time F.E. Quarter Quarter Quarter
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Cluster S.E. Firm Firm Firm
Adjusted R2 0.631 0.695 0.617
Column (1) present the results of estimating equation (5) using guiding firms in non-guiding
quarters as a control sample. Column (2) present the results of estimating equation (5) using
a propensity score matching methodology, we match firms in size, performance, leverage, book-
to-market and analyst coverage before the shock, and requires firms to be in the same industry-
quarter. Column (3) present the results of estimating equation (5) using a random generated shock
replicating the proportion of shocked firms in the original sample. The full sample consist of 32.841
firm-quarter observations for the period 2003-2013. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1%
and 99% levels. ***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
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Table 4 (continued)
Panel B: Balance Properties Propensity Score Matching
Variable
Unmatched Mean
% % Dec.
t-test
V(T)/V(C)
Matched Treated Control bias bias t p>t
SIZE
U 6.181 4.113 102.5
90.4
96.7 0 0.76
M 6.068 6.266 -9.8 -9.33 0 0.89
ROA
U 0.01 -0.006 28.4
91.5
24.4 0 0.24
M 0.01 0.011 -2.4 -3.33 0.001 1.39
LEV
U 0.19443 0.156 21.2
65.4
21.32 0 0.91
M 0.19493 0.208 -7.3 -5.77 0 0.97
AF
U 10.905 3.092 127.7
95.5
148.02 0 0.73
M 10.171 9.821 5.7 3.95 0 0.93
BTM
U 0.505 0.664 -18.3
68.9
-15.36 0 0.14
M 0.512 0.463 5.7 5.8 0 0.34
Sample Ps R2 LR chi2 p > chi2
Mean Med
B R
% %
bias bias Conc. Bad
Unmatched 0.233 16036.42 0 45.9 21.2 136.7 1.31 29 29
Matched 0.007 223.8 0 4.6 5.7 19.4 0.8 14 14
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Table 5
Different Monitoring
Dependent Variable: INC REM
Sample: Low AF High AF No Big-Four Big-Four
GUIDEt 0.576** 0.120 1.185** 0.104
(0.230) (0.166) (0.488) (0.152)
SHOCKt 0.551** 0.028 0.360 0.122
(0.260) (0.105) (0.433) (0.103)
GUIDE SHOCKt -1.040** -0.225 -1.609** -0.179
(0.411) (0.175) (0.681) (0.170)
Observations 18,408 14,433 8,159 21,602
Number of ID 1,927 1,195 855 1,768
Control Variables Included Included Included Included
Time F.E. Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster S.E. Firm Firm Firm Firm
Adjusted R2 0.581 0.690 0.602 0.666
Low AF sample include firm-quarters with analyst coverage lower or equal to
four. High AF sample include firm-quarters with analyst coverage greater than
four. Non Big-Four sample include firm-quarters not audited by a Big-Four
auditing firm. Big-Four sample include firm-quarters audited by a Big-Four
auditing firm. The full sample consist of 32.841 firm-quarter observations for
the period 2003-2013. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99%
levels. ***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 7
Different Managerial Ability
Dependent Variable: INC REM
Sample:
Low Ability High Ability
Managers Managers
GUIDEt 0.436** 0.316
(0.184) (0.207)
SHOCKt 0.065 0.234
(0.148) (0.143)
GUIDE SHOCKt -0.089 -0.636***
(0.199) (0.244)
Observations 9,475 23,366
Number of ID 738 2,305
Control Variables Included Included
Time F.E. Quarter Quarter
Firm F.E. Yes Yes
Cluster S.E. Firm Firm
Adjusted R2 0.625 0.606
Low Ability Managers sample include firm-quarters with a MA SCORE rank
lower or equal to 0.6. High Ability Managers sample include firm-quarters
with a MA SCORE rank greater than 0.6. See APPENDIX-C for variable
definitions. The full sample consist of 32.841 firm-quarter observations for the
period 2003-2013. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99%
levels. ***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 8
Guidance Frequency & the Decision to Stop Guidance
Dependent Variable: INC REM
VARIABLES Low FREQ Mid FREQ High FREQ
GUIDEt 0.437* 0.791*** -0.061
(0.232) (0.269) (0.243)
SHOCKt 0.310** 0.072 -0.110
(0.132) (0.218) (0.215)
GUIDE SHOCKt -0.636* -0.658** -0.058
(0.363) (0.330) (0.259)
STOP INFOt 0.659 0.854 1.130
(0.707) (1.175) (1.059)
STOP STRATEGICt -0.971* 0.567 0.152
(0.529) (0.561) (0.606)
Observations 22,005 5,005 5,831
Number of ID 2,058 648 498
Control Variables Included Included Included
Time F.E. Quarter Quarter Quarter
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Cluster S.E. Firm Firm Firm
Adjusted R2 0.606 0.752 0.699
FREQ range from 1 to 10 indicating the deciles of the industry’s guidance
frequency distribution. Low FREQ sample includes firm-quarters within deciles
1 to 4 of FREQ. Mid FREQ sample includes firm-quarters within deciles 5 to
7 of FREQ. High FREQ sample includes firm-quarters within deciles 8 to 10 of
FREQ. STOP INFO is a dummy variable equal to one for firm-quarters after
the decision to stop guidance if the last guidance was informative, and zero
otherwise. STOP STRATEGIC is a dummy variable equal to one for firm-
quarters after the decision to stop guidance if the last guidance was strategic
and zero otherwise. The full sample consist of 32.841 firm-quarter observations
for the period 2003-2013. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and
99% levels. ***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Chapter 2
Conditional Conservatism and
Management Earnings Forecasts
2.1 Introduction
We test the hypothesis that conditional conservatism and voluntary disclosure of management’s pri-
vate information are complementary mechanisms. Conditional conservatism in accounting stems from
the asymmetric verifiability requirements that result in economic losses being recognized in a more
complete and timelier manner than gains (Basu, 1997). LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that condi-
tional conservatism allows other sources of information to flourish, by providing a hard benchmark
that “makes it possible for alternative ‘soft’ sources to generate credible information on unverifiable
gains” (LaFond and Watts, 2008, p. 452).1 This idea that financial statements discipline other softer
sources of information (including management-initiated disclosures) is not novel (see, e.g., Ball (2001);
Watts (2006)), but has received limited empirical attention and, as noted in Ball et al. (2012), little
is known about how firms credibly commit to different levels of disclosure of private information.
Theoretically, voluntary disclosure can play an informational role if there is a mechanism that
allows managers to truthfully disclose their private information. Otherwise, unverifiable disclosures
are uninformative in equilibrium (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). In this paper, we study if conditional
conservatism acts as a hard benchmark that lends credibility to managerial good news disclosure,
enabling it to ‘flourish.’ In particular, we focus on the links between firm commitment to conditional
conservatism and management guidance behavior. If conservatism, by delaying (accelerating) the
1LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that in the presence of uncertainty conditional conservatism has an information
role. First, conservatism acts as a governance mechanism that reduces managerial incentives and ability to manipulate
accounting earnings. Second, conservative accounting provides a benchmark for current performance that enables other
sources of information to produce credible information.
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accounting recognition of good (bad) news, lends credibility to managerial disclosure, we expect that
more conditionally conservative firms (a) disclose good news more frequently; and (b) third parties
lend greater credibility to such firm-initiated disclosures.
Although no prior research directly tests our predictions, the existing literature offers theoreti-
cal support for them. For example, Guay and Verrecchia (2007) analytically demonstrate that firm
commitment to a conditionally conservative reporting system, combined with voluntary disclosure of
good news, leads to full disclosure, whereby all news about the firm are communicated to markets in
a timely manner, lowering the discount applied by markets in the presence of uncertainty. A further
link between conditional conservatism and good news disclosure that also lends support to the afore-
mentioned predictions is explored in Bertomeu and Marinovic (2016). These authors model optimal
disclosure via hard verifiable information and soft disclosures, and predict that hardness in financial
statements and soft disclosure might be complementary.
Using a large sample of US publicly-listed firms for the period 1997-2014, we test if firm commit-
ment to conditional conservatism (i.e. an ex-ante managerial choice that prevents aggressive account-
ing) triggers the disclosure of good news and lends credibility to management forecast disclosures.
In line with prior research we consider conservatism as “being exogenous and predetermined for the
current generation of managers” (Garc´ıa Lara et al., 2016a, p. 225). We measure commitment to
conditional conservatism using the decile ranking of the average past three- and past five-years of the
Khan and Watts (2009) measure. This measure takes into account how firm-specific characteristics
affect conditional conservatism over time. It also captures the properties of accounting conservatism
that are of interest to our study: the timeliness of losses and the differential timeliness of good and
bad news recognition.
First, we use Khan and Watts (2009) proxy to examine the association between conditional con-
servatism and management forecasts. Then, we assess the effects of conservatism over the credibility
of management forecasts. Credibility is a subjective attribute of disclosure, related to investors’ ap-
praisal of the believability of a given disclosure (Mercer, 2004). We follow prior work and study
management forecasting behavior and the market reaction to those forecasts, to provide evidence on
whether forecast credibility increases in the commitment to conditional conservatism.
We report the following key findings. We find that conditional conservatism is positively (nega-
tively) associated with higher frequency of good (bad) news management earnings forecasts, and that
this association is stronger for good news management forecasts when future stock returns are positive.
This finding is consistent with more conditional conservative firms issuing more guidance when future
good news is anticipated.
47
2. Conditional Conservatism and Management Earnings Forecasts
Next, we focus on analysts’ and market reactions to forecasts. This permits assessing the credi-
bility of management-initiated earnings forecasts. Prior literature suggests that analysts’ and market
reactions to management forecasts depend on (1) the magnitude of the news contained in the forecast
and (2) the extent to which the forecast is perceived as credible (Jennings, 1984, 1987; Ng et al., 2013).
Based on prior literature, Mercer (2004) proposes a framework to assess disclosure credibility. She
argues that there are four main determinants of disclosure credibility: (1) situational incentives; (2)
management credibility; (3) external and internal assurance, and (4) disclosure characteristics. Con-
trolling for the magnitude of the news as well as for the determinants of credibility, we find that after
a management forecast, analysts’ revisions are greater and lead to larger reductions in forecast errors
for more conditionally conservative firms.2 Further, analysts’ estimates dispersion after a management
forecast is lower for more conditionally conservative firms. Overall, we interpret this evidence as ana-
lysts assessing management forecasts as being more credible when issued by conditionally conservative
firms. We also find stronger markets reaction (i.e. larger cumulative abnormal returns) to good news
management forecasts issued by more conditionally conservative firms, but not to bad news forecasts.
This evidence suggests consistency in the evaluation of management forecasts credibility, and provides
further support to our predictions.
Despite our view that firm-level conservatism is predetermined for current managers, we cannot
completely dismiss endogeneity concerns (i.e. potential correlated omitted variables). To alleviate
these concerns we include in our models year- and industry-fixed effects to control for economic trends
and time invariant firm-specific factors that might be confounding variables of conditional conservatism
in explaining management forecasting behavior. We also control for corporate governance quality, given
the evidence in prior work that both conditional conservatism and voluntary disclosure are influenced
by the quality of corporate governance (Eng and Mak, 2003; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007).
Furthermore, to better establish a causal link we conduct two additional tests. First, we exploit
the implementation of the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142, Goodwill and Other
Intangible Assets (FASB 2001, hereafter “SFAS 142”) as a plausible exogenous shock to conditional
conservatism. Cedergren et al. (2015) argue that SFAS 142 forces a greater degree of conditional
conservatism into the reporting system relative to the previous reporting regime, because it requires
annual impairment testing and imposes stricter tests.3 Consistent with the idea that SFAS 142 in-
creased conditional conservatism, Li et al. (2011b) document an increase in the frequency of goodwill
2We also control for the possibility that analysts may systematically issue biased forecasts for more conditionally
conservative firms (e.g., Helbok and Walker (2004))
3The previous standard was the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 121, Accounting for the Impairment
of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to be Disposed Of (hereafter “SFAS 121”).
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impairments after SFAS 142. We find that this plausible exogenous increase in conditional conser-
vatism leads to an increase in good news management earnings forecasts. Second, we follow Lins et al.
(2017) and use their shocks to overall credibility to assess whether management forecasts issued by
more conservative firms elicit stronger market reactions during unexpectedly “low trust” periods. Our
evidence indicates that conditionally conservative firms are more resistant to credibility shocks and
that the beneficial consequences of conservatism over managerial forecasting extend to crisis of trust
periods.
Our paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the literature
investigating conditional conservatism and voluntary disclosure, by providing novel evidence consis-
tent with conditional conservatism acting as a mechanism that disciplines disclosure and allows other
‘softer’ sources of information to thrive. We document a complementary relation between condition-
ally conservative reporting and voluntary managerial disclosure of good news information. This is
consistent and adds to the prior line of research that studies the beneficial consequences of conser-
vatism in accounting (e.g., LaFond and Watts (2008)). There is no prior work directly examining
whether conditional conservatism acts as a mechanism that enables good news disclosure, enhancing
the credibility of management forecasts. However, the work of Hui et al. (2009) and D’Augusta and
DeAngelis (2017) are closely associated. Hui et al. (2009) study the relation between unconditional
conservatism and management forecasts, taking a different theoretical and empirical stance. They
argue that conservatism reduces information asymmetries between managers and shareholders, and
thus, serves as a substitute to management forecasts. Whilst this would hold for bad news disclosure,
where timely recognition of losses could plausibly substitute for its timely disclosure, we argue that
it cannot hold for good news, as conservatism delays the recognition of good news, and thus, cannot
act as a substitute for timely good news disclosure. A second fundamental difference with Hui et al.
(2009) is that they focus on unconditional conservatism (i.e. news independent). It is unlikely that
this type of conservatism bears a contracting/information role (see, e.g., Beaver and Ryan (2005);
Ball and Shivakumar (2005)). Also relevant to our study is the work of D’Augusta and DeAngelis
(2017), which reports a negative association between conditional conservatism and tone management
in the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of 10K filings. This is consistent with
conservatism acting as a disciplining mechanism of softer sources of disclosure.
A further contribution of our study is to provide empirical evidence in favor of the arguments in
LaFond and Watts (2008) and Guay and Verrecchia (2007) that firm commitment to a conditionally
conservative reporting system enhances the credibility of good news disclosure, potentially leading to
full disclosure. Our results provide novel insights on the causal links between conditional conservatism
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and voluntary disclosure, by showing that a plausible exogenous shock to conditional conservatism
increases the frequency of good news management earnings forecasts. This evidence is of relevance in
light of the decade-long debate of FASB, IASB and other regulatory bodies on whether conservatism
is a desirable property of accounting information that should be included into accounting conceptual
frameworks. Our results are consistent with beneficial consequences of conservatism over voluntary
disclosure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 revises prior literature and develops
our main hypotheses. Section 3 describes our research design. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the sample
and empirical results, and Section 6 presents additional analyses. Finally, Section 7 summarizes and
concludes our study.
2.2 Conditional Conservatism and Voluntary Disclosure
The existence of asymmetric verifiability requirements for the recognition of economic gains and losses
in financial statements means that economic losses (bad news) and economic gains (good news) are
treated asymmetrically, particularly when the news is hard-to-verify. This leads to differential time-
liness and persistence of good versus bad news, with bad news being recognized in a timelier and
more complete manner than good news (Basu, 1997). The extant prior literature refers to this form
of conservatism as conditional conservatism.4
In this section, we outline our main hypothesis that conditional conservatism disciplines managerial
voluntary disclosure, influencing its timing and credibility. We start by reviewing the general literature
that establishes that financial reporting quality acts a as mechanism through which managers can
commit to truthful disclosure of private information.
2.2.1 Financial Reporting and Voluntary Disclosure as Complements
At the core of financial reporting is the concept of decision usefulness. The International Accounting
Standards Board, in its Conceptual Framework (developed within the IASB-FASB joint project), notes
that financial information is capable of making a difference in decisions “if it has predictive value,
confirmatory value or both” (IASB, 2010, QC7). Confirmatory value means that financial information
can provide feedback about (confirms or changes) previous evaluations.5 While largely unexplored
4See Beaver and Ryan (2005) for an explanation of the difference between conditional and unconditional conservatism.
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that conditional conservatism has contracting value while unconditional conservatism
only introduces a bias into reported earnings and reduces the scope for conditional conservatism.
5As noted in the conceptual framework, predictive and confirmatory value are interrelated, and information with
predictive value often also has confirmatory value.
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by empirical research, the confirmatory role of financial accounting is key to understand the relation
between financial statements and other information sources (Cascino et al., 2017). For example,
current reported revenue can be used as the basis for predicting future revenues, but importantly, it
can also be used to compare it with revenue predictions for the current year that were made in past
years using management forecasts as well as other industry- and market-wide information sources.
Such comparisons, if unfavorable, would lead to corrections in the processes used by third parties in
considering the information disclosed by the firm.
This confirmatory role of accounting implies that high quality financial reporting disciplines man-
agerial voluntary disclosure both ex-ante and ex-post. Reported current period figures (earnings,
revenues, cash flows, etc.) are observed by third parties, who can then detect deviations with respect
to management forecasts issued in the past and assess the accuracy of prior voluntary disclosure.
Boards, analysts and other interested parties can then question management on detected deviations
ex-post. In turn, managers, aware that their forecasts will come under such scrutiny will make more
truthful and informative disclosures ex-ante.
The above argumentation implies that the disciplining role over disclosure is increasing in the extent
to which the accounting regime imposes that actual outcomes are accurately reported and lowers the
opportunities to misreport current performance. Ball et al. (2012) provide evidence consistent with this
claim. They build on Crawford and Sobel (1982) and argue that voluntary disclosure of information
privately known to the firm can only play an informational role if there is a mechanism that allows
managers to credibly commit to truthful disclosure. Ball et al. (2012) argue that a primary role
of financial reporting is to supply information to use in efficient contracting and in particular, they
propose that firms can make different commitments to truthful disclosure by choosing different levels
of audit of financial outcomes, as measured by audit fees. They show that commitment to higher audit
verification levels is associated with better quality disclosure, as measured by the frequency, specificity,
accuracy and timeliness of management earnings forecasts.
The underlying idea that financial statements discipline disclosure appears in Ball (2001), Watts
(2006) or LaFond and Watts (2008), who argue that financial reports based on independent verifiable
outcomes provide investors with a hard benchmark against which to compare the credibility of other
sources of information. Similarly, a number of analytical papers develop models in line with the
hypothesis that mandatory reporting complements voluntary disclosure, or more generally, that ‘hard’
verifiable information and ‘soft’ disclosure have a complementary relationship (Gigler and Hemmer,
1998; Bertomeu and Marinovic, 2016). However, little empirical research to date has explored the
mechanisms that managers can use to credibly commit to truthful disclosure of private information.
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Exceptions include the work of Ball et al. (2012) and Beniluz (2005).6 Both papers find evidence
consistent with the view that accounting disciplines disclosure. In particular, Beniluz (2005) finds a
negative relation between accounting quality, as measured using earnings management proxies, and
the optimistic biases in both analysts and management earnings forecasts.
Finally, albeit not directly addressing this issue, a number of recent papers also report evidence of
a positive association between accounting quality as measured by earnings quality and the incidence,
frequency, and accuracy of voluntary disclosure (Lennox and Park, 2006; Francis et al., 2008; Gong
et al., 2009), which is suggestive of reporting and disclosure acting as complements.
2.2.2 Conditional Conservatism and the Timing and Credibility of Managerial
Voluntary Disclosure
In the absence of mechanisms that permit commitment to truthful disclosure, managers are expected
to act strategically and use their private information for their own interests. This would lead to the
prediction that voluntary disclosure focuses on news that emphasize positive aspects and affect stock
prices favorably, while de-emphasizing negative news (Dye, 1985; Verrecchia, 1983).
Against this backdrop, we argue that conditional conservatism is an efficient mechanism that di-
rectly disciplines managerial disclosure. Conservatism imposes lower (higher) verification standards
for the recognition of losses (gains). This results in the recognition of losses that managers would
be unwilling to report otherwise. Conditional conservatism thereby reassures outside investors that
unverifiable gains will not be overemphasized and that losses will not be under-reported, providing a
‘hard’ benchmark for current earnings.7 Indeed, by imposing timely and complete recognition of bad
news, third parties interested in the firm can directly assess the truthfulness of past management fore-
casts of current figures by comparing them with realized outcomes. If managers have been optimistic
in their disclosures, conditional conservatism accelerates the discovery of poor quality disclosure, im-
proving monitoring ex-post, i.e., it permits a wide range of financial statements users, from boards
of directors to lenders or analysts, to detect and question managers on deviations between forecasts
6Some recent findings suggests that certain features of mandatory reporting and disclosure may be substitutes of
voluntary disclosure. For example, Guay et al. (2016) argues and shows that greater complexity in mandatory disclosure
(as measured by information readability) is associated with greater voluntary disclosure.
7To illustrate, consider the case of a pharmaceutical firm. If a medication is discovered to have side effects, the news
would be recognized if it is bad (i.e., the treatment cures headaches but causes liver failure) by writing off any associated
R&D assets and recognizing a provision for the firm best estimate of its expected future payments to those affected.
That is, bad news is recognized in a timely and complete manner. However, if the news is good (i.e., the treatment cures
headaches and also, acne), its recognition would be delayed until the increased sales and cash flows accrue to the firm.
It would then be up to the firm to voluntarily disclose its best estimate of the expected value of this good news. In
both scenarios, firms’ commitment to conditional conservatism would reassure outside investors that good news are not
overemphasized and that bad news are not under-reported.
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and realizations. Recurrent deviations could, in the best case scenario, be interpreted as a sign of
low managerial ability in forecasting, and in the worst case scenario, of managerial deceit. Knowing
that conservatism negates the possibility of delaying the recognition of losses, and therefore, that opti-
mistic forecasts will come under scrutiny in the short-term, means that conditional conservatism also
deters managers from issuing untruthful disclosure ex-ante, as any unwarranted optimism unravels
immediately: as soon as the outcomes realize.
Hence, conditional conservatism enhances the confirmatory role of accounting directly, because of
its disciplining ex-ante and ex-post roles. In addition, conditional conservatism is predicted to enable
disclosure and enhance its credibility indirectly at least through two channels.
First, conditional conservatism lowers managerial ability to misreport current performance. As
noted above, the extent to which managers are able to misreport lowers the disciplining value of
accounting. Watts (2003) and LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that managers have incentives to
overemphasize unverifiable gains but tend to be unwilling to report on unverifiable losses. Condi-
tional conservatism, by imposing lower verification standards for the recognition of losses relative to
gains, acts as a governance mechanism that reduces managerial incentives and ability to manipulate
earnings. Garc´ıa Lara et al. (2016b) study the links between earnings management and conditional
conservatism and provide empirical support for this claim, while a number of studies provide evidence
indicating that more conditionally conservative firms provide more accurate and reliable information.
Particularly, conservatism is associated with improvements in the firm information environment, as
indicated by lower cost of equity (Garc´ıa Lara et al., 2011), lower cost of debt and better assessment
of default risk for lenders (Ahmed et al., 2002; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008), and decreases in informa-
tion asymmetry (Francis et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2013). Conservatism is also associated with better
corporate governance (Beekes et al., 2004; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). Overall, this body of research
shows that conditional conservatism acts as a governance mechanism that improves contracting and
lowers agency costs.
Second, conditional conservatism indirectly influences disclosure through its consequences over
managerial decision-making. Prior literature indicates that conditional conservatism is useful to mon-
itor and discipline managers, as it improves investment efficiency (Francis and Martin, 2010) and
facilitates firm access to financing sources (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Zhang, 2008). Conservatism has
also been shown to lower stock price crash risk (Kim and Zhang, 2016), to improve the alignment of
managerial decisions-making with shareholders’ incentives (Louis et al., 2012), and to lead to higher
SEO announcement returns due to lower financing costs in SEOs (Kim et al., 2013). Thus, conditional
conservatism is expected to affect the underlying distribution of economic gains and losses (good and
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bad news), through better decision-making.
There is no prior empirical work directly studying our predictions. D’Augusta and DeAngelis
(2017) provide empirical evidence suggesting that conditional conservatism lessens tone management
in the MD&A section of the 10K filings of industrial companies, consistent with a disciplining role
of conditional conservatism. Also related is the work of Hui et al. (2009), who study the links be-
tween conservatism and management forecasts, but focusing on unconditional conservatism, a news
independent type of conservatism (Beaver and Ryan, 2005; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).8 This choice
leads them to predict and report evidence that unconditional conservatism serves as a substitute to
management forecasts. Whilst this may hold partially for realized bad news disclosure, where timely
recognition of losses could substitute for timely disclosure, it does not hold for forward-looking disclo-
sure of bad news or for good news disclosure, as conservatism delays the recognition of good news, and
thus, cannot act as a substitute for timely good news disclosure. In agreement with this view, Jaggi
et al. (2014) argue that Hui et al. (2009) results do not consider the heterogeneity in management fore-
casts, questioning the links between unconditional conservatism and management forecasts.9 Perhaps
closer to our argumentation is the theoretical work of Guay and Verrecchia (2007), who argue that in
the presence of uncertainty, markets apply a discount to firm value because managers have incentives
to act strategically (i.e. withhold bad news and disclose good news) when there is no mandatory
disclosure requirements. They show that commitment to timely recognition of bad news, together
with voluntary disclosure of good news results in full disclosure. Full disclosure implies that all news
concerning firm value are more timely communicated to markets (i.e. no information is withheld),
reducing the discount that markets apply in the presence of uncertainty. The theoretical model by
Guay and Verrecchia (2007) suggests a complementary relationship between conditional conservatism
and voluntary disclosure in communicating firm information.
2.2.3 Main Predictions
Given the above discussion, we formulate two empirical predictions. First, if conditionally conservative
reports asymmetrically recognize unrealized gains and losses, with bad news being recognized in a more
timely and complete manner, we expect that managers of more conditionally conservative firms will
voluntarily issue more (less) good (bad) news information. Conditional conservatism imposes delayed
8They use the bias component of the book-to-market ratio as in Beaver and Ryan (2000), the negative accruals proxy
of Givoly and Hayn (2000) and the C-score of Penman and Zhang (2002).
9Also related is the study of Li (2008), who argues that managers incentives to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts lead
them to issue more voluntary disclosure to inform analyst about the downward bias in earnings caused by unconditional
conservatism, and induce a downward revision of analysts’ forecasts. While Sun and Xu (2012) claim that management
failure to fully incorporate historical accounting conservatism effects on realized earnings results in optimistically biased
management forecasts.
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good news recognition, i.e., often times, good news are not recognized until their associated cash flows
are realized. This means that, by construction, conditionally conservative firms are unlikely to have
(internally known) unrealized bad news they need to disclose to markets, as bad news are recognized
in the firm financial statements more timely. In contrast, if the firm has (internally known) unrealized
gains, the constraints imposed by conditional conservatism to the recognition of gains imply that the
only way to communicate the good news to the market is thorough disclosure. Accordingly, our first
hypothesis is:
H1: Conditional conservatism is positively (negatively) associated with managerial volun-
tary disclosure of good (bad) news information.
Although this prediction might seem na¨ıve, there are several reasons why is not obvious that
more conditional conservative firms will disclose more good news information. First, committing to
timely and complete recognition of bad news does not mean that firms will ‘fabricate’ future good
news by overestimating the amount of recognized bad news. Against the common misconception that
conditional conservatism is an income decreasing form of earnings management, Garc´ıa Lara et al.
(2016b) find evidence consistent with conditional conservatism limiting downward accruals manipula-
tion. Second, conditional conservatism does not eliminate incentives to meet-or-beat earnings (MBE)
benchmarks, and sufficiently high MBE incentives may lead to more bad news disclosure (Konrad,
2018). Finally, it is not clear that debt-contracting incentives associated with conservatism will lead
to more good news disclosures, given that bondholders might have more direct mechanisms to obtain
firm information.
Our second empirical prediction is related with the effects of conservatism on disclosure credibil-
ity. Prior literature defines disclosure credibility as “investors’ perceptions of the believability of a
particular disclosure” (Mercer, 2004, p.186). Building on the previously reviewed literature that indi-
cates that hardness in financial reporting lends credibility to softer sources of information, we predict
that firm commitment to more conditional conservative reporting acts as a disciplining mechanism
that lends credibility to managerial disclosure, enabling it to ‘flourish,’ and particularly, to good news
disclosure, which, ceteris paribus would be subject to lower credibility, given the aforementioned man-
agerial incentives to disclose strategically. Stated in the alternative form our second hypothesis is as
follows:
H2: Conditional conservatism is associated with greater credibility of managerial voluntary
disclosure of good and bad news information.
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2.3 Research Design
To test our predictions we use a proxy for commitment to conditional conservatism based on the
measure of Khan and Watts (2009).10 Starting from the Basu (1997) model:
Xi = β1 + β2Di + β3Ri + β4DiRi + ei (2.1)
Where the dependent variable, Xi, is earnings scaled by lagged price, Ri are annual stock returns,
and Di is a dummy variable equal to one if returns are negative and zero otherwise. Khan and Watts
(2009) specify the Basu (1997) asymmetric earnings timeliness coefficients (β3 and β4) as a linear
function of firm size, market to book and leverage:11
G SCORE ≡ β3 = µ1 + µ2Sizei + µ3MtoBi + µ4LEVi (2.2)
C SCORE ≡ β4 = λ1 + λ2Sizei + λ3MtoBi + λ4LEVi (2.3)
G SCORE is a firm-year estimation of the timeliness to good news, and C SCORE is a firm-year
estimation of the incremental timeliness to bad news. The sum of both coefficients measures the
total timeliness to bad news. Estimators of µ’s and λ’s are constant across firms but vary over time,
therefore to obtain a firm-year measure of conditional conservatism Khan and Watts (2009) substitute
equations (2) and (3) into regression model (1) to obtain the annual cross-sectional regression model
used to estimate C SCORE and G SCORE:
Xi =β1 + β2Di +Ri(µ1 + µ2Sizei + µ3MtoBi + µ4LEVi) +DiRi(λ1+
λ2Sizei + λ3MtoBi + λ4LEVi) + (δ1Sizei + δ2MtoBi + δ3LEVi+
δ4DiSizei + δ5DiMtoBi + δ6DiLEVi) + i
(2.4)
We take the three-year average of C SCORE (i.e. incremental timeliness to bad news) and define
our proxy for conditional conservatism as the annual decile of this average. We denote this mea-
sure as CO RANK. Taking the three-year average helps us to better capture firm commitment to
conditionally conservative financial reporting.12
As in Garc´ıa Lara et al. (2016a) we consider conservatism (i.e. an ex-ante commitment that
10While there are some concerns about the validity of Basu’s (1997) derived measures of conditional conservatism
(Patatoukas and Thomas, 2015), prior research (Ettredge et al., 2012; Jayaraman, 2012; Ball et al., 2013a,b) documents
that Khan and Watts (2009) provides a valid measure of conditional conservatism.
11Prior literature shows that conservatism changes with these variables (e.g., LaFond and Watts (2008)).
12Taking the average and the decile rank of the average helps to mitigate measurement errors and nonlinearity concerns,
facilitating the interpretation of our results.
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prevents aggressive accounting) to be predetermined for current managers. In line with this view,
reporting conservatism is expected to be stable over time Givoly et al. (2007), and prior literature
show that conservatism measures are fairly stable at the firm level (Khan and Watts, 2009; Callen
et al., 2010). Appendix A provides details on the estimation of C SCORE and G SCORE and
validates our proxy of conditional conservatism.13
2.3.1 Conditional Conservatism and Management Forecast Frequency
Under H1, we hypothesize that conditional conservatism is associated with the frequency of good and
bad news disclosure. To test this prediction we use the following simple model:
MFt = β0 + β1 ∗ CO RANKt−n + γ ∗ Controlst−4 + t (2.5)
where, MFt is a proxy for the frequency of good and bad news management forecast frequency.
CO RANK is our proxy of firm commitment to conditional conservatism as defined above. Model (5)
incorporates industry- and year- fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Management forecast frequency is measured by GUIDE and MF REG. GUIDE is a dummy
variable equal to one if the firm issues an earnings per share (EPS) management forecast in a particular
quarter and zero otherwise. Following Cheng et al. (2007b), we consider initial quarterly forecast of the
next quarter’s earnings issued within a window of (-90, 45) days, where day 0 is the fiscal quarter-end
date.14 MF REG is a variable indicating the number of quarters in which the firm issues an EPS
management forecast over the last four quarters.
To test H1, we divide our measures depending on whether they represent good or bad news
disclosure. GUIDE GN (GUIDE BN) disclosure is measured by a dummy variable equal to one
if the EPS management forecast is greater (lower) than the mean analysts’ consensus EPS estimate
at the management forecast date and zero otherwise. MF REG GN (MF REG BN) indicates the
number of quarters in which the firm issues a good (bad) news forecast over the last four quarters.
Under H1, we expect β1 in model (5) to be positive and significant for good news disclosures. In
contrast, if timely recognition of losses acts as substitute for timely disclosure of losses, we expect a
negative β1 for bad news disclosures. A positive (negative) β1 for good (bad) news disclosure implies
that conditional conservatism acts as a complement for timely voluntary disclosure of good news and
a substitute for timely disclosure of losses.
13Our results are robust to using also the five-year average, and total timeliness of loss recognition (C SCORE +
G SCORE) as our proxy for conditional conservatism.
14In untabulated sensitivity analyses, we exclude forecasts made after fiscal quarter end (i.e. earnings pre-
announcements), and our findings remain qualitatively similar.
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We follow prior literature to control for other determinants of management forecast frequency. We
control for firm size (SIZE) as the costs of voluntary disclosure decrease as firms’ size increase (Lang
and Lundholm, 1993; Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Baginski and Hassell, 1997); book-to-market (BTM) to
take into account the effects of growth opportunities on firm’s voluntary disclosure behavior (Bamber
and Cheon, 1998); return on assets (ROA) to control for earnings performance effects on disclosure
(Miller, 2002); number of analyst following (AF ) and institutional ownership (INST ) to proxy for the
demand for firm forward-looking information, a positive association is expected (Ajinkya et al., 2005;
Healy and Palepu, 2001; Hirst et al., 2008); analysts forecast dispersion (DIS) is expected to be nega-
tively associated with management earnings forecasts because managers might perceive that earnings
are harder to predict (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Ajinkya et al., 2005); earnings volatility (S EARN),
cash-flow volatility (S CFO), and stock return volatility (RET V OL) to proxy for uncertainty and
the difficulty in predicting earnings (Waymire, 1985; Healy and Palepu, 2001); litigation risks (LIT )
because firms in high litigation industries are more likely to issue guidance to avoid potential litiga-
tion caused by withholding information (Skinner, 1994, 1997; Rogers and Stocken, 2005). We also
control for bid-ask spread (BID ASK) as a proxy for information asymmetry, a positive association
is expected. See Appendix B for variables definitions.
In addition to SIZE and BTM we also control for leverage (LEV ), these three variables are used
to calculate our measure of conditional conservatism. Including these variables as controls alleviates
concerns that our measure of conservatism captures the effect of these variables.
2.3.2 Conditional Conservatism and the Credibility of Management Forecasts
Under H2, we hypothesize that conditional conservatism lends credibility to management earnings
forecasts. To test this prediction we use the following model:
Yt =β0 + β1 ∗ CO RANKt−n + β2 ∗N SIZE + β3 ∗N SIZE ∗ CO RANKt−n
+ γ ∗ Controlst + t
(2.6)
where, Yt is a proxy for management forecast credibility. Model (6) incorporates industry- and
year- fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
We define management forecast credibility following prior work (Jennings, 1987; Mercer, 2004;
Hutton et al., 2003), and measure it using the reaction to management forecasts. To the extent that
conservatism lends credibility to management voluntary disclosure, allowing softer sources of infor-
mation on difficult-to-verify good news to flourish, we expect conditionally conservative firms will
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experience a larger analysts’ and market reaction in response to management forecasts. However,
analysts’ and market reactions are a function of both the news embedded in the forecast, and its cred-
ibility (Jennings, 1987; Ng et al., 2013). In our model, the magnitude of forecasts news is captured by
N SIZE, which is the absolute value of the difference between management earnings forecasts (mid-
point for range forecasts) and the most recent mean consensus analyst forecast. While the interaction
term N SIZE ∗CO RANK isolates the credibility portion of the reaction to management forecasts.
Mercer (2004) literature review proposes a framework to evaluate disclosure credibility, based on
four factors: (1) Situational Incentives, investors are less likely to believe managerial disclosure when
managers have incentives to be untruthful. Prior work suggests that investors react to management
forecasts as if they understand situational incentives. For example, bad news are expected to be more
credible because managers have incentives to be optimistic in their disclosures (McNichols, 1989).
Accordingly, several studies find that bad news management forecasts lead to larger analyst forecast
revisions and stock price reactions relative to good news forecasts (Williams, 1996; Skinner, 1994; Soffer
et al., 2000; Hutton et al., 2003; Ng et al., 2013). Analysts’ and market responses are also consistent
with situational incentives related to financial distress, litigation risk, insider trading, and competitive
pressures. 15 (2) Management Credibility, investors are less likely to believe managers with bad
reputations. Existing empirical evidence suggests that markets and investors response to management
forecasts is larger when managers develop a reputation of issuing accurate forecasts (Williams, 1996;
Ng et al., 2013). (3) External and Internal Assurance, external (e.g. auditors) and internal (e.g. board
of directors) assurance can increase disclosure credibility. Prior literature find evidence consistent with
governance mechanisms affecting disclosure credibility (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas,
2005). (4) Disclosure Characteristics, various aspects of the disclosure are likely to affect its credibility.
These features include the disclosure’s precision, venue, horizon, supporting information and inherent
plausibility. Prior literature finds that more precise, timely, plausible management forecasts and those
accompanied by supporting information are perceived as more credible (Mercer, 2004; Hirst et al.,
2008).
We follow the framework in Mercer (2004) and control for several factors associated with disclo-
sure credibility. We control for financial distress (FD), litigation risk (LIT ), insider transactions
(INSIDE) and industry concentration (HHI) to account for situational incentives. We control for
15Prior work shows that financially distressed firms have greater incentives to issue misleading forecasts because the
benefits (costs) of inaccuracy are higher (lower) (Koch, 2002); also, that firms facing greater litigation risk are more likely
to issue less (more) optimistic (pessimistic) forecasts (Rogers and Stocken, 2005), and managers have more incentives to
mislead when trading opportunistically on their own stock (e.g. insider acquisitions after a bad news forecasts) (Rogers
and Stocken, 2005). Finally, managers of firms in more concentrated industries have greater incentives to mislead (i.e.
issue overly pessimistic forecasts) to discourage entry (Rogers and Stocken, 2005).
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prior management forecast accuracy (ACCURACY ) as a proxy for management credibility. To ac-
count for external and internal assurance effects we control for institutional ownership (INST ), the
composition of the board of directors (BINDEP ) and the proportion of financial experts on the
audit committee (AUDIT FE). Additionally, we control for disclosure characteristics, by including
controls for horizon (GUIDE H), specificity (GUIDE S), and supporting information (SUPPORT ).
Finally, following Ball et al. (2012), we also control for market value of equity (MVE), leverage (LEV ),
book-to-market (BTM), number of analyst following (AF ), and stock return volatility (RET V OL).
Appendix B contains all variable definitions.
As noted above, we measure analysts’ and market reactions to management forecasts using a
number of measures. Next, we explain our proxies for each of these constructs in turn.
Analysts’ reactions to management forecasts
Our first proxy for analysts’ reaction to management forecasts is AF CORR, which measures the
change in analysts’ forecasts five days after the issuance of a management forecast,16 and is calculated
as the change in the absolute difference (scaled by lagged quarter closing price) between EPS mean
consensus estimate and management forecast before and after guidance, multiplied by minus one.
A positive (negative) value indicates a correction of analysts’ mean forecast towards (away from)
the management forecast. Our second proxy is ∆AF ERROR that indicates the change in analysts’
forecast error five days after the issuance of management forecasts, where the forecast error is measured
as the absolute value of the difference between mean estimate and the actual EPS for that quarter
scaled by lagged quarter closing price. A negative (positive) value indicates a decrease (increase)
in analysts’ forecast error. Our third proxy is DIS AFTER, which indicates analysts’ estimates
dispersion and is measured as the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts after a management forecast,
a larger value implies greater disagreement among analysts.17
In model (6), we expect β1 and β3 to be positive (negative) when the dependent variable is
AF CORR (∆AF ERROR), suggesting greater reaction to forecasts made by more conditionally
conservative firms and also, a greater reduction in analysts’ forecast error. Finally, if management
forecasts are informative, β2 will be positive (negative) when the dependent variable is AF CORR
(∆AF ERROR), and we should observe a larger coefficient for bad news forecasts in accordance with
the idea that bad news are inherently more credible (Mercer, 2004; Hutton et al., 2003). When the
16Consistent with Cotter et al. (2006), in our sample around 45% of analysts revise their forecasts within five days of
earnings guidance. Longer windows have also been used in prior work (see e.g. Pae et al. (2016)). Our results are robust
to using ten, fifteen and twenty days within earnings guidance as alternatives.
17Results are consistent if we use the median consensus estimate to calculate AF CORR and ∆AF ERROR.
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dependent variable is DIS AFTER, we expect β1 and β3 to be negative, indicating more agreement
among analysts after forecasts made by more conditionally conservative firms and β2 to be positive as
analysts might react differently to the same forecast.
A natural question that arises at this point is whether analysts incorporate conditional conser-
vatism into their earnings forecasts, and how this might affect their reaction to management forecasts.
If analysts fail to incorporate conditional conservatism into their earnings forecasts either due to lack
of motivation or lack of ability, we risk finding a mechanical relation between analysts’ reaction to
management forecasts and conditional conservatism, because analysts’ forecast errors would be sys-
tematically biased for more conservative firms. Prior research tackles this question, helping to dispel
this concern, as it suggests that analysts are sophisticated users of accounting information that do
understand the effects of conditional conservatism on reported earnings. A number of prior studies
show that, although a certain heterogeneity exists in terms of the degree to which analysts understand
complex accounting transactions, on aggregate, analysts’ forecasts incorporate the effects of conser-
vatism (Heflin et al., 2015; Jung et al., 2017), and for example, that late-in-the period forecasts are not
different for more conservative firms. Helbok and Walker (2004) argue that when reported earnings
are conservative analysts face a dilemma, whether to forecast reported or ‘sustainable’ earnings. They
claim that analysts solve this dilemma by focusing on ‘sustainable’ earnings early in the year and then
revising the forecast to incorporate any information that reflect the impact of any transitory items.
More recent research by Louis et al. (2014) is in line with Helbok and Walker (2004), while Sohn
(2012) results suggest that end of period analyst forecast errors for more conservative firms are not
different from those of less conservative firms.
Despite the reassurance provided by this literature, to ensure that we control for this possibility,
we follow this prior work and when estimating analysts’ reaction to management forecasts, we include
two additional controls in model (6). First, we control for the level of forecast error before a man-
agement forecast (FE BEFORE) to account for systematic analysts’ forecast biases associated with
conditional conservatism (Helbok and Walker, 2004; Louis et al., 2014). Second, we control for ab-
normal accruals (AB ACC) because Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) argue that firm reporting choices
affect analysts’ forecast errors. In particular, they show that the recognition of unexpected accruals
is associated with asymmetries in forecasts errors distributions.18
18A greater number and magnitude of extreme optimistic analyst forecasts relative to pessimistic forecasts, and higher
incidence of small pessimistic relative to small optimistic analyst forecasts.
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Market reaction to management forecasts
Following previous research (Mercer, 2004; Hutton et al., 2003; Ng et al., 2013), we measure market
reaction to management forecasts by studying cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over the 3-day
window surrounding the forecast date. CAR is estimated using the market model.19
To the extent that conditional conservatism increases forecast credibility we expect β1 in model (6)
to be positive (negative) and significant for good (bad) news forecasts, when the dependent variable
is CAR. If management forecasts are informative we expect β2 to be positive (negative) for good
(bad) news forecasts. We also expect β2 to be larger for bad news relative to good news forecasts,
indicating the former are more credible (Mercer, 2004; Hutton et al., 2003). Finally, we expect a
positive (negative) and significant β3 for good (bad) news forecasts, capturing the market reaction
beyond that generated by the magnitude of the forecast (i.e. increased credibility that can be attributed
to conditional conservatism).
2.4 Sample and Results
We collect management forecast data from I/B/E/S Guidance, financial data from Compustat, secu-
rities data from CRSP, analyst coverage data from I/B/E/S and institutional ownership information
from Thomson Reuters 13F.20 After imposing all data requirements for the estimation of model (5),
our final sample consists of 3,056 US publicly-listed firms over the period 1997-2014, and 94,134 firm-
quarter observations. We winsorize continuous variables at the 1% and 99% of their distributions to
mitigate concerns regarding outliers.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our sample firms. Panel A shows that firm-quarter obser-
vations are evenly distributed across years and conservatism ranks. Panel B reports the distribution of
firms and quarterly EPS management forecasts by year. Around 80% of our sample firms issue at least
one forecast during the period, of which 30.39% are good news and 68.96% are bad news. The number
of forecasts increases significantly during the first years of our sample period and specially after the
passage of Reg. FD in August 2000. We introduce year fixed-effects in our models to account for these
time trends. Throughout the period, the proportion of bad news forecasts doubles that of good news
forecasts. This is consistent with managerial use of forecasts to issue early warnings to avoid litiga-
tion risk and reputation costs (Skinner, 1994) and also, to lower analysts’ expectations to facilitate
19We obtain qualitatively similar results when CAR is calculated from a four factor model and/or using a 5-day window
around the forecast date.
20Because I/B/E/S provides analyst and management forecasts based in their own version of earnings (i.e. street
earnings) we also use I/B/E/S actual earnings rather than Compustat actual earnings to avoid introducing measurement
error in our dependent variables.
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beating analysts’ forecasts subsequently (i.e., earnings guidance) (Matsumoto, 2002). This evidence
is also consistent with limited disclosure of good news, potentially, because of lack of credibility or to
avoid loss of competitive advantage. The patterns observed are also consistent with evidence in Chuk
et al. (2013) suggesting Thomson First Call’s Company Issued Guidance (CIG)21 database coverage
is incomplete and biased towards bad news management forecasts.22 Panel C shows the number of
unique firms by the number of forecast issued in our entire sample period. There are 1,489 (779) firms
that do not issue good news (bad news) guidance and 633 firms that do not issue guidance. Panel C
also shows that around 51% (75%) of sample firms issue a good news (bad news) management forecast
in at least one quarter. Most sample firms issue guidance with high frequency. In fact, 9% (21%) of
them issue good news (bad news) management forecasts in ten or more quarters. Panel D confirms
that firms issue more bad news forecasts on average. The average firm issues bad news forecasts in
nine quarters, and good news forecasts in four quarters.
Table 1 Panel E reports quarterly EPS management forecasts by conservatism rank. The uni-
variate relation between management forecast frequency and conservatism appears to be negative.
However, this evidence does not control for other determinants of management forecast frequency. We
explore those in Panel G. This also may explain the positive (negative) univariate association between
conditional conservatism and bad news (good news) voluntary disclosure. Panel F show that our final
sample is composed mostly of large and profitable firms, and that the distribution of our conservatism
measure is similar to the distribution of the entire estimation sample.23
Table 1 Panel G shows mean values of selected variables by conservatism rank. First, we consider
the distribution of situational incentives variables. On average firms in the top deciles of conditional
conservative are slightly more financially distressed, have less litigation concerns, and have more insider
stock and options acquisitions relative to firms in the bottom decile. There is no significant difference
regarding market concentration. More financially distressed firms have greater incentives to issue
misleading management forecasts because the benefits (costs) associated with inaccurate forecasts are
higher (lower) (Mercer, 2004; Koch, 2002). Second, we examine management credibility. Accuracy
is fairly constant across groups, although firms in the top deciles of conditional conservatism score
slightly lower in managerial credibility. Third, internal and external assurance variables indicate that
on average more conditionally conservative firms have lower institutional ownership. There is no
significant difference in board independence. Importantly, guidance characteristic variables indicate
21I/B/E/S Guidance was merged with First Call CIG, after the acquisition of First Call by Thomson.
22Our main results are robust to limiting the early years in our sample (i.e. excluding observations prior to 1999) and
to limiting our sample only to firms covered by I/B/E/S.
23See Appendix A, Table A2.
63
2. Conditional Conservatism and Management Earnings Forecasts
that more conditionally conservative firms issue guidance slightly later in the period, and issue more
guidance on additional measures (e.g. revenue forecasts) relative to less conservative firms. This
is consistent with conditionally conservative firms issuing differential guidance, and with these firms
disclosing more information (providing guidance on additional measures, such as revenue), consistent
with the complementary hypothesis.
Regarding the distribution of other variables over conservatism rank, we find that firm size, return
on assets, analyst following and abnormal accruals are monotonically decreasing on conservatism
rank, while book-to-market is monotonically increasing in conservatism rank. Leverage is higher for
firms in the top decile relative to firms in the bottom decile. These associations are consistent with
prior theoretical and empirical predictions (Watts, 2003; LaFond and Watts, 2008; Khan and Watts,
2009), further validating CO RANK as a good measure of conservatism in our sample. Finally,
we observe that analysts forecast error before guidance is increasing in conservatism rank. These
results are consistent with Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) concern that analysts’ forecast biases may
be associated with firm reporting choices and confirms the importance of include FE BEFORE as a
control variable in our multivariate analysis of analysts and market reactions to management forecasts.
Overall, the evidence in Table 1 serves to validate our conditional conservatism proxy and suggests
that it is unlikely that it spuriously captures other determinants of management forecasts’ credibil-
ity. It also ratifies the need to control for the determinants of credibility in our analyses and offers
some preliminary evidence that conditional conservatism and managerial voluntary disclosure through
management forecasts act as complements.
2.4.1 Conditional Conservatism and Management Forecasts Frequency
Table 2 reports the results for the estimation of model (5).24 The coefficient on CO RANK for good
news forecasts (columns 1 and 3) is significantly positive, while for bad news forecasts (columns 2 and
4) is significantly negative. Consistent with H1, this result suggests a positive (negative) association
between conditional conservatism and good news (bad news) voluntary disclosure.
In terms of economic magnitude, other things equal, moving from the bottom to the top decile
of conditional conservatism implies an increase in the probability of issuing good news forecasts of
2.42% (column 1). The probability of issuing a good news earnings forecasts in a given quarter for our
sample equals 8.6%, which means that firms in the top decile of conditional conservatism are 28.13%
(2.42%/8.6%) more likely to issue good news than firms in the bottom decile. For bad news earnings
24In Table 2 the dependent variables were multiplied by 100, so the coefficients on CO RANK is interpreted as
percentages.
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forecasts (column 2) moving from the bottom to the top decile of conservatism implies a decrease
in the probability of issuing bad news of 6.02%. This can be interpreted as firms in the top decile
of conditional conservatism being 31.03% (6.02%/19.4%) less likely to issue bad news. Regarding
forecast regularity (columns 3 and 4), moving from the bottom to the top decile entails a 29.49%
(24.32%) increase (decrease) in good (bad) news regularity.25 This suggests the effect of conservatism
is economically large.
As expected, the coefficient on SIZE is positive, indicating that larger firms issue more earnings
guidance. The coefficient on BTM is positive for good news and negative for bad news, indicating that
growth opportunities are negatively (positively) associated with good (bad) news disclosure. Firms
with higher ROA are less (more) likely to issue good (bad) news forecasts. The coefficient on AF is
positive and significant consistent with an increased demand for forward-looking disclosure in firms
with more analyst following. The coefficient on INST is positive as expected, and significant for both
good and bad news forecasts. Consistent with S EARN , DIS and RET V OL being surrogates for
the difficulty of predicting earnings we observe negative coefficients as predicted by prior literature.
The coefficient on BID ASK is positive, consistent with firms issuing more earnings guidance when
information asymmetries are higher. Finally, firms with higher AB ACC are less (more) likely to issue
good (bad) news forecasts.
To further tease out if the reason why more conditionally conservative firms issue more good news
earnings forecasts is to disclose good news (particularly, difficult-to-verify expected future profits), we
look at the association between conditional conservatism and good news voluntary disclosure when
future good news is anticipated (i.e. positive RETt+1).
26
Table 3 presents evidence on the moderating effect of future stock market returns over the associa-
tion between conditional conservatism and voluntary disclosure of good news. The results indicate that
the association between conservatism and good news forecasts (column 1) is stronger in anticipation of
one-quarter ahead stock returns, whereas no such association is found for bad news management fore-
casts (column 2). In terms of economic significance, other things being equal, one standard deviation
increase in future stock returns means an additional 0.58% increase in the likelihood of issuing a good
news forecast for a firm moving from the bottom to the top decile of our measure of conservatism.
Overall, this test provides evidence consistent with conditional conservatism enabling truthful good
news disclosure.
25Results in columns 3 and 4 are robust to estimating model (5) using a orderer probit panel data approach.
26Results are robust to alternatively using expected returns from the market model or the four-factors model.
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2.4.2 Conditional Conservatism and Management Forecasts Credibility
Thus far, our results indicate that conditional conservatism influences the frequency of good and bad
news management forecasts, and that good news forecasting in conditionally conservative firms is
associated with future positive returns. Next, we focus on the credibility of these forecasts.
First, we look at analysts’ reaction to management forecasts. Figure 1 plots the univariate relation
between analysts’ reactions and management forecasts. Figure 1.1 shows that analysts’ corrections
after management forecasts monotonically increase in conditional conservatism whereas Figure 1.2
shows that analysts’ forecasts errors after guidance monotonically decrease in conditional conservatism.
This evidence suggests that management forecasts made by more conditionally conservative firms
trigger a stronger reaction (in the expected direction). This is consistent with prior literature indicating
that analysts are concerned about the accuracy of their earnings forecasts and seek to minimize forecast
errors (Stickel, 1992; Mikhail et al., 1999; Hong and Kubik, 2003).
To provide further evidence on whether conditional conservatism increases the credibility of man-
agement forecasts, we also analyze market reactions to such forecasts. Figure 2 plots mean cumulative
abnormal returns around the day of the management forecast for firms in the top and bottom decile
of our conservatism measure.27 Figures 2.1 and 2.2 plot mean market reactions to good and bad news
management forecasts, respectively. Both figures reveal a stronger market reaction to forecasts made
by more conservative firms. The effect is around 2 basis points larger for forecasts made by firms in
the top rank of conservatism relative to firms in the bottom rank.
Table 4 presents the results from a formal test on the links between conditional conservatism and
the credibility of management forecasts (model (6)).28 Table 4 Panel A shows the results for good
news management forecasts. When the dependent variable is AF CORR (columns 1 and 2), we find a
positive and significant coefficient of 0.327 (column 2) on the interaction term (N SIZE∗CO RANK),
indicating that analysts’ revisions in reaction to forecast news increase with conditional conservatism,
consistent with H2. In terms of economic magnitude, a one standard deviation change in N SIZE
implies a 29.72% incremental analyst revision for good news forecasts issued by firms in the top decile
of CO RANK relative to firms in the bottom decile. We also find a negative and significant coefficient
forN SIZE∗CO RANK when the dependent variable is ∆AF ERROR (columns 3 and 4), indicating
that the reduction in analyst forecast errors after good news management forecasts is larger for more
conditional conservative firms. The coefficient of -0.234 on N SIZE ∗CO RANK (column 4) implies
27In Figure 2 CAR is calculated using the market model but we get similar patterns when using the four-factor model.
28Untabulated univariate results indicate, for both types of news, that conditional conservatism is positively (nega-
tively) associated with AF CORR (∆AF ERROR) consistent with the patterns described in Figure 1.
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that the reduction in analyst forecast error, for one standard deviation change in N SIZE, is 21.27%
larger for good news forecasts issued by firms in the top decile of CO RANK relative to firms in
the bottom decile. Finally, Panel A, columns (5) and (6) presents the results on the association
between analysts’ estimates dispersion after management forecast (DIS AFTER) and conditional
conservatism. The coefficient on N SIZE is positive, while the coefficient on N SIZE ∗CO RANK
is negative (both significant). These results are consistent with analysts having different abilities
to incorporate new information into their forecasts, and conditional conservatism helping to reduce
disagreement among them.
After controlling for the effects of situational incentives, management credibility, internal and exter-
nal assurance, disclosure characteristics (Mercer, 2004), the magnitude of the forecast news (Jennings,
1987; Ng et al., 2013) and the plausible ex-ante bias in analysts’ forecasts due to conditional conser-
vatism (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003), we find that the reaction of analysts to management forecasts
increases considerably for more conditionally conservative firms. This is consistent with conditional
conservatism increasing the credibility of management forecasts and the complementary prediction:
i.e., conditional conservatism allows other sources of information to ‘flourish’ (LaFond and Watts,
2008).
Panel A columns (7) and (8) presents evidence on the association between conditional conservatism
and cumulative abnormal returns. The coefficient on N SIZE is positive and slightly statistically sig-
nificant. However the coefficient on N SIZE ∗CO RANK is positive and significant, indicating that
the market reacts beyond the magnitude of forecasts news due to the increase in forecast credibility
associated with conditional conservatism. In terms of economic magnitude, the coefficient of 3.519
(column 8) indicates that the market reaction to the magnitude of the forecast increases by approxi-
mately 3.19 basis points between the top and bottom deciles of conservatism for good news forecasts.
These findings indicate a strong market reaction to good news management forecast issued by more
conservative firms, in terms of cumulative abnormal returns.29
We obtain similar results for the bad news sample (Panel B), indicating that conditional con-
servatism adds credibility to both good and bad news management forecasts, consistent with H2.
However, the coefficient on N SIZE ∗ CO RANK is larger in magnitude for good news relative to
bad news management forecasts suggesting that the effect of conditional conservatism on credibility
is greater for good news disclosure.
Regarding the control variables, N SIZE is greater in magnitude and significance for bad news
29CAR in Table 4 is calculated using the market model but we obtain similar results if CAR is calculated using the
four-factor model.
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(Panel B) relative to good news (Panel A) in all specifications except when the dependent variable
is DIS AFTER. Indicating that bad news forecasts are ex-ante regarded as more credible (Skinner,
1994; Soffer et al., 2000). Regarding the situational incentives proxies, in most of the specifications the
coefficients are not statistically significant, except for financial distress (FD) that appears to increase
analyst dispersion, and inside trading (INSIDE) and market concentration (HHI) that are associated
with weaker market reactions to management forecasts, both for good and bad news management
forecasts. Consistent with management credibility effects on disclosure credibility, we find a positive
(negative) association between ACCURACY and AF CORR (∆AF ERROR) for both good and bad
news forecasts. For the CAR specifications, we find that ACCURACY is associated with stronger
(weaker) reactions for good (bad) news forecasts. These results are consistent with prior accuracy
increasing disclosure credibility for good news forecasts but not for bad news forecasts.30 Coefficients
for internal and external assurance control variables are mostly not statistically significant except
for INST and AUDIT FE when the dependent variable is AF CORR (or ∆AF ERROR), in both
cases the sign of the coefficient is contrary to what was expected. Finally, for guidance characteristics
control variables more precise forecasts are associated with larger analyst revisions (AF CORR), but
also with increased forecast errors (∆AF ERROR). In addition, guidance made early in the period
are associated with lower analyst estimate dispersion after the forecast (DIS AFTER), but also with
increased forecast errors (∆AF ERROR).
Taken together, these results suggest that conditional conservatism is associated with higher vol-
untary disclosure of good news, and enhanced credibility of management forecast. Further, more
conditional conservative firms are able to elicit a stronger analyst/market reaction. Overall, this ev-
idence is consistent with both H1 and H2, and suggests that conditional conservatism complements
voluntary disclosure of managerial private information through management forecasts, particularly,
good news disclosure.
2.5 Endogeneity Concerns
A potential concern with our empirical design is endogeneity arising from potential correlated omitted
variables. We take several steps to address this concern. First, we take the three- and five-year average
of Khan and Watts (2009) measure of incremental timeliness to bad news (C SCORE) as our proxy for
conservative accounting. This measure is likely to be predetermined for current managers (Garc´ıa Lara
30A potential explanation may be that managers guide analysts’ forecasts downwards and manipulate earnings upwards
to avoid negative earnings surprises (Matsumoto, 2002), this actions taken by manager will result in more accurate bad
news forecasts and less market reactions to bad news forecasts if investors anticipate this behavior.
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et al., 2016a). Consistent with this idea, prior research shows that conservative accounting is stable
over time (Khan and Watts, 2009; Callen et al., 2010). Moreover, by construction C SCORE varies
with the determinants of conservatism (i.e. firm size, leverage and book-to-market) further mitigating
endogeneity concerns. Second, we include in our models time- and industry-fixed effects to account for
economic trends and unobservable time invariant industry-specific factors that might be confounding
variables in explaining management earnings forecasts frequency and credibility. Third, we control for
known determinants of management forecasts (Hirst et al., 2008) and their credibility (Mercer, 2004).
We also control for corporate governance quality, because prior research suggests that it influences
both conditional conservatism and voluntary disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003; Ahmed and Duellman,
2007).
However, we cannot entirely rule out endogeneity. Ideally, to establish causality, we would require
an exogenous and significant overhaul to existing conservatism in accounting regulation that was
randomly assigned to firms. In the absence of such a shock, we conduct two additional analyses to
attempt to better identify the causal flow. We discuss them in turn.
2.5.1 Conditional Conservatism and Management Forecasts around SFAS 142
We follow prior work and analyze a change in financial accounting standards as a plausible exogenous
shock to conditional conservatism. In particular, we look at the adoption of SFAS 142. SFAS 142
replaces amortization of goodwill with an annual impairment test based on fair value with write-offs
if the carrying amount of goodwill exceeds its implied fair value.31 Roychowdhury and Watts (2007)
argue that “to the extent that FAS 142 generates more impairment of goodwill, the consequence would
be an increase in earnings timeliness with respect to negative returns” (p. 30). Cedergren et al. (2015)
shows that SFAS 142 forces a greater degree of conditional conservatism into the reporting system
relative to the previous regime (SFAS 121). The frequency of goodwill impairment increases after
SFAS 142 (Li et al., 2011b), and measures of acquisition overpayment become better predictors of
subsequent write-offs consistent with SFAS 142 increasing conditional conservatism (Cedergren et al.,
2015).
To test this effect, we run the following model:
Yt =β0 + β1 ∗ TREATED + β2 ∗ SFAS142 + β3 ∗ TREATED ∗ SFAS142
+ γ ∗ Controlst−4 + t
(2.7)
31Goodwill and intangible assets acquired after June 30, 2001, will be subject immediately to the non-amortization
and amortization provisions of this Statement.
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where TREATED is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm was involved in at least one M&A deal
(as acquiror) before SFAS 142.32 We define it in more detail below. SFAS 142 is a dummy variable
equal to one for all observations after 2001-Q2, when SFAS 142 became effective, and zero otherwise.
The coefficient of interest is the interaction term TREATED ∗ SFAS142 that captures the effect on
the treated of an exogenous increase in conditional conservatism. If conditional conservatism induces
the expected associations, β3 will be significant. Model (7) incorporates industry and year fixed effects,
and standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Given that goodwill is an intangible asset that arises when a firm acquires an existing business,
firms that were never the acquiror part in an M&A deal will not have any goodwill to impair and will
be less likely to be affected by SFAS 142. The firms likely affected are those involved in M&A deals
pre-SFAS 142. We use the SDC Platinum database to collect data on M&A deals (i.e., the acquiring
firm). Our sample includes all completed deals from January 1, 1995 through December 31, 2014 in
which the acquiror is a U.S. publicly listed firms, and the percentage of target’s outstanding shares
acquired is at least 90%. After imposing data requirements to construct all variables, we identify 1,743
firms involved in at least one deal before SFAS 142. These 1,743 unique firms constitute our sample
of firms that are most likely to be affected by SFAS 142.
Figure 3 plots the mean value of our conditional conservatism measure for treated and non-treated
firms before and after SFAS 142.33 As expected, there is a greater increase in conditional conservatism
after SFAS 142 for treated firms. The change in the mean value is 0.026 (0.011) or a 28% (9.4%) increase
for treated (non-treated firms). A t-test confirms that the mean difference in the change of conditional
conservatism is statistically significant. For treated firms the increase in conditional conservatism is
0.0155 larger (t-value of 5.62) than in non-treated firms.
Table 5 Panel A presents the results of estimating model (7). Given potential systematic differences
between treated and non-treated firms that might affect our dependent variable, we estimate model
(7) using a control sample matched in SIZE, LEV , BTM , ROA and AF before SFAS 142. We
use a standard propensity score matching approach.34 We also require control and treated firms
32Two potential concerns with this analysis are the next. First, impairment of goodwill was required before SFAS
142; however, this was not a common practice with most firms amortizing goodwill over 20-40 years and not many
firms recording impairments (Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007). Second, conditional conservatism may be systematically
associated with M&A. Francis and Martin (2010) show that conditionally conservative firms make more profitable
acquisitions, and less post-acquisition divestitures. This implies that conditionally conservative firms are less likely to
impair goodwill, because they take better investment decisions ex-ante. To the extent that TREATED may capture
M&A deals made by acquirors that were already conservative, it will make finding an effect harder.
33We show the mean value of C SCORE 3y instead of CO RANK for illustration purposes only, as is clear to see the
change in the three-year average relative to the rank.
34We implement a nearest-neighbor matching using a logit regression without replacement, and with a 0.001 caliper
tolerance.
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to belong to the same industry. As expected, we obtain a positive and significant coefficient on
TREATED*SFAS 142 when our dependent variable is GUIDE GN but not for GUIDE BN .35 In
terms of economic significance, conditional conservatism increases the probability of issuing good news
forecasts by 2.269% (column 1). These results support our prediction that conditional conservatism
is positively associated with good news earnings forecasts.
Panel A columns (3) to (10) shows the effect on good news forecasts credibility. We find an
increased analyst response beyond forecast news due to the increase in conditional conservatism,
except for DIS AFTER, and we also find a marginally significant increased market response for good
news forecasts. A potential explanation for not finding stronger results supporting H2 is that the
group of treated firms were less conservative before SFAS 142, and after treatment they become more
conservative getting closer to the level of conservatism of non-treated firms (see Figure 3.1). Table 5
Panel B shows the balanced properties of the matching procedure.
Finally, we present evidence consistent with the parallel trends assumption. Figure 3.2 shows that
before treatment both treated and control firms follow a similar path with respect to GUIDE GN .
We observe in the graph that for the year following the treatment GUIDE GN increase slightly more
for treated firms. Figure 3.2 also suggests for the remaining years in our sample GUIDE GN follows
a similar trend for both treated and non-treated firms, with GUIDE GN being on average greater for
treated firms. Another way to verify that the pre-treatment parallel trends assumption is not violated
is to introduce leads and lags for the implementation of treatment in model (7). Finding positive and
significant lead coefficients would be evidence against the pre-treatment parallel trends assumption.
We re-estimate model (7) introducing lead/lags for the implementation of SFAS 142. Figure 3.3.
shows that the estimated coefficients on TREATED*YEAR are not statistically significant different
from zero for years prior to SFAS 142, indicating that the difference in the frequency of good news
voluntary disclosure between the treatment and control groups did not exist before the implementation
of SFAS 142, in other words, it is reasonable to accept the pre-treatment parallel trends assumption.
Overall, given the restrictions imposed on our sample by this test, we do not consider it our main
analysis, but it provides confirmatory evidence in support for our main analyses. Taken together, the
results in Table 5 provide some assurance that conditional conservatism increases the issuance of good
news management earnings forecasts and their credibility.
35Untabulated results indicate qualitative similar results for MF REG GN and MF REG BN
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2.5.2 Shock to Overall Credibility
To provide further assurance on our credibility tests, following Lins et al. (2017) we exploit the En-
ron/Worldcom scandal and the 2008-2009 financial crisis as periods during which the overall level of
credibility in firms and capital markets plummet unexpectedly (i.e. shocks to credibility). During
low-trust periods investors and shareholders are likely to be more concerned with the credibility of
the information they relied on to make investment decisions in the past, and will look for signals
indicative of firms trustworthiness (Guiso et al., 2008; Lins et al., 2017). Accordingly, we expect
management earnings forecasts issued by more conservative firms to elicit a stronger market reaction
during “unexpectedly low-trust” periods, when credibility is more valuable, consistent with H2.
To test this prediction, and given that prior literature does not explore the effects over analysts of
such crises, we follow the method in Lins et al. (2017) as precisely as possible in both the definition
of crisis of trust periods and the choice of dependent variable. In particular, we focus exclusively on
market reactions, following their approach. Lins et al. (2017) define two periods of low-trust: (1)
the accounting frauds and bankruptcy of Enron and Worldcom, which begins in October 2001 (when
Enron first admitted accounting violations) and ends in March 2003 (the month before the U.S. stock
market recovery); and (2) the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The “Financial Crisis” begins August 2008
(the month before Lehman Brothers bankruptcy) and ends March 2009 (when the S&P 500 reach the
lowest point during the crisis). Using these shocks, we estimate model (6) for crisis and non-crisis of
trust periods. Our dependent variable is the CAR over a 3-day window around good news management
forecast date. Consistent with H2 we expect β3 to be positive and statistically significant, and larger
for crisis of trust periods relative to non-crisis periods.
Table 6 presents the results. N SIZE is positive and significant in column (1), indicating that
during non-crisis periods good news forecasts are regarded as informative, N SIZE ∗ CO RANK is
also positive and significant as in our previous tests. During crisis of trust periods, in columns (2) to
(4) we find a negative and significant coefficient on N SIZE, for two out of our three regressions. This
suggests markets apply a discount to management forecast news when there is a shock to the overall
level of credibility. Importantly, we find a positive and significant coefficient on N SIZE∗CO RANK,
indicating that even during crisis of trust periods management forecasts issued by more conditional
conservative firms remain credible. The effect is stronger for the financial crisis period relative to the
Enron/Worldcom period. In terms of economic significance, if we consider the financial crisis period
(column 3), one standard deviation in N SIZE is associated with a market reaction of -2.41 basis
points for firms in the bottom decile of conditional conservatism against a 8.92 basis points market
72
2. Conditional Conservatism and Management Earnings Forecasts
reaction for firms in the top decile of conditional conservatism. Also we find that the coefficient on
N SIZE ∗CO RANK is significantly larger for crisis of trust periods relative to the non-crisis period,
as expected.
Taken together, the results in Table 6 indicate that conditional conservative firms are more resilient
to credibility shocks, and that the benefits of conditional conservatism are not limited only to crisis of
trust periods. The findings are consistent with the idea that conditional conservatism is more valuable
when overall credibility decreases unexpectedly, as trustworthiness is highly valued by the market in
these periods.
2.6 Additional Analysis
In this section, we provide additional evidence supporting our main results by examining specific
settings where we expect the effects of conditional conservatism to be greater. We further report on
some final robustness checks (most of them have been discussed as we explained our main results).
2.6.1 Management forecasts and the firm information environment
Prior literature suggests a more important role for conservatism when the information environment
of the firm is weaker (LaFond and Watts, 2008; Garc´ıa Lara et al., 2016b). Following Duchin et al.
(2010), we build a composite index of information asymmetry (IA) as the mean of the standardized
values of seven variables related with firms’ information environment: (1) minus one times the number
of analyst covering the firm each quarter; (2) analyst forecast dispersion; (3) analyst forecast error;
(4) number of firms’ segments; (5) percentage of intangible assets; (6) the average of daily Bid-Ask
spread over the last four quarters; and (7) stock return volatility.
We partition our sample using IA. Firms in the bottom (top) tercile of IA are classified as firms
with low (high) information asymmetries. If the benefits of conservatism are higher in settings where
information asymmetry is more severe, we expect the coefficient on CO RANK to increase in the
terciles of IA for good news management forecasts.
Table 7 presents the results. Consistent with IA capturing different aspects of the firm information
environment (e.g., operating complexity/fundamental uncertainty/cost of acquiring information for
outsiders) and with prior research, we find that the coefficient on CO RANK increases in IA, both
in magnitude and significance, for GUIDE GN (columns 1 to 3).36 We find equivalent results when
36Untabulated results shows that more conditional conservative firms issue less bad news management forecasts except
when firms face high information asymmetries.
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consider analyst/market reactions (columns 4 to 15), with the exception of DIS AFTER, N SIZE ∗
CO RANK increases in magnitude and significance with IA terciles.
2.6.2 Bundled Forecasts
Anilowski et al. (2007) document a steady increase in the use of bundled forecasts (i.e. forecasts issued
together with earnings announcements) over the period 1994-2004. In line with this prior research,
bundled forecasts are predominant in our sample (approx. 67%). Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013)
argue that the traditional approach to measure forecast news (i.e. forecast value minus analysts’
expectations) is inadequate to measure news for bundled forecasts, given that analysts are likely to
revise their expectations about future earnings after current earnings announcement. Failing to account
for such changes in expectations might bias the measure of forecast news and lead to misclassification
of forecasts. Additionally, when the management forecast is issued contemporaneously with earnings
announcements it is harder to disentangle the effect of the forecast from that of the earnings news.
According to Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013), the correct way to measure forecast news for bundled
forecasts is to estimate analysts expectations conditional on the information conveyed by current
earnings announcements, calculated as follows:
Conditional Expectations(E[Xt+1|Xt]) = E[Xt+1] +AnalystRevision
Forecast News = f [Xt+1]− E[Xt+1|Xt]
Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) propose and validate this method for estimating analyst conditional
expectations. They generate predicted analysts’ revisions by estimating a model of observed analysts’
revisions for firms not issuing management forecasts: for this group the revision can be attributed
to current earnings announcements. Then, the estimated coefficients are applied to the group of
forecasting firms, to obtain a prediction on how analyst would have revised their earnings estimates
absent management forecast.
We follow two approaches to account for the potential effect of bundled forecasts in our results.
First, we follow Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) procedure to calculate predicted analyst revisions, and
bundled forecasts news, and re-estimate models (5) and (6), controlling for current earnings surprises
(SURPRISE) for bundled forecasts. SURPRISE is defined as the difference between actual EPS
and the most recent analyst estimate. Second, we re-estimate models (5) and (6) considering only non-
bundled forecasts. None of the two approaches is perfect, Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) procedure
may potentially introduce measurement error biasing the results, while excluding bundled forecast
reduces the sample size likely reducing the power of our tests.
Table 8 replicates the analysis in Table 2 and Table 4 for good news forecasts. Columns (1) to (5)
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show the results for the Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) approach. The coefficients on CO RANK
remains positive and significant when the dependent variable is GUIDE GN (column 1). In addi-
tion, our results regarding forecasts credibility (columns 2 to 5) are robust to applying Rogers and
Van Buskirk (2013) procedure, except for DIS AFTER. As expected, SURPRISE is significant in
most of the cases. Our results remain robust if we consider only non-bundled forecasts (columns 6 to
10), except for ∆AF ERROR.
Taken together, these results suggest that our inferences are generally robust to accounting for the
effects of bundled forecasts.
2.6.3 Market Reaction to Earnings Announcements
Bertomeu and Marinovic (2016) argue that when soft signals are perceived as ‘fully credible’ markets
should not react to any hard report of the same information released ex-post, as any information
contained in the verified signal should have been anticipated by the market. However, if the signal is
not ‘fully credible’ the market will react, to a certain extent, to an ex-post verified signal (Crawford
and Sobel, 1982).
If conditional conservatism increases management forecast (i.e., the soft signal) credibility, we
expect that the market reaction to earnings announcements (i.e., the ex-post verified signal) to be
lower for more conditional conservative firms. In other words, the market reaction to earnings an-
nouncements is expected to be weaker for more conditional conservative firms as this information is
impounded into prices to a greater extent when management forecasts are issued.
To test this prediction we estimate the following model separately for good and bad news manage-
ment forecasts:
EA CARt = β0 + β1 ∗ CO RANKt−n + β2 ∗ SURPRISEt + γ ∗ Controlst−4 + t (2.8)
where EA CAR measures cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day window around the earnings
announcement date, and are estimated using the market model and alternatively the four-factor model.
CO RANK, SURPRISE and Controls are all as previously defined. If our prediction is correct we
expect β1 (β2) to be negative (positive) and significant.
37
Table 9 shows the results of estimating model (8). We find a negative and significant β1 for good
news forecasts, indicating that the market response to earnings announcements is weaker for more
37We do not include N SIZE and N SIZE ∗ CO RANK in this specification because the effect of the news size
and its credibility is embedded in SURPRISE. However, untabulated analysis indicate that including N SIZE and
N SIZE ∗ CO RANK do not change our results.
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conditional conservative firms. For bad news forecasts β1 is negative but not statistically significant.
As expected the β2 is positive and significant for both, good and bad news forecasts, indicating that
the larger the earnings surprise the stronger the market reaction. These results are consistent with
our prediction that conditional conservatism increases credibility of good news management forecasts.
2.6.4 Managerial Overconfidence
Managerial overconfidence (i.e., managerial tendency to overestimate future returns from firms’ projects)
is potentially a confounding variable in our analyses. Prior literature documents that overconfidence
affects both conditional conservatism, and management forecasting. In particular, Ahmed and Duell-
man (2012) argue that the tendency to overestimate (underestimate) the likelihood and size of positive
(negative) shocks to future cash flows will be reflected in accelerated (delayed) gain (loss) recognition.
This implies that overconfident managers are less likely to engage in conditional conservative financial
reporting. Regarding management forecasting, Hribar and Yang (2016) predict and find evidence that
overconfident managers are more likely to issue and subsequently miss their own earnings forecast. This
is mainly because overconfident managers are a) more optimistic about firm future performance, b)
more confident in their ability to predict future firm performance, and c) underestimate the likelihood
of uncertain outcomes.
Thus, prior research indicates that managerial overconfidence is associated with lower conditional
conservatism and with higher frequency and lower credibility of management earnings forecasts. Thus,
not controlling for managerial overconfidence could plausibly bias our results. 38
We follow prior literature and use CEOs option-exercise behavior to proxy for managerial over-
confidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Campbell et al., 2011; Hribar and Yang, 2016). CEOs are
exposed to their firm’s idiosyncratic risk, and thus, exercising options early, after vesting, is a mecha-
nism CEOs have to reduce the exposure to this kind of risk. However, overconfident CEOs are more
likely to delay option exercise because they believe the stock price will continue to outperform the risk
free rate (Malmendier and Tate, 2005).
Following Campbell et al. (2011) and Ahmed and Duellman (2012) we use ExecuComp data to
calculate the average percent moneyness of exercisable options, and classify a CEOs as overconfident
if they hold stock options that are more than 67% in the money at least twice during our sample
38Regarding our first hypothesis, the managerial overconfidence argument implies that less conditional conservative
firms are more likely to issue good news management earnings forecasts, which goes against our prediction that con-
servatism is positively associated with voluntary disclosure of good news information. Therefore, is unlikely that our
findings supporting H1 are driven by managerial overconfidence. For our second hypothesis, the overconfidence argument
suggests that management forecast issued by less conservative firms are likely less credible, in line with our prediction
that conservatism is positively associated with the credibility of voluntary disclosure. Consequently, our second set of
findings supporting H2 may be potentially driven by overconfidence.
76
2. Conditional Conservatism and Management Earnings Forecasts
period.39 Our proxy for managerial overconfidence (OV ER) is a dummy variable that takes the value
of one for overconfident CEOs, staring the first fiscal year CEOs exhibit overconfident behavior (i.e.
hold stock options more than 67% in the money), and zero for the rest of the sample.
Table 10 results indicate that more conditional conservative firms issue more good news manage-
ment earnings forecasts, and that this forecast are associated with greater analyst and market reactions
even after controlling for managerial overconfidence. This evidence alleviates concerns that our results
are driven by managerial overconfidence.
2.7 Summary and Conclusions
We study whether conditional conservatism allows ‘soft’ sources of information to flourish as argued
in LaFond and Watts (2008). Conservatism may attain this benefit because (1) it acts as a governance
mechanism that reduces managerial incentives and ability to manipulate accounting earnings, and (2)
it provides a benchmark for current performance that enables other sources of information to produce
credible information.
We show that more conditionally conservative firms issue more good news earnings forecasts, and
that good news forecasts are associated with greater market reactions for conditionally conservative
firms, signaling greater credibility of disclosure. This is consistent with conditional conservatism acting
as a mechanism that lends credibility ex-ante to voluntary disclosure by providing a “hard” reporting
benchmark that allows outsiders to better evaluate the truthfulness of management forecasts. The
results are robust to considering an exogenous shock to conditional conservatism (i.e. implementation
of SFAS 142), and to using Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) approach to measure the effect of bundled
forecasts. We also verify that the association between conditional conservatism and good news earnings
forecasts is moderated as theory would predict. We find a stronger (weaker) association when the
firms face high (low) information asymmetries (LaFond and Watts, 2008; Garc´ıa Lara et al., 2016b).
Additionally, we show that the association of conditional conservatism and market reactions to good
news earnings forecasts is stronger during “crisis of trust” periods, when signals of credibility are more
valuable (Lins et al., 2017; Guiso et al., 2008). Moreover, we show that market reaction to earnings
announcements (i.e., the ex-post verified signal) is lower for more conditionally conservative firms
issuing management forecasts (i.e. soft signals perceived as more credible).
We contribute to the conservatism literature by presenting empirical evidence on the benefits of
conditional conservatism for firms information environment. We show that conditional conservatism
39We take as given Malmendier and Tate (2005) 67% moneyness cutoff, it cames from the calibration of stock options
valuation model for undiversified executives.
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is a mechanism by which managers can commit to truthfully disclose earnings forecasts. Second, we
contribute to the debate on whether financial reporting and voluntary disclosure are complements or
substitutes, by showing that conditional conservatism acts as a complement for timely voluntary dis-
closure of good news. By providing a “hard” reporting benchmark, conditional conservatism enhances
the information value of good news earnings forecasts. Finally, our paper contributes to the literature
on the determinants and characteristics of management forecasts by documenting that conditional
conservatism increases the frequency and credibility of good news earnings forecasts.
Our evidence should be, however, interpreted considering the following caveats. First, the imple-
mentation of SFAS 142 may not be fully exogenous in the sense that it may be correlated with other
concurrent relevant changes in regulation (e.g. Reg FD or SarbanesOxley). Second, potential mea-
surement errors in our measure of conditional conservatism and coverage bias associated with I/B/E/S
guidance database may result in unreliable inferences. Finally, our results may not generalize beyond
the specific choices of our study. In particular, as we focus on management earnings forecasts the
results may not be generalizable to other sources of ‘soft’ information.
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APPENDIX A- Conservatism Measure
We replicate Khan and Watts (2009) main results. This appendix provides details on the estimation
of our proxy for conditional conservatism. We follow Khan and Watts (2009) estimation procedure
and delete all firm-years with negative book value of equity or total assets, and all firm-years with
price per share less than $1. Then we trim size, earnings, returns, leverage, market to book and
depreciation at the 1% level each year. Khan and Watts (2009) estimate C SCORE and G SCORE
using a sample of 115,516 firm-years observations between 1963 and 2005. Our sample is composed of
129,858 firm-years observations between 1968 and 2014.
Table A1 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation, comparable to those
in Table 1 of Khan and Watts (2009) which despite differences in the estimation period are fairly
similar. We also report descriptive statistics of C SCORE and G SCORE as in Table 4 of Khan
and Watts (2009). Again our results are comparable to those in Khan and Watts (2009). C SCORE
(G SCORE) has a mean of 0.1147 (0.0247) and median of 0.1088 (0.0295), the first quartile (Q1) for
both measures is positive, and there is a negative and significant correlation between C SCORE and
G SCORE of similar size.
In Table A2 we show Fama-MacBeth coefficients from the estimation of model (6). The magnitude,
sign and statistical significance is similar to those presented in Table 3 of Khan and Watts (2009).
The mean adjusted R-square is also similar, we obtain an average of the adjusted R-squares from the
46 annual regressions of 19% and in Khan and Watts (2009) is 24%.
In Table A3 we show how mean ROA (NOACC) is monotonically decreasing (increasing) in
C SCORE, and the mean of ROA is negative for the most conservative firms, consistent with Table
6 results in Khan and Watts (2009).
Finally, in Table A4 we replicate Table 7 in Khan and Watts (2009), and show how our estimation
of C SCORE and G SCORE show the same patterns. First, we replicate their results of how sorting
on C SCORE induces a reverse sort on G SCORE. Second, we also replicate their result that market-
to-book and size are decreasing, while leverage is increasing, in C SCORE. Third, we also replicate
their result that the length in investment cycle is increasing in C SCORE.
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLES N Mean SD Q1 Median Q3
Earn 143,291 0.0433 0.134 0.0106 0.0579 0.103
Ret 147,919 0.117 0.490 -0.196 0.0455 0.327
SIZE 162,215 5.046 2.115 3.440 4.915 6.520
MTB 162,214 2.563 2.874 1.004 1.666 2.924
LEV 163,871 0.641 1.083 0.0335 0.242 0.742
NOACC 119,087 -0.0181 0.0558 -0.0300 -0.00872 0.00205
CFOA 130,387 0.0709 0.133 0.0208 0.0809 0.141
INV CYCLE 139,246 0.0443 0.0303 0.0244 0.0392 0.0579
Mean SD Q1 Median Q3
C SCORE 0.1147 0.1157 0.0452 0.1088 0.1726
G SCORE 0.0247 0.0460 0.0074 0.0295 0.0463
Pearson Correlation -0.346***
Spearman Correlation -0.244***
Descriptive statistics for 129,858 firm-years between 1968 and 2014. The number of observations(N),
mean, standard deviation (SD), median and first(Q1) and third (Q3) quartiles are reported. All
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99 % level.
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Table A2: Fama-MacBeth Coefficients from Estimation Regressions
Independent Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient T-Stat
Intercept 0.0534*** 4.11
D -0.0138*** -3.34
Ret + 0.0257*** 3.42
Ret x SIZE + 0.00151 1.17
Ret x MTB - -0.00188*** -2.57
Ret x LEV - -0.00430 -0.86
D x Ret + 0.237*** 13.20
D x Ret x SIZE - -0.0305*** -10.89
D x Ret x MTB + -0.00290* -1.30
D x Ret x LEV + 0.0558*** 6.47
SIZE 0.00656*** 6.96
MTB -0.0105*** -7.80
LEV -0.00354** -2.05
D x SIZE 0.00121* 1.59
D x MTB 0.00108 1.28
D x LEV 0.00115 0.57
Mean Adj. R2 0.190
Mean #Obs 2,763
Fama-MacBeth coefficients from annual cross-sectional regressions of model(6), on a sample of
129,858 firm-years from 1968 to 2014. The dependent variable, Xi, is earnings scaled by lagged
price, Ri are annual stock returns, and Di is a dummy variable equal to one if returns are negative
and zero otherwise. MTB is the market-to-book ratio, LEV is leverage, and SIZE is the natural
logarithm of market value of equity. Mean Adj. R2 is the average of the adjusted R-squares from
the 46 annual regressions estimated ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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Table A3: Distributions of ROA and NOACC, by C SCORE Decile
ROA NOACC
Decile Mean SD Skew Mean SD Skew
1 0.0822 0.101 -1.927 -0.0167 0.0480 -1.583
2 0.0715 0.0957 -1.963 -0.0172 0.0471 -1.434
3 0.0628 0.0979 -2.005 -0.0178 0.0508 -1.578
4 0.0518 0.106 -2.173 -0.0185 0.0523 -1.629
5 0.0424 0.107 -2.042 -0.0171 0.0522 -1.533
6 0.0321 0.114 -1.992 -0.0179 0.0547 -1.536
7 0.0206 0.117 -2.024 -0.0180 0.0565 -1.631
8 0.0102 0.116 -1.991 -0.0178 0.0564 -1.666
9 -0.00218 0.117 -2.023 -0.0167 0.0585 -1.515
10 -0.0132 0.102 -2.080 -0.0139 0.0580 -1.452
Mean, standard deviation (SD) and skewness (Skew) of ROA and NOAcc, by C SCORE decile.
The sample consists of 129,858 firm-years between 1968 and 2014. Firms are sorted annually into
deciles by C SCORE. ROA is is earnings before extraordinary items, deflated by lagged assets and
NOACC is non-operating accruals, deflated by lagged assets.
Table A4: Mean of Selected Characteristics of C SCORE Decile
Decile C SCORE G SCORE MTB SIZE LEV INV CYCLE
1 -0.0310 0.0340 4.3043 7.8920 0.2656 0.0487
2 0.02703 0.0320 3.0313 6.8328 0.3079 0.0464
3 0.0556 0.0307 2.6938 6.1981 0.3348 0.0460
4 0.0778 0.0293 2.4803 5.6871 0.3535 0.0458
5 0.0977 0.0280 2.2490 5.2541 0.3871 0.0448
6 0.1172 0.0264 2.1206 4.8568 0.4255 0.0443
7 0.1384 0.0248 1.9600 4.4339 0.4945 0.0435
8 0.1634 0.0223 1.8609 4.0440 0.6010 0.0424
9 0.1996 0.0180 1.7561 3.6102 0.8362 0.0418
10 0.3019 0.0010 1.6738 3.2240 1.9845 0.0404
Means of selected characteristics of C SCORE deciles. The sample consists of 129,858 firm-years
between 1968 and 2014. Firms are sorted annually into deciles by C SCORE, and the mean of the
reported firm characteristics is calculated by decile. MTB is the market-to-book ratio, SIZE is the
natural logarithm of market value of equity, LEV is leverage and INV CYCLE is firm investment
cycle.
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2. Conditional Conservatism and Management Earnings Forecasts
Figure 1: Analyst Reaction to Management Forecasts
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Figure 1.1: Analyst Forecast Correction Towards Guidance
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Figure 1.2: Change in Analyst Forecast Error After Guidance
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Figure 2: Market Reaction to Management Forecasts
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Figure 2.1: Market Reaction to Good News Guidance
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Figure 2.2: Market Reaction to Bad News Guidance
CO RANK=10
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Figure 3: Shock to Conditional Conservatism
-Implementation of SFAS 142-
Before SFAS142 After SFAS142
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Figure 3.1: Change in Conditional Conservatism
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Figure 3.2: Parallel Trends I
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Figure 3.3: Parallel Trends II
Coefficient
(90% Confidence Interval)
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2. Conditional Conservatism and Management Earnings Forecasts
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Year and Conservatism Rank
Year
Conditional Conservatism Rank
Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1997 421 402 410 406 402 400 407 413 410 398 4,069
1998 485 482 482 482 481 482 481 483 479 476 4,813
1999 529 527 526 526 523 522 518 525 520 525 5,241
2000 538 540 539 536 538 540 529 534 541 529 5,364
2001 546 541 546 543 543 540 544 543 549 541 5,436
2002 561 559 559 557 561 558 557 559 558 550 5,579
2003 602 597 596 599 599 593 591 597 600 599 5,973
2004 603 607 604 603 606 605 607 605 606 602 6,048
2005 599 593 591 596 593 599 594 602 596 597 5,960
2006 573 574 569 570 572 564 570 565 572 571 5,700
2007 550 550 546 549 547 547 548 547 548 548 5,480
2008 501 504 502 499 503 502 504 505 502 502 5,024
2009 515 517 518 517 514 517 518 517 516 516 5,165
2010 518 513 511 516 514 516 515 517 513 513 5,146
2011 499 498 498 501 495 501 496 497 498 497 4,980
2012 488 482 483 484 482 485 487 485 484 482 4,842
2013 481 482 482 481 485 482 480 482 484 479 4,818
2014 451 450 451 448 450 450 448 449 450 449 4,496
Total 9,460 9,418 9,413 9,413 9,408 9,403 9,394 9,425 9,426 9,374 94,134
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Table 1 (cont’d)
Panel B: Distribution of Firms and Management Forecast by Year
Year Firms Guiding % of # of % of % of
Firms Guiding Firms Forecast Good News Bad News
1997 1,157 295 25.50% 384 19.27% 79.69%
1998 1,392 513 36.85% 711 16.46% 81.15%
1999 1,513 530 35.03% 741 22.67% 74.90%
2000 1,562 719 46.03% 1,111 19.26% 79.48%
2001 1,567 869 55.46% 1,820 21.92% 76.43%
2002 1,636 848 51.83% 1,848 33.71% 65.10%
2003 1,670 827 49.52% 1,987 33.17% 66.33%
2004 1,684 844 50.12% 2,187 34.16% 65.16%
2005 1,638 751 45.85% 2,002 34.12% 65.23%
2006 1,588 704 44.33% 1,887 33.55% 65.87%
2007 1,501 625 41.64% 1,738 29.75% 69.91%
2008 1,384 555 40.10% 1,574 32.40% 67.41%
2009 1,399 492 35.17% 1,420 39.65% 60.14%
2010 1,378 492 35.70% 1,508 41.38% 58.49%
2011 1,327 486 36.62% 1,439 30.92% 68.94%
2012 1,293 491 37.97% 1,425 27.44% 72.42%
2013 1,285 483 37.59% 1,415 25.65% 74.20%
2014 1,267 487 38.44% 1,344 24.93% 75.07%
Total 3,056 2,423 79.29% 26,541 30.39% 68.96%
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Table 1 (cont’d)
Panel C: Distribution of Firms by Number of Management Forecast Issued
# of Forecast All Forecasts Good News Bad News
0 633 1,489 779
1 470 479 489
2-5 772 589 807
6-10 382 259 387
11+ 799 240 594
Total 3,056 3,056 3,056
Panel D: Distribution of Management Forecasts per Firm by News Type
# of Forecast Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
All 13.13 6.00 15.41 0.00 64.00
Good News 4.04 1.00 5.87 0.00 39.00
Bad News 9.00 5.00 10.46 0.00 50.00
Panel E: Distribution of Management Forecasts by Conservatism Rank
CO RANK # of Forecast % of Good News % of Bad News
1 3,330 31.95% 67.54%
2 3,491 30.97% 68.55%
3 3,309 32.64% 66.76%
4 3,214 31.24% 68.20%
5 3,062 31.58% 67.86%
6 2,802 28.41% 70.56%
7 2,609 28.48% 70.64%
8 2,166 28.86% 70.50%
9 1,646 28.68% 70.72%
10 912 25.55% 73.46%
Total 26,541 30.39% 68.96%
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Table 1 (cont’d)
Panel F: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. 1% 25% Median 75% 99%
Management Forecast Variables
GUIDE 0.282 0.450 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
GUIDE GN 0.086 0.280 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
GUIDE BN 0.194 0.396 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
MF REG GN 0.335 0.756 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.000
MF REG BN 0.754 1.163 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 4.000
N SIZE 0.061 0.101 0.000 0.010 0.026 0.070 0.551
Analyst and Market Reaction Variables
AF CORR 0.146 0.399 -0.390 0.000 0.026 0.134 2.330
∆AF ERROR -0.130 0.398 -2.276 -0.118 -0.018 0.000 0.445
DIS AFTER 0.045 0.069 0.000 0.011 0.023 0.048 0.381
CAR -0.926 10.357 -33.040 -5.515 -0.325 4.658 23.695
Conditional Conservatism Variables
C SCORE 0.117 0.135 -0.255 0.044 0.115 0.187 0.519
G SCORE 0.004 0.038 -0.097 -0.015 0.007 0.023 0.119
CO 0.121 0.124 -0.256 0.065 0.121 0.178 0.499
C SCORE 3y 0.112 0.113 -0.187 0.044 0.113 0.180 0.392
CO RANK 5.496 2.873 1.000 3.000 5.000 8.000 10.000
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Table 1 (cont’d)
Panel F: (cont’d) Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. 1% 25% Median 75% 99%
Control Variables
SIZE 5.008 1.787 0.999 3.752 4.979 6.234 9.066
BTM 0.571 0.403 0.069 0.290 0.469 0.734 2.221
LEV 0.179 0.167 0.000 0.009 0.155 0.294 0.636
ROA 0.007 0.051 -0.157 0.002 0.012 0.023 0.075
AF 1.517 1.013 0.000 0.693 1.609 2.303 3.296
INST 0.487 0.347 0.000 0.114 0.551 0.789 1.076
DIS 2.279 3.916 0.000 0.000 1.000 3.000 23.000
S EARN 32.895 75.224 0.282 2.546 7.202 24.325 479.569
S CFO 1.395 3.940 0.026 0.080 0.241 0.892 23.746
RET V OL 3.164 1.490 1.059 2.086 2.817 3.899 8.197
BID ASK 0.991 1.529 0.018 0.106 0.305 1.227 7.875
FE BEFORE 0.006 0.014 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.080
AB ACC 0.017 0.095 -0.287 -0.025 0.005 0.044 0.382
RET 0.035 0.321 -0.555 -0.116 0.017 0.153 0.931
FD 0.268 0.362 0.000 0.003 0.041 0.515 0.999
LIT 0.387 0.487 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
INSIDE 0.026 6.245 -5.635 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.023
HHI 0.245 0.189 0.048 0.115 0.187 0.308 0.963
ACCURACY 0.004 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.049
BINDEP 0.881 0.166 0.333 0.800 1.000 1.000 1.000
AUDIT FE 0.471 0.267 0.143 0.250 0.333 0.667 1.000
GUIDE H 2.228 1.016 0.000 2.000 3.000 3.000 3.000
GUIDE S 2.092 0.444 1.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 3.000
SUPPORT 1.101 0.992 0.000 0.000 1.000 2.000 4.000
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Table 1 (cont’d)
Panel G: Mean Values of Selected Variables by Conservatism Rank
Decile 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 t-test t-stat Rank
(1-2)-(9-10) Correlation
Situational Incentives
FD 0.256 0.245 0.242 0.268 0.315 -0.058 -15.33 -0.003
LIT 0.413 0.366 0.382 0.409 0.365 0.049 9.72 -0.0184
INSIDE -0.025 -0.083 -0.088 0.125 0.201 -0.226 -3.78 0.0765
HHI 0.249 0.230 0.243 0.248 0.256 -0.007 -3.21 0.0264
Management Credibility
ACCURACY 0.062 0.074 0.088 0.110 0.071 -0.009 -2.35 -0.1443
Internal and External Assurance
BINDEP 0.826 0.853 0.866 0.880 0.861 -0.035 -16.28 0.1049
AUDIT FE 0.344 0.326 0.308 0.277 0.240 0.104 33.22 -0.0914
INST 0.555 0.578 0.539 0.460 0.302 0.253 80.17 -0.252
Guidance Characteristics
GUIDE H 2.398 2.304 2.195 2.097 1.904 0.494 21.13 -0.1673
GUIDE S 2.123 2.109 2.082 2.068 2.031 0.092 8.51 -0.0651
SUPPORT 0.960 1.055 1.179 1.230 1.126 -0.166 -9.00 0.079
Other
SIZE 6.939 5.652 4.853 4.114 3.472 3.467 252.43 -0.6915
BTM 0.348 0.451 0.533 0.645 0.880 -0.532 -130.00 0.4691
LEV 0.199 0.182 0.159 0.154 0.201 -0.001 -0.60 -0.0609
ROA 0.017 0.013 0.008 0.001 -0.004 0.022 39.15 -0.3138
AF 2.515 2.006 1.547 1.075 0.439 2.077 318.42 -0.725
FE BEFORE 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.015 -0.012 -35.59 0.3759
AB ACC 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.007 11.00 -0.0121
The sample consist of 94,134 firm-quarter observations for the period 1997-2014. Contin-
uous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99%. See Appendix B for variable definitions.
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Table 2
Conditional Conservatism Commitment and Management Forecasts Frequency
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GUIDE GN GUIDE BN MF REG GN MF REG BN
CO RANKt−4 0.242** -0.602*** 0.988** -1.834***
(0.104) (0.175) (0.419) (0.698)
LEVt−4 -1.565 -1.445 -6.929 -3.565
(1.196) (2.057) (5.046) (8.350)
SIZEt−4 0.983*** 2.403*** 4.591*** 15.056***
(0.195) (0.351) (0.892) (1.560)
BTMt−4 0.694* -3.093*** -0.245 -6.952***
(0.395) (0.633) (1.435) (2.356)
ROAt−4 -5.641*** 14.359*** -18.837*** 37.958***
(2.147) (3.004) (5.819) (10.759)
AFt−4 1.370*** 3.532*** 3.710*** 15.042***
(0.261) (0.416) (0.986) (1.603)
INSTt−4 2.361*** 4.739*** 7.049** 17.939***
(0.850) (1.490) (3.571) (6.171)
S EARNt−4 -0.006* -0.012** -0.022 -0.040*
(0.003) (0.006) (0.014) (0.024)
DISt−4 -0.321*** -0.483*** -1.152*** -1.984***
(0.032) (0.050) (0.114) (0.177)
RET V OLt−4 -0.224* -1.296*** -1.528*** -5.175***
(0.117) (0.201) (0.450) (0.762)
BID ASKt−4 0.294*** 0.638*** 1.107*** 2.056***
(0.100) (0.175) (0.368) (0.656)
AB ACCt−4 -3.427* 6.528*** -1.869 20.562***
(1.773) (2.221) (3.422) (4.750)
BINDEPt−4 0.642 -1.024 2.426 -4.341
(1.007) (1.762) (4.214) (7.136)
Observations 94,134 94,134 94,134 94,134
Number of Firms 3,056 3,056 3,056 3,056
Time F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster S.E. Firm Firm Firm Firm
R2 0.105 0.192 0.309 0.387
The estimated model is: MFt = β0 + β1 ∗ CO RANKt−n + γ ∗ Controlst−4 + t. See
Appendix B for variable definitions. The sample consist of 94,134 firm-quarter observations
for the period 1997-2014. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table 3
The Effect of Future Stock Returns on the Association Between Conditional
Conservatism and Management Forecasts Frequency
(1) (2)
GUIDE GN GUIDE BN
CO RANKt−4 0.207* -0.530***
(0.108) (0.178)
RETt+1 -1.507** -1.178
(0.679) (0.982)
RETt+1 ∗ CO RANKt−4 0.202** -0.073
(0.087) (0.150)
Control Variables Yes Yes
Observations 89,588 89,588
Number of Firms 3,008 3,008
Time F.E. Yes Yes
Industry F.E. Yes Yes
Cluster S.E. Firm Firm
R2 0.107 0.191
The estimated model is: MFt = β0 + β1 ∗CO RANKt−n +
β2 ∗ RETt+1 + β3 ∗ RETt+1γ ∗ Controlst−4 + t. See Ap-
pendix B for variable definitions. The full-sample consist of
94,134 firm-quarter observations for the period 1997-2014.
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% lev-
els. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4
Analysts and Market Reaction to Management Forecasts
Panel A: Good News Management Forecast
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable: AF CORR ∆AF ERROR DIS AFTER CAR
CO RANKt−4 0.000 -0.007** -0.003 0.007* -0.001 0.000 0.005 0.093
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.062) (0.119)
N SIZE 0.193 0.227 -0.791*** -0.798*** 0.489*** 0.478*** 8.925* 9.175*
(0.282) (0.283) (0.290) (0.288) (0.075) (0.073) (5.054) (5.073)
N SIZE ∗ CO RANKt−4 0.338*** 0.327*** -0.259*** -0.234*** -0.027** -0.029** 3.124*** 3.519***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.065) (0.065) (0.012) (0.012) (1.089) (1.080)
Control Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 7,800 7,650 7,786 7,650 7,567 7,421 7,502 7,354
Number of Firms 1,513 1,497 1,511 1,497 1,453 1,437 1,466 1,447
Time F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster S.E. Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
R2 0.524 0.521 0.546 0.574 0.579 0.564 0.0281 0.0118
Panel B: Bad News Management Forecast
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable: AF CORR ∆AF ERROR DIS AFTER CAR
CO RANKt−4 0.006** -0.020*** -0.003 0.019*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.009 0.396***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.057) (0.095)
N SIZE 0.961*** 1.015*** -0.900*** -0.918*** 0.361*** 0.355*** -19.312*** -18.348***
(0.214) (0.205) (0.226) (0.219) (0.028) (0.027) (2.338) (2.194)
N SIZE ∗ CO RANKt−4 0.228*** 0.195*** -0.177*** -0.150*** -0.004 -0.006 -0.593 -0.318
(0.042) (0.041) (0.046) (0.045) (0.006) (0.005) (0.440) (0.406)
Control Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 16,644 16,314 16,613 16,314 16,171 15,866 16,062 15,700
Number of Firms 2,031 2,008 2,027 2,008 1,946 1,929 1,953 1,936
Time F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster S.E. Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
R2 0.438 0.444 0.396 0.381 0.380 0.355 0.134 0.107
The estimated model is:Yt = β0+β1∗CO RANKt−n+β2∗N SIZE+β3∗N SIZE∗CO RANKt−n+γ∗Controlst−4+t.
Yt is equal to AF CORR, ∆AF ERROR, DIS AFTER, and CAR. Panel A presents the results for good news
management forecasts, while panel B presents the results for bad news management forecasts. See Appendix B for
variable definitions. The sample consist of 26,541 firm-quarter guiding observations for the period 1997-2014. Continuous
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, and the model includes industry and time fixed effects.
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Table 5 (cont’d)
Panel B: Balance Properties Propensity SCORE Matching
Variable
Unmatched Mean
% % Dec.
t-test
V(T)/V(C)
Matched Treated Control bias bias t p>t
SIZE
U 4.9889 4.491 27.4
96.1
49.07 0.000 0.91
M 4.6435 4.6241 1.1 1.61 0.108 0.88
ROA
U 0.00713 0.00388 5.6
96.6
10.19 0.000 0.79
M 0.00498 0.00487 0.2 0.30 0.764 0.70
LEV
U 0.16311 0.12498 24.4
95.5
43.38 0.000 1.04
M 0.13268 0.13439 -1.1 -1.66 0.096 0.91
AF
U 6.5009 6.3347 2.7
66.1
4.77 0.000 0.95
M 6.3907 6.447 -0.9 -1.34 0.181 0.96
BTM
U 0.55882 0.5564 0.6
-84.3
1.07 0.285 0.86
M 0.56562 0.56115 1.1 1.63 0.103 0.86
Sample Ps R2 LR chi2 p > chi2
Mean Med
B R
% %
bias bias Conc. Bad
Unmatched 0.022 3983.34 0.000 12.1 5.6 35.6 0.91 20 0
Matched 0.000 20.04 0.001 0.9 1.1 3.0 0.87 20 0
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Table 6
Market Reactions to Good News Management Forecasts
Non-Crisis vs. Credibility Crisis Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Crisis Enron/Worldcom Financial Crisis Crisis
Period Period Period Periods
CO RANKt−4 0.141 0.356 -0.779 -0.069
(0.134) (0.371) (0.868) (0.331)
N SIZE 10.879** 0.475 -36.522† -5.644
(5.058) (15.332) (23.489) (12.730)
N SIZE ∗ CO RANKt−4 2.969** 7.748** 12.494* 8.860***
(1.186) (3.813) (6.718) (3.181)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,042 710 295 1,005
Number of Firms 1,284 436 218 583
Time F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster S.E. Firm Firm Firm Firm
R2 0.058 0.104 0.235 0.092
The estimated model is: Yt = β0+β1∗CO RANKt−n+β2∗N SIZE+β3∗N SIZE∗CO RANKt−n+γ∗
Controlst−4 + t. See Appendix B for variable definitions. Enron/Worldcom period include observations
from Q4 2001 to Q1 2003, financial crisis period include observations from Q3 2008 to Q1 2009 and Crisis
periods combine both. The guiding sample consist of 26,541 firm-quarter observations for the period 1997-
2014. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, *, indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10%. † indicate significance at the 10% for one-tailed test. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table 9
Market Reaction to Earnings Announcement
Dependent Variable: Cumulative Abnormal Returns
(1) (2)
Good News Bad News
CO RANKt−4 -0.231** -0.021
(0.102) (0.075)
SURPRISE 8.934*** 7.036***
(1.607) (0.875)
Control Variables Yes Yes
Observations 6,842 14,141
Number of Firms 1,327 1,722
Time F.E. Yes Yes
Industry F.E. Yes Yes
Cluster S.E. Firm Firm
R2 0.040 0.029
The estimated model is: EA CARt = β0 +β1 ∗CO RANKt−n +β2 ∗SURPRISEt +
γ ∗ Controlst−4 + t. EA CAR measure cumulative abnormal returns over a 3 day
window around the earnings announcement date, and are estimated using the mar-
ket model. SURPRISE is the earnings surprise measured as the difference between
actual earnings and analysts earnings consensus estimate before quarter end. See
Appendix B for variable definitions. The guiding sample consist of 26,541 guiding
firm-quarter observations for the period 1997-2014. Continuous variables are win-
sorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
103
2. Conditional Conservatism and Management Earnings Forecasts
T
a
b
le
1
0
M
a
n
a
g
e
ri
a
l
O
v
e
rc
o
n
fi
d
e
n
c
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
G
U
I
D
E
G
N
G
U
I
D
E
B
N
A
F
C
O
R
R
∆
A
F
E
R
R
O
R
D
I
S
A
F
T
E
R
C
A
R
C
O
R
A
N
K
t −
4
0.
39
7*
*
-0
.8
05
**
*
-0
.0
02
0.
0
0
3
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
1
1
(0
.1
89
)
(0
.3
00
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.1
4
4
)
O
V
E
R
0.
66
0
-0
.7
53
-0
.0
09
†
0.
0
1
2
†
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
1
9
(0
.5
8
5)
(0
.9
58
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.2
8
4
)
N
S
I
Z
E
-
-
0.
14
7
-0
.4
5
7
0
.4
4
8
*
*
*
6
.5
9
7
-
-
(0
.2
51
)
(0
.3
1
6
)
(0
.0
8
8
)
(5
.1
2
1
)
N
S
I
Z
E
∗C
O
R
A
N
K
t −
4
-
-
0.
30
2*
**
-0
.2
1
4
*
*
-0
.0
2
0
4
.3
6
5
*
*
*
-
-
(0
.0
68
)
(0
.0
8
7
)
(0
.0
1
6
)
(1
.3
3
0
)
C
on
tr
ol
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
41
,8
69
41
,8
69
4,
45
5
4,
4
5
5
4
,4
0
4
4
,2
8
3
N
u
m
b
er
of
F
ir
m
s
1,
43
9
1,
43
9
82
2
82
2
8
1
4
8
0
0
T
im
e
F
.E
.
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
In
d
u
st
ry
F
.E
.
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
lu
st
er
S
.E
.
F
ir
m
F
ir
m
F
ir
m
F
ir
m
F
ir
m
F
ir
m
R
2
0.
04
3
0.
05
9
0.
19
0
0.
29
8
0
.3
9
0
0
.0
8
8
F
or
co
lu
m
n
s
(1
)
an
d
(2
)
th
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
m
o
d
el
is
:
M
F
t
=
β
0
+
β
1
∗C
O
R
A
N
K
t −
n
+
γ
∗C
on
tr
ol
s t
−4
+
 t
.
M
F
t
is
ei
th
er
G
U
I
D
E
G
N
or
G
U
I
D
E
B
N
.
F
or
co
lu
m
n
s
(3
)
-
(6
),
th
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
m
o
d
el
is
:Y
t
=
β
0
+
β
1
∗C
O
R
A
N
K
t −
n
+
β
2
∗N
S
I
Z
E
+
β
3
∗N
S
I
Z
E
∗C
O
R
A
N
K
t −
n
+
γ
∗C
on
tr
ol
s t
−4
+
 t
.
Y
t
is
eq
u
a
l
to
A
F
C
O
R
R
,
∆
A
F
E
R
R
O
R
,
D
I
S
A
F
T
E
R
,
an
d
C
A
R
.
P
an
el
A
co
lu
m
n
s
(3
)
-
(6
)
p
re
se
n
ts
th
e
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
go
o
d
n
ew
s
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
fo
re
ca
st
s.
S
ee
A
p
p
en
d
ix
B
fo
r
va
ri
ab
le
d
efi
n
it
io
n
s.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
co
n
si
st
of
41
,8
69
fi
rm
-q
u
ar
te
r
ob
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
fo
r
th
e
p
er
io
d
1
9
9
7
-2
0
1
4
,
w
h
ic
h
h
ad
th
e
d
at
a
av
ai
la
b
le
in
E
x
ec
u
C
om
p
to
ca
lc
u
la
te
O
V
E
R
.
C
on
ti
n
u
ou
s
va
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
w
in
so
ri
ze
d
a
t
th
e
1
%
a
n
d
99
%
le
ve
ls
.
**
*,
**
,
*
in
d
ic
at
e
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
1%
,
5%
,
an
d
10
%
le
ve
ls
.†
in
d
ic
at
e
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
fo
r
o
n
e-
ta
il
ed
te
st
.
R
ob
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
,
an
d
th
e
m
o
d
el
in
cl
u
d
es
fi
rm
an
d
ti
m
e
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
.
104
Chapter 3
Firms Reaction to Peers
Non-Disclosure
3.1 Introduction
We study how an exogenous shock that decreases information disclosure affects peer firms. The
information-transfer literature shows that the release of information about one firm can be relevant
to its peers because they face similar economic conditions (Schipper, 1990). Information-transfer
occurs when the information released by one firm (e.g. earnings announcements, restatements, or
management earnings forecasts) produces an unexpected stock price correction for other firms with
similar earnings determinants. Prior literature has extensively studied and documented information-
transfer effects when new information about the firm is released to markets.1 However, to the best of
our knowledge, there is no prior work studying how peer firms react to a loss of information in the
context of information-transfers.
Although not directly studying a setting where related firms limit information disclosure, of partic-
ular interest for our paper is the study by Kim et al. (2008) which suggests that information-transfers
can be positive or negative. A negative information transfer arises when information released by a
peer produces an unexpected reduction on related firms stock prices. In this situation, managers
would have incentives to voluntarily disclose their private information to counteract the negative
information-transfers from peers disclosures (Desir, 2012).2 According to Kim et al. (2008), the sign
1See, Foster (1981); Olsen and Dietrich (1985); Baginski (1987); Pownall and Waymire (1989); Han et al. (1989); Han
and Wild (1990); Freeman and Tse (1992); Han and Wild (1997); Laux et al. (1998); Thomas and Zhang (2008); Alves
et al. (2009); Hilary and Shen (2013); Hope and Zhao (2017).
2Managers’ decision to voluntary disclose their private information will depend on a rational assessment of the trade-
offs between the costs (e.g. litigation risks, disclosure costs, proprietary costs) and benefits (e.g. increasing stock prices)
associated with the disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Hirst et al., 2008). In the context of negative information-
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of the information transfer (positive or negative) depends on the type of competitive relation between
the firm and its peers (i.e. whether they are rival or non-rival firms).
Prior analytical work emphasizes this role of competition in driving voluntary disclosure, and
suggests that managers voluntarily disclose their private information to differentiate their firms from
competitors, or to respond to the disclosure made by them (see e.g. Verrecchia (1983); Dye (1985);
Wagenhofer (1990); Suijs (1999)). Related literature also shows that information-transfers depend
on the information environment, and that they are stronger for non-forecasting firms (Pownall and
Waymire, 1989), and occur prior to the firms’ own earnings announcement, and for firms with weak
information environments (Graham and King, 1996). More recently, several studies show that man-
agers disclose bad news in response to peers’ disclosure of bad news (Tse and Tucker, 2009; Sletten,
2011), and that managers in more (less) concentrated industries are more likely to disclose good news
after their rival firms announce good news (bad news) (Desir, 2012). The preceding argumentation
indicates that managers may take a purposeful action (e.g. voluntary disclosure) to prevent negative
information-transfers.
Following the same line of reasoning, we argue that peer firms are likely to change their disclosure
behavior when there is less information on the market about a peer firm, and that this change in
behavior will depend on whether these firms are rival or non-rival peers. In particular, we study how
the adoption of inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) affects the disclosure of peer firms in those states
not affected by the IDD.3
IDD adoption provides a clear setting in which to study whether firms intervene to affect the
information-transfer process when there is a negative shock to the information environment (i.e., in
our setting, less information). Li et al. (2018) show that the staggered adoption of IDD by U.S. state
courts generates exogenous variation in the proprietary costs of disclosure, and that firms respond
to IDD adoption by reducing the level of disclosure. In particular, they show that affected firms
reduce disclosure on customers’ identity. This type of proprietary information is particularly relevant,
as disclosures regarding firm’s customers may assist capital market participants in evaluating firm’s
current and future revenues, trading relationships, productive capacity, price/cost margins, etc. At
the aggregate level, disclosure regarding firm’s customers could help capital-market participants to
better estimate information about the industry as a whole. Moreover, capital-markets participants
transfers, managers’ incentives and shareholders’ interest are aligned so that voluntary disclosure of private information
is beneficial for both.
3The inevitable disclosure is a legal doctrine through which an employer can forbid an employee from working for
another firm, claiming that in fulfilling the new role the employee will inevitably disclose firm’s trade secrets. Klasa et al.
(2018) argue that the staggered adoption of IDD exogenously increases proprietary costs of disclosure in the adopting
states.
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can potentially infer information about industry revenues from disclosures made by the customer firms
(Ellis et al., 2012). Thus, lower levels of this type of proprietary information disclosure will result in
valuable information vanishing from the market.
We expect that IDD adoption significantly influences the information environment for peer firms
operating in non-IDD states. We argue that IDD adoption affects the information environment of
peer firms in two main ways. First, lower levels of disclosure of firms located in those states affected
by IDD adoption is expected to elicit information-transfers that may cause the disclosure behavior of
peer firms located in states not affected by IDD adoption. Second, we expect peer firms’ reaction (i.e.,
whether they increase or decrease voluntary disclosure as a reaction to the decrease in proprietary
information by related firms) to depend on product-market competition at the industry level.
Prior literature suggests that the effect of competition on disclosure will depend on the source of
competition, and that it is important to differentiate whether the competition comes from market size,
product similarities, or entry costs (Lang and Sul, 2014). In the context of information-transfers, in
more concentrated industries each firm’s disclosure might provide more information about the indus-
try as whole (Ali et al., 2014). For example, Desir (2012) argues that, in more concentrated indus-
tries, non-announcing firms will disclose more good news following peer good news (‘me-too’ story),
while in less concentrated industries, non-announcing firms will disclose more good news following
peer bad news (‘not-me’ story). Kim et al. (2008) argue that industry commonalities trigger posi-
tive information-transfers, whereas competitive shifts cause negative information-transfers. Therefore
information-transfers will be negative (positive), depending on whether the peer is a rival (non-rival)
firm announcing good or bad news. For instance, a positive revenue forecast made by a particular firm
may convey good news to its peers (i.e. positive information-transfer) if it is indicative of a better
outlook for the industry, or may convey bad news (i.e. negative information-transfer) if an increase in
the firm’s future revenue means that its peers lost market share (Kim et al., 2008).
Lower levels of disclosure by firms in IDD adopting states means that capital-market participants
have less information to evaluate the industry as a whole. Therefore, we expect firms in non-IDD
states to voluntary disclose (i.e. customer identity) more after IDD adoption, to compensate for
the loss of positive information-transfers. Skeptical investors might also interpret lower levels of
disclosure by firms in IDD adopting states as firms withholding bad news. In which case, we also expect
firms to voluntary disclose more to counteract potential negative information-transfers. Alternatively,
managers of peer firms in non-IDD states may not disclose their private information if they are
uncertain about investors’ response to disclosed information (Dye, 1998; Dutta and Trueman, 2002;
Suijs, 2007). Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether firms in non-IDD states respond to less
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voluntary disclosure of peers in IDD adopting states.
We test our predictions using a large sample of US publicly-listed firms over the period 1994-
2010. In our main research design we employ a difference-in-differences (DID) approach, based on
the staggered adoption of IDD across U.S. states as plausible exogenous shock to proprietary costs
of disclosure (Klasa et al., 2018; Li et al., 2018). We include year, state, and firm fixed-effects to
control for economic trends, and time-invariant unobservable state and firm characteristics. Following
Li et al. (2018), we proxy voluntary disclosure by firms disclosure choice of customer identity, and
we measure it as the proportion of unidentified customers in Compustat Segment Files. We follow
Desir (2012) in additional analysis and focus on whether the firms in IDD adopting states are industry
leaders to maximize the power of our tests. Following Bloomfield (2018), we use different proxies of
product-market competition, in an attempt to capture the different sources of competition. Our first
measure is based on Kedia (2006) who classifies firms as facing strategic complement (substitutes)
interactions when the slope of the firm’s reaction function is positive (negative). The second measure
captures the importance of capacity constraints in competition (Maggi, 1996). Firms in industries
with more production flexibility (i.e. less capacity constraints) are more likely to engage in a Bertrand
type of competition, while firms with less production flexibility (i.e. more capacity constraints) are
more likely to engage in a Cournot type of competition. The third measure captures firms efforts to
differentiate their products from their competitors.
Our results indicate that firms headquartered in non-IDD states, whose closest peer is a firm head-
quartered in IDD adopting states, respond to IDD adoption disclosing more information on customer
identity. Moreover, the response is stronger, in magnitude and significance, when they the closest
peer is an industry leader. We also, find results indicating that peer firms’ reaction to IDD adop-
tion is larger for firms facing strategic complement interactions, and for firms in industries with low
production flexibility.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature and sets our
main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 discusses the sample and main
results. Finally, section 5 offers the summary and conclusions of our study.
3.2 Prior Literature on Peer Effects and Main Prediction
Prior work shows that firm’s disclosure decisions affects peer firms, both in terms of their stock prices
and their disclosure choices. As noted in Matsumoto and Shaikh (2017), there are two main literatures
on this issue. The first one is the information transfer literature, which shows that the release of firm
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information, such as earnings and management earnings forecasts affects related firms’ stock prices
(Foster, 1981; Han et al., 1989). This literature builds on the idea that peer firms are subject to
similar economic forces, such as macro-economic shocks, or common demand/supply shocks. This
means that the cash flows of peer firms are correlated, and therefore, disclosures from one firm provide
information on the other firm’s cash flows. More recently, a number of studies document that stock
price reactions may respond not to a numerator (cash flow) effect, but rather, to a denominator effect,
i.e., to information risk (e.g., Shroff et al. (2017)).
The second literature on this topic focuses on how peer firms disclosure decisions affects the dis-
closure choices of related firms. This literature presents mixed views and findings, and suggests that
the effect of firm disclosures on its peers can be both complementary: where the disclosure decision of
one firm encourages related firms’ disclosure decisions (e.g., Tse and Tucker (2009)) and substitutive:
where increases (decreases) in disclosure of one firm lower (increase) the disclosure of its peers (e.g.,
Baginski and Hinson (2016); Breuer et al. (2018)).
We attempt to disentangle the mixed findings in prior literature by identifying a source of exoge-
nous variation in firm information disclosure and studying the effects of competition on disclosure.
Following Kim et al. (2008), we expect that disclosure effects will depend on the source of compe-
tition, that is, whether the competition comes from market size, product similarities, or entry costs
(Lang and Sul, 2014). According to the information-transfer literature, in concentrated industries,
each firm’s disclosure provides more information about the industry as a whole (Ali et al., 2014).
For example, Desir (2012) argue that, in more concentrated industries, non-announcing firms disclose
more good news following peers’ good news (‘mee-too’ story), while in less concentrated industries,
non-announcing firms disclose more good news following peers’ bad news. Kim et al. (2008) argue
that industry commonalities trigger positive information-transfers, whereas competitive shifts cause
negative information-transfers. Therefore, we expect that information-transfers depend on whether
the peer is a rival (non-rival) firm announcing good or bad news.
Lower levels of disclosure by firms means that capital-market participants have less information
to evaluate the industry as a whole. Therefore, we expect non-rival firms to voluntary disclose more
(i.e. customer information) after related firms stop disclosing information, to compensate for the loss
of positive information-transfers. Skeptical investors might also interpret lower levels of disclosure as
firms withholding bad news. In which case, we also expect non-rival firms to voluntary disclose more
to counteract potential negative information-transfers. On the contrary, since bad news from rivals
imply potential positive information-transfers from their peers (i.e., there is no need to counteract
negative information-transfers), and given that disclosure is costly, we expect rival firms to engage
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in less voluntary disclosure after the negative change in disclosure by the related firm. Alternatively,
managers of peer firms (both rival and non-rivals) may not disclose their private information if they are
uncertain about investors’ response to disclosed information (Dye, 1998; Dutta and Trueman, 2002;
Suijs, 2007).
Accordingly, our hypothesis can be summarized as follows:
H1: Exogenous decreases in firm proprietary information affects peer firms information
environment. Peer firms response is contingent on competition.
3.3 Research Design
To test our predictions, we estimate the following difference-in-differences (DiD) model:
Yi,t = β0 + β1 ∗ PEERi,t + γ ∗ CONTROLSi,s,t−1 + µi + ηs + θt + i,s,t (3.1)
Where:
i = firm,
s = state of firm′s headquarters,
t = year.
The dependent variable in model (1) is a proxy for the voluntary disclosure of customer information.
Our main proxies capture firms disclosure choices regarding customer identity, an important aspect
of this is that customer identity exists. In this sense non-disclosure reflects a managerial choice, and
not the absence of information to disclose. Following Li et al. (2018) we measure customer identity
disclosure using two proxies. The first proxy, RATIO 1, is the percentage of unidentified customers.
The second proxy, RATIO 2, is the sales-weighted percentage of unidentified customers. Then our
dependent variable is either: R1 = ln(1 + RATIO 1), or R2 = ln(1 + RATIO 2), note that higher
values of R1 and R2 indicate less disclosure of customer information. Regulation S-K demands firms
to disclose the amount of sales to an identity of any major customer (i.e. comprise more than 10% of
firm consolidated sales revenues) if losing the customer would have a material negative effect on the
firm. However, disclosure of costumer information is generally voluntary in the sense that many firms
report the existence but not the name of major customers (Ellis et al., 2012).4
4Following Li et al. (2018), we require firms to have at least one customer that represent 10% (or more) of firm’s
annual total sales.
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Our main independent variable, PEER, captures how firms react to an exogenous decrease of
available information from firms in the same industry. We follow prior literature and exploit the
staggered adoption of inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) by U.S. state courts as a plausible exogenous
shock to the proprietary costs of disclosure (Klasa et al., 2018; Li et al., 2018). In those states where
IDD is adopted the employer can prevent a current or former employee to work for another company,
if the employer can prove that the employee will inevitably disclose trade secrets to his new employer.
Thus, IDD adoption prevents rival firms to obtain confidential information through “employees job
switching” increasing proprietary costs of disclosure (i.e. the marginal value of disclosure to its rivals
is higher). In addition, to be protected by IDD firm’s trade secrets should not be available from
other public sources (i.e. firms should not disclose their proprietary information).5 Li et al. (2018)
shows that IDD adoption decreases significantly the amount of customers’ identity disclosure. The
more disclosure on customers information of a particular firm, the better capital-market participants
can evaluate firm’s revenues, trading relationships, productive capacity, and also industry revenues
(Ellis et al., 2012). Therefore, IDD adoption will affect the information environment of peer firms in
non-IDD adopting states.
We follow Klasa et al. (2018) to identify IDD-adopting states and the year of adoption/rejection,
and define PEER as a indicator variable that takes value one for firms headquartered in non-IDD
states whose closest peer is a firm headquartered in a state adopting IDD in year t. To identify the
closest peer of each firm we follow Hoberg and Phillips (2010) ‘Text Network Industry Classification’
(TNIC), and define the closest peer of a given firm as the firm with higher similarity in the 10-K
business description based on the TNIC score devloped by Hoberg and Phillips (2010).6
Following prior literature, we introduce several controls in model (1), to capture potential deter-
minants of voluntary disclosure. Following Li et al. (2018) we control for a firm’s proprietary costs
of disclosure including R&D (RD EXP ) and advertising expenditures (AD EXP ) relative to sales,
and the proportion of intangible assets (INTAN). We also include an indicator variable taking value
one when R&D expenditure is missing (MISS RD), as in Li et al. (2018). To control for the effect
of competition on disclosure we include Fama-French 48 industry concentration ratio (HHI). We
further include firm size (SIZE), because large firms tend to disclose more (Lang and Lundholm,
1993; Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Baginski and Hassell, 1997). We also control for whether the firm is
5This identification strategy requires firms to be aware of the IDD-related cases that set a precedent on their head-
quarters states. Li et al. (2018) argue that it is reasonable to consider this as valid assumption for two reasons. First,
firms are expected to monitor trade secrets laws because the protection of trade secrets is key for maintaining firms’
competitive advantages. Second, firms legal counsels are likely to be aware of IDD precedent-setting cases discussed in
legal journals, and pervasive media coverage of prominent cases likely increases market awareness on IDD-related cases.
6See Hoberg and Phillips (2016) for details on TNIC score construction. Data on TNIC score is available at:
http://hobergphillips.usc.edu/industryclass.htm
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audited by a big 4 auditor (BIG4), the composition of the board of directors (BOARD), and the pro-
portion of institutional ownership (INST ) to capture the effects of corporate governance on voluntary
disclosure (Hirst et al., 2008). We include the number of analyst following (AF ) to account for the
potential demand for voluntary disclosure analyst following (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Healy and Palepu,
2001; Hirst et al., 2008). To capture capital market incentives for voluntary disclosure we include
controls for whether the firm announces M&A deals (MA) or seasoned equity offerings (SEO) during
the year succeeding the year of disclosure. Finally, following Li et al. (2018), to control for economic
conditions at the state level we include state real GDP growth rate (∆GDP ) and state unemployment
rate (U RATE). See Appendix B for variable definitions.
We include a set of fixed-effects in model (1). First, µi is the firm fixed-effect, which captures time-
invariant unobservable committed firm characteristics that might be associated with firm voluntary
disclosure. Second, ηs is the state fixed-effects, that allows us to account for time-invariant across
state differences in disclosure, and change in headquarters location. Finally, we have year fixed-effects,
θt, to control for time trends or economic shocks that might affect all firms in the sample (e.g. Reg
FD). Standard errors are clustered at the state level to address potential autocorrelation concerns.
Coefficient β1 in model (1) captures how peer firms in non-IDD adopting states respond to lower
levels of disclosure due to IDD adoption. A negative (positive) β1 would indicate an increase (decrease)
in the disclosure of customer information. Klasa et al. (2018) identify 21 states that adopt IDD during
the period 1919-2011.7 To the extent that less disclosure from industry leaders might send a stronger
signal to the capital-markets (e.g. reflect industry trends), we expect information-transfers and peer
firm’s response to be larger. To test whether firm’s reaction is stronger when the closest peer is
an industry leader headquartered in an IDD adopting state, we consider the interaction PEER ∗
LEADER in model (1). Where LEADER is an indicator variable that takes value one if the closest
peeri is an industry leader in year t. We consider a firm as an industry leader, in year t, if its market
value is among the top decile of the industry in that year, where industry is defined using Fama-French
48 industry classification.
3.3.1 Type of Competition
We explore potential cross-sectional variation on peer’s response to IDD adoption. Prior literature
suggests that information-transfers might differ depending on the type of product-market competition
(Kim et al., 2008; Desir, 2012). We follow Bloomfield (2018), and use several proxies in an attempt to
capture different sources of product-market competition. Our first measure is based on Kedia (2006)
7See Appendix A for details on IDD adopting states dates.
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who classifies firms as facing strategic complement (substitutes) interactions when the slope of the
firm’s reaction function is positive (negative). To obtain the sign of the firm’s reaction function we
estimate the following model for each industry-quarter:
∆
∆pii,t
∆xi,t
= β1xi,t∆xi,t + β2∆xi,t + β3xj,t∆xi,t + β4∆xj,t (3.2)
Where:
i = firm,
j = firm i′s rivals (defined at the Fama-French 48 Industry level),
pi = quarterly profits,
x = quarterly revenues.
The estimator of the sign of the strategic interaction is given by βˆ3xj,t + βˆ4. The intuition of this
measure is as follows, the left-hand side captures the returns to strategic actions, then βˆ3xj,t + βˆ4
reflect how the returns to strategic actions change as a consequence of firm i’s rivals strategic actions
(xj,t). We follow Bloomfield (2018), and aggregate βˆ3xj,t + βˆ4 over all firm-years in a an industry
to obtain an industry-level measure of strategic interactions. If the industry median sign is positive
(negative) we consider strategic actions as complements (substitutes).8
The second measure captures the importance of capacity constraints in competition (Maggi, 1996;
Bloomfield, 2018). Firms in industries with more production flexibility (i.e. less capacity constraints)
are more likely to engage in a Bertrand type of competition, while firms with less production flexibility
(i.e. more capacity constraints) are more likely to engage in a Cournot type of competition. Following
Bloomfield (2018) we calculate the average ratio of property plant and equipment to total assets by
industry year, using the Fama-French 48 industry classification, and define industries as having high
(low) production flexibility if the average ratio is below (above) the median.
The third measure captures firms efforts to differentiate their products from their competitors.
Following Bloomfield (2018) we calculate the average R&D and advertising expenditures by industry
year, using the Fama-French 48 industry classification, and define industries as having high (low)
product differentiation if the average is below (above) the median.
8The underlying assumptions for this measure to be an unbiased measure of competition are (1) that demand is linear,
and (2) marginal costs are flat. See Kedia (2006) for more details on this measure.
113
3. Firms Reaction to Peers Non-Disclosure
3.4 Sample and Results
Our sample includes all firm-year observations during the period 1994-2010. Following Li et al. (2017)
we use Bill McDonald 10-K Headers Database to obtain information regarding the historical location
of each firm headquarters.9 We exclude all firms headquartered outside the U.S. and firms that might
be subject to specific institutional and regulatory constraints (SIC 60-69). Finally, we exclude all
firm-year observations of firms in IDD adopting sates, and after imposing all data requirements, our
final sample includes 10,814 firm-year observations over the period 1994-2010.
Table 1 panel A presents the description of the sample selection process. Panel B of table 1 presents
the sample distribution by state, the number of firm-year observations in our final sample is balanced
among the number of observations of firms headquartered in IDD and non-IDD adopting sates. Table
1 panel C, suggests that there is enough variation in the IDD adoption at the state-level in our sample
period. Figure 1 shows states adopting/rejecting IDD during our sample period. Appendix A presents
variables definitions and panel D of table 1 reports the descriptive statistics on the variables used in
estimating model (1).
3.4.1 Peers response to IDD adoption
Table 2 present the results for the estimation of model (1). The coefficient on PEER in column (1),
β1, is negative and only statistically significant at the 10% level for a one tailed test. In terms of the
economic magnitude, β1 = −0.009, implies that firms in non-IDD states are 3.08% less likely to conceal
customer information after the adoption of IDD in the state where its closest peer is headquartered.
The coefficient on PEER in column (3) is not statistically significant different from zero.
In columns (2) and (4), we consider the effects of IDD adoption when the closest peer is an industry
leader. The coefficient on the interaction term, PEER ∗ LEADER, is negative and statistically
significant at the 1% level in column 2. Firms in non-IDD states whose closest peer is an industry
leaders in an IDD adopting state, are are 11.29% less likely to conceal customer information relative
to non-IDD firms whose closest peer is not an industry leader. If we consider R2 as the dependent
variable (column 4), β3 remains negative and statistically significant different from zero at the 5%
level.
These results suggests that firms headquartered in non-IDD states whose closest peer is headquar-
tered in an IDD adopting states, respond to IDD adoption disclosing more information on customer
identity when when its closest peer is an industry leader. This is consistent with the argument that
910-K Headers Database is available at https://www3.nd.edu/mcdonald/10-K Headers/10-K Headers.html
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managers might take actions (i.e. voluntary disclosure) to mitigate the effects of negative information-
transfers (Desir, 2012).
3.4.2 Product Market Competition
Our motivation in this section is to determine whether product market competition affects non-IDD
peer firms response to IDD adoption. First, we partition our sample using Kedia (2006) measure of
strategic interactions. Table 3 column (1), presents the results of estimating model (1) for firms in
industries facing strategic substitute interactions from rival firms, while column (2) presents the results
for firms facing strategic complement interactions. In both cases the coefficient on PEER∗LEADER
is negative, but is only statistically significant for firms in industries facing strategic complement
interactions.
Next, columns (3) and (4) of table 3 presents the results of estimating model (1) partitioning
our sample among firms with high and low production flexibility. We find evidence of stronger peer
response to IDD adoption for firms in industries with low product flexibility. The coefficient on PEER
in column (4) is is negative and statistically significant at the 5%. In terms of the economic significance,
β1 = −0.015, implies that firms in non-IDD states whose closest peer is headquartered in an IDD state
are 6.5% less likely to conceal customers identity, the magnitude increases in 23.33% if the closest peer
is an industry leader (β3 = −0.055).
Finally, we examine the effect of product differentiation on peer firms response to IDD adoption.
Results on columns (5) and (6) suggests that there is no statistically meaningful effect of product
market differentiation on peers response to IDD adoption.
Overall, results presented in table 3 suggest that product market competition, proxied by strategic
interactions and production flexibility plays an important role on peer firms response to IDD adoption.
3.5 Management Forecasts
Our purpose in this section is to analyze whether firms respond to negative information-transfers
using other types of disclosure. Managers’ decision to voluntary disclose information will involve a
cost-benefit analysis Healy and Palepu (2001); Hirst et al. (2008), in this sense is likely that managers
will choose the least costly venue to voluntary disclose their private information in response to negative
information-transfers.
In this section we focus on management forecasts. Relative to the proxy used in our main analysis
(i.e. disclosure of customer indentity), management forecasts can be considered as non-proprietary
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disclosure (Ellis et al., 2012). In particular we focus in annual forecasts of sales and earnings per
share(EPS). We use I/B/E/S guidance database to identify those firms issuing good news sales and
EPS management forecasts for the next fiscal year. We consider a forecast to be good news when its
value is higher that the most recent analyst consensus forecast.
Table 4 present the results for the estimation of model (1) when the dependent variable is a good
news management forecasts. The results for good news sales forecasts (column 1) indicate that firms
respond to IDD adoption in the states where its closest peer is headquartered issuing more good news
sales forecasts. In terms of the economic magnitude, β1 = 0.015, implies that firms in non-IDD states
are30.7% more likely to issue good news sales forecasts after the adoption of IDD in the state where
its closest peer is headquartered. Results in column (2) suggest that leadership status of the closest
peer do not play any role in firms response to IDD adoption. Finally, results in columns (3) and
(4) indicate that firms do not issue more good news management forecasts in response to negative
information transfers.
3.6 Summary and Conclusion
We study how firms respond to lower levels of disclosure from peers. Firms might respond to lower
levels of disclosure from rivals to mitigate potential negative information-transfers. We exploit the
staggered adoption of IDD as an exogenous shock to the information environment of peer firms in
non-IDD states. Preliminary results indicate that peer firms in non-IDD states are less likely to
conceal customer identity after IDD adoption. These results are stronger when industry leaders are
headquartered in IDD adopting states. Our results are robust to excluding states that have no variation
in IDD adoption during our sample period, and to excluding peers in non-neighbor states to control for
potential local economic conditions confounding. We also find that the results are stronger for firms
that face strategic substitute interactions from rivals and for firms in industries with higher product
market differentiation.
We contribute to the literature on information-transfers and disclosure by showing how firms
respond to lower levels of disclosure from rivals by increasing their own disclosure to counteract
potential negative information-transfers. Additionally, we show how peer firms’ response depend on
product market competition.
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Appendix A - IDD Adoption
Klasa et al. (2018) identify the main legal cases addressing IDD in each state, and based on the court
rulings identify the precedent-setting cases adopting IDD as the first case in which, (a) court ruling
recognizes the IDD can be used to prevent a former employee of the firm form working at a competing
firm, and (b) court ruling on the use of the IDD is not justified by referring to a previous case in the
same state that adopt the IDD. For the precedent-setting cases rejecting IDD identification, Klasa
et al. (2018) focus on legal cases that revert prior courts’ adoption of the IDD, where the case decision
is the first one to reject the IDD in the state. Klasa et al. (2018) argue that state courts will consider
preceding-setting cases as ‘case law’, and therefore follow its ruling in the future. Table A.1 details
the 21 sates and dates of IDD adoption identified by Klasa et al. (2018). See table 1 in Klasa et al.
(2018) for a list of IDD precedent-setting cases.
Table A.1: States Adopting/Rejecting the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
Abbreviation State Adoption Date Rejection Date
AR Arkansas 3/18/1997 -
CT Connecticut 2/28/1996 -
DE Delaware 5/5/1964 -
FL Florida 7/11/1960 5/21/2001
GA Georgia 6/29/1998 -
IA Iowa 4/1/1996 -
IL Illinois 2/9/1989 -
IN Indiana 7/12/1995 -
KS Kansas 2/2/2006 -
MA Massachusetts 10/13/1994 -
MI Michigan 2/17/1966 4/30/2002
MO Missouri 11/2/2000 -
MN Minnesota 10/10/1986 -
NC North Carolina 6/17/1976 -
NJ New Jersey 4/27/1987 -
NY New York 12/5/1919 -
OH Ohio 9/29/2000 -
PA Pennsylvania 1/19/1982 -
TX Texas 5/28/1993 4/3/2003
UT Utah 1/30/1998 -
WA Washington 12/301997 -
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Figure 1: States Adopting/Rejecting the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
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Table 1
Panel A: Sample Selection
Sample: Customers Identity Disclosure Observations
McDonald’s headquarters data (1994 to 2010) 161,561
- Observations without customer, financial & controls data (123,604)
- Financial Firms (2,171)
- Firms without at least one customer representing 10% or more of their sales (7,441)
- Firms in IDD adopting states (17,531)
Final Sample 10,814
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Table 1
Panel B: Firm-Year Observations by State
State IDD=0 IDD=1 Total
AK 16 0 16
AL 131 0 131
AR 23 103 126
AZ 468 0 468
CA 7,144 0 7,144
CO 1,207 0 1,207
CT 69 661 730
DC 15 0 15
DE 0 71 71
FL 838 687 1,525
GA 216 613 829
HI 49 0 49
IA 12 88 100
ID 103 0 103
IL 0 1,057 1,057
IN 27 301 328
KS 109 40 149
KY 148 0 148
LA 235 0 235
MA 27 2,057 2,084
MD 564 0 564
ME 19 0 19
MI 326 458 784
MN 0 1,108 1,108
MO 126 289 415
MS 88 0 88
MT 60 0 60
NC 0 654 654
ND 13 0 13
NE 107 0 107
NH 155 0 155
NJ 0 1,894 1,894
NM 57 0 57
NV 210 0 210
NY 0 2,826 2,826
OH 390 557 947
OK 398 0 398
OR 401 0 401
PA 0 1,337 1,337
RI 123 0 123
SC 135 0 135
SD 22 0 22
TN 359 0 359
TX 1,548 1,938 3,486
UT 90 319 409
VA 638 0 638
VT 40 0 40
WA 76 473 549
WI 449 0 449
WV 35 0 35
WY 11 0 11
Total 17,277 17,531 34,808
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Table 1
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. 1% Q1 Median Q3 99%
RATIO 1 0.413 0.429 0.000 0.000 0.321 1.000 1.000
RATIO 2 0.419 0.452 0.000 0.000 0.183 1.000 1.000
PEER 0.167 0.373 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
MISS RD 0.367 0.482 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
RD EXP 0.195 0.605 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.155 3.319
INTAN 0.096 0.146 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.141 0.595
AD EXP 0.007 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.112
HHI 0.062 0.042 0.026 0.033 0.048 0.070 0.201
SIZE 4.630 2.001 -0.057 3.220 4.645 6.056 8.897
BIG4 0.622 0.485 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
MAt+1 0.069 0.253 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
SEOt+1 0.036 0.187 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
∆GDP 1.768 2.803 -5.400 0.300 2.400 3.600 7.200
U RATE 6.025 2.182 2.700 4.700 5.700 6.800 12.100
BOARD 0.380 0.453 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
INST 0.309 0.311 0.000 0.003 0.212 0.563 0.979
AF 1.058 1.039 0.000 0.000 1.099 1.946 3.178
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Table 2
IDD and Disclosure of Customer Information of Peers in Non-IDD States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R1 R1 R2 R2
PEER -0.009† -0.007 0.003 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
LEADER - 0.005 - 0.002
- (0.014) - (0.011)
PEER ∗ LEADER - -0.033*** - -0.028**
- (0.012) - (0.012)
MISS RDt−1 0.029* 0.028* 0.033* 0.033*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
RD EXPt−1 0.010 0.010 0.013 0.013
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
INTANt−1 0.026 0.026 0.023 0.024
(0.023) (0.023) (0.047) (0.047)
AD EXPt−1 0.220 0.224 0.103 0.107
(0.144) (0.145) (0.123) (0.123)
HHIt−1 0.107 0.107 0.039 0.039
(0.281) (0.281) (0.302) (0.302)
SIZEt−1 -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
BIG4t−1 -0.010 -0.010 -0.004 -0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
BOARDt−1 -0.011 -0.011 -0.009 -0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
INSTt−1 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
AFt−1 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
MAt+1 -0.009 -0.009 -0.000 -0.000
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
SEOt+1 0.020** 0.021** 0.012 0.012
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
∆GDPt -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
U RATEt 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 10,814 10,814 10,814 10,814
Number of Firms 2,675 2,675 2,675 2,675
State F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster S.E. State State State State
Adj R2 0.748 0.748 0.740 0.739
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † p<0.1 (for one tail test)
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Table 3
Disclosure of Customer Information of Peers in Non-IDD States and Product Market
Competition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Strategic Prod. Flex. Prod. Diff.
Variable: R1 Subs. Comp. High Low High Low
PEER -0.012 -0.004 0.001 -0.015** -0.012 0.011
(0.013) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.018)
LEADER 0.013 0.001 0.003 -0.006 -0.012 0.077***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.009) (0.027)
PEER ∗ LEADER -0.001 -0.049** 0.003 -0.055** -0.024 -0.066
(0.039) (0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.018) (0.043)
MISS RDt−1 0.041 0.020 -0.007 0.046* 0.040** -0.026
(0.031) (0.016) (0.022) (0.024) (0.015) (0.031)
RD EXPt−1 -0.022 0.014 -0.002 0.011 0.012 -0.004
(0.035) (0.008) (0.005) (0.011) (0.010) (0.003)
INTANt−1 0.073 0.006 0.090* -0.027 0.021 0.017
(0.056) (0.023) (0.052) (0.042) (0.034) (0.070)
AD EXPt−1 0.685** 0.137 -0.113 0.475** 0.219 0.276
(0.320) (0.136) (0.314) (0.232) (0.187) (0.340)
HHIt−1 0.217 -0.290 0.130 0.307 0.939*** -0.875
(0.325) (0.411) (0.437) (0.301) (0.326) (0.524)
SIZEt−1 -0.041*** -0.008 -0.030*** 0.007 -0.015*** -0.017
(0.014) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.018)
BIG4t−1 0.013 -0.022*** -0.011 -0.018 -0.015 -0.008
(0.019) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.021)
BOARDt−1 0.025 -0.029*** -0.009 -0.014 -0.012 -0.025
(0.022) (0.010) (0.012) (0.023) (0.010) (0.024)
INSTt−1 0.006 0.007 0.023 -0.013 0.003 -0.038
(0.027) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.019) (0.047)
AFt−1 0.023* 0.018** 0.027*** -0.002 0.016*** 0.039**
(0.012) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.017)
MAt+1 -0.013 -0.005 -0.008 -0.013 -0.010 -0.002
(0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.009) (0.016) (0.014)
SEOt+1 0.055* 0.010 0.019 0.024 0.019 0.020
(0.032) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011) (0.027)
∆GDPt -0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
U RATEt 0.006 -0.001 0.007 -0.011* 0.002 -0.008
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009)
Observations 3,517 7,297 6,620 4,194 8,007 2,807
Number of Firms 836 1,840 1,636 1,263 2,067 899
State F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster S.E. State State State State State State
Adj R2 0.768 0.781 0.700 0.651 0.651 0.760
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4
Good News Management Forecasts of Peers in Non-IDD States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sales Forecasts Sales Forecasts EPS Forecast EPS Forecast
PEER 0.015*** 0.014** -0.004 -0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
LEADER - 0.008 - -0.002
- (0.018) - (0.007)
PEER ∗ LEADER - -0.000 - 0.037
- (0.034) - (0.041)
MISS RDt−1 -0.019 -0.019 0.004 0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
RD EXPt−1 -0.007 -0.007 -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002)
INTANt−1 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.062*** 0.061***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013)
AD EXPt−1 -0.153 -0.156 -0.197*** -0.202***
(0.142) (0.143) (0.069) (0.070)
HHIt−1 -0.189 -0.187 0.206 0.206
(0.193) (0.193) (0.235) (0.235)
SIZEt−1 0.009** 0.009** 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
BIG4t−1 0.014** 0.014** 0.005 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
BOARDt−1 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.021 0.021
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
INSTt−1 0.028 0.027 0.023 0.023
(0.026) (0.027) (0.016) (0.016)
AFt−1 0.014 0.014 0.006 0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
MAt+1 -0.005 -0.005 0.011 0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
SEOt+1 -0.029** -0.029** -0.019** -0.020**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
∆GDPt -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
U RATEt -0.004 -0.004 -0.007** -0.007**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 10,814 10,814 10,814 10,814
Number of Firms 2,675 2,675 2,675 2,675
State F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster S.E. State State State State
Adj R2 0.121 0.121 0.0673 0.0677
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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